Bates College

SCARAB
Honors Theses

Capstone Projects

Spring 5-2016

Fragmented Citizenship in a Fragmented State:
Ideas, Institutions, and the Failure of
Reconstruction
Allen C. Sumrall
Bates College, asumrall@utexas.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://scarab.bates.edu/honorstheses
Recommended Citation
Sumrall, Allen C., "Fragmented Citizenship in a Fragmented State: Ideas, Institutions, and the Failure of Reconstruction" (2016).
Honors Theses. 162.
http://scarab.bates.edu/honorstheses/162

This Open Access is brought to you for free and open access by the Capstone Projects at SCARAB. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses
by an authorized administrator of SCARAB. For more information, please contact batesscarab@bates.edu.

Fragmented Citizenship in a Fragmented State:
Ideas, Institutions, and the Failure of Reconstruction

An Honors Thesis
Presented to
The Faculty of the Department of Politics, Bates College
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Bachelor of Arts

by
Allen Sumrall
Lewiston, Maine
March, 2016

!ii
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, I would like to extend deep thanks to my incredibly helpful advisor,
Stephen Engel. Not only did he read and critique chapter drafts on embarrassingly short notice, but
he instilled in me a desire to pursue this project in the first place. His enthusiastic and encouraging
teaching style that I experienced in many of his courses allowed me to see how my many interests
and disjointed observations could be linked together, both in this project and beyond. Without his
encouragement and assistance, I would not have started, let alone finished, this project.
Next, I need to thank Sonia Roth for first introducing me to constitutional law many years
ago. Had I not taken her class in high school, and had she not seen in me an affinity for law and
politics, I might have been completing an uninspired physics thesis now. Her interest in my
intellectual development helped catalyze my transformation from a lazy student into one who wanted
to learn.
And finally, of course, I need to thank my family. My parents never pushed me to work
harder, but somehow taught me that I should. They have also given up so much so that both my
brother and I could attend amazing schools. If they see this project as at all resultative of their
sacrifice, then I can count myself lucky. And of course, my brother, who showed me what hard work
looks like, and always told me I was being stupid at just the right times. Thanks, brother.

!iii
Abstract

In the United States, citizenship as a theory has been constantly subject to contestation
and disagreement. However, because recognition by a political institution is necessarily prior to
any more substantive notion of citizenship, the state plays a key role in the regulation and
definition of citizenship. Research in American Political Development (APD) suggests that
political institutions and ideas often conflict, and define state institutions as constantly in flux
and constantly developing (rather than in equilibrium) as different ideas and governing authority
vie for permanence and durability within the institutional structure. Scholars of APD have
pointed out that institutional structure allows for endogenous development as political
entrepreneurs and social movements exploit the frictions created by institutional misalignments.
Ideational development in the polity marks a shift in authority, but because the state is so
fragmented, old ideas never die. In light of these theoretical characterizations of the relationship
among institutions, ideas, and entrepreneurial actors, this thesis examines citizenship as an idea
during and after Reconstruction (1863-1876). This thesis suggests that the contestation over the
meaning and content of citizenship status between the Republican-led Congress, the president,
state governments, social movements like the KKK, and the judiciary that took place during
Reconstruction not only leads to an endogenous explanation for its failure, but also sheds light on
how the fragmented state leads to a fragmented and inevitably unsettled definition of U.S.
citizenship.
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Introduction
Rethinking Reconstruction’s Failure: Developmental Citizenship and Institutional Change

In July, 2014, I sat in the gallery of a courtroom in the Albuquerque courthouse of the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico and watched families being split apart. I sat
quietly as fathers who had crossed the border with Mexico illegally to be with their families were
ordered back to Mexico by a judge. The families sat near me in the gallery: a grandmother, weeping
quietly; a mother in resolute shock; the children largely unaware of the gravity of the situation. I
watched men brought before the judge in orange jumpsuits and chains speak in short sentences
through a translator, explaining to the judge they knew what they had done was wrong and that they
promised to not return illegally. They were not citizens, despite desperately wanting to be. They had
crossed the border to find work so they could bring money home to their families. Their children
were citizens, and the mothers were likely green-card holders. But here was a federal district judge,
an official of the American state, enforcing the boundaries of American citizenship, and telling these
men they were not within those boundaries. My curiosity about the interaction between the American
state and the meaning of citizenship in the United States had been piqued.

With the 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges1 the Supreme Court agreed that denying the
right to marry to same-sex couples was an unconstitutional act, thus granting gay couples a right
previously denied to them. Mary Bonuato began her oral argument on behalf of the petitioners in
Obergefell with rhetoric of how the denial of a right to a certain class of persons relegates them to an
inferior status: “If a legal commitment, responsibility and protection that is marriage is off limits to
gay people as a class, the stain of unworthiness that follows on individuals and families contravenes
the basic constitutional commitment to equal dignity.”2 Bonuato continued her argument by invoking
1

576 U.S. ____ (2015).

2

Obergefell v. Hodges 576 U.S. ___ (2015) Oral Argument Transcript. 14-556. April 28, 2015, 4.
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the Fourteenth Amendment: “Indeed, the abiding purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment is to
preclude relegating classes of persons to second-tier status.” 3 Bonuato’s invocation of one of the
Reconstruction Amendments in reference to tiers of persons in the United States raises more
questions about the nature of citizenship. Specifically, it opens the door to understanding how and
why the boundaries of citizenship in the United States can be contested by the state. We must ask
how the institutions of American governance have shaped the meaning of U.S. citizenship. How have
these institutions defined the meaning and content of that status?
Attempting to answer this question leads to an unusual realization. In his canonical work
Civic Ideals, Rogers Smith shows how citizenship has been defined differently throughout U.S.
history.4 He suggests that American political cultures is comprised of several, conflicting
understandings of citizenship that ebb and flow between each other. One definition of citizenship
becomes more popular for a period of time, only to be supplanted by another. Smith documents how
these multiple traditions of citizenship have fluctuated through U.S. history. Through his work, I
began to understand how and why these traditions — civic republican, liberal democratic, and
ascriptive — explained how the state might grant rights to make gay couples fuller citizens, but also
simultaneously deport men who had crossed the the border to find work. Smith’s work gave me an
opportunity to explore a more comprehensive account of how and why the state manipulates the
boundaries of citizenship.
Smith offers a compelling account of when and where different traditions of citizenship are
more dominant than others, but is less helpful at explaining why dominant traditions differ over time.
While the state could clearly hold different definitions of the content of citizenship at different times,
when I saw the judge’s decision to send home a man willing to work and earn a peaceful living for
his family, I saw a rejection of civic republican values and inclusionary liberal values. When I saw
the Supreme Court find bans on same-sex marriage unconstitutional a year later, I saw an
endorsement of a liberal democratic tradition of citizenship. Smith’s insight into multiple traditions

3
4

Ibid.

Rogers M. Smith. Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997).
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potentially lacks explanatory power for this comparison. I saw tension between state institutions on
deciding who was to be a citizen, and what being a citizen means. Luckily, Stephen Engel and others
have suggested one common link between these two situations where the state exerts its power to
define citizenship.5 Both called upon the fundamental prior concept of recognition. These accounts of
citizenship all take for granted the state’s ability to recognize a person as a citizen. Regardless of
what being a “citizen” means, a person cannot be a “citizen” without being recognized in the eyes of
the state. As historian of sexuality Margot Canaday has shown, throughout the early to mid-twentieth
century the state crafted policies that “crystallized homosexual identity, fostering a process by which
certain individuals began to think of their sexuality in political terms, as mediating and mediated by
their relationship to the state.”6 These policies were implemented to define who qualified as a citizen.
Understanding citizenship as constituted, developed, and shaped by the state’s recognition allowed
me to begin to investigate the relationship between state institutions and ideas about citizenship.
Researching the interactions between citizenship as a developmental idea and the state
requires an analytical lens that can account for institutional, ideational, and policy change over time.
American Political Development (APD), a subfield of political science, offers just such a lens. At
base, APD rejects the traditional assumption in political science that the normal condition of the
polity is a stable equilibrium. Politics is not, APD argues, a condition of “punctuated equilibrium,”
where political stasis is sometimes disrupted by a shock to the system, such as a war, economic crisis,
or famine, that forces political institutions to quickly readjust to address the shock, then reassume its
condition of stasis. Rather, scholars of APD have shown that political change is always happening.
Of course, shocks to the system do cause political institutions to change, but they are not the only
sources of change. The analytical tools that APD scholars have developed to analyze political change
provide a way to understand how citizenship can be defined by the state differently over time and
even at the same time by different state institutions.
5

Stephen Engel. "Developmental Perspectives on Lesbian and Gay Politics: Fragmented Citizenship in a
Fragmented State." Perspectives on Politics 13, no. 2 (2015): 287-311; Engel, Stephen. Fragmented Citizens:
Changing Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Lives. (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2016. Forthcoming. Manuscript on
file with Author).
6

Margot Canaday. The Straight State : Sexuality and Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America. (Politics and
Society in Twentieth-Century America. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2009), 10.
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In this thesis, I investigate Reconstruction to understand this developmental relationship
between state recognition of citizens and the changing meaning of citizenship. Mary Bonuato
suggested in her argument before the Supreme Court in Obergefell that the Fourteenth Amendment
plays a role in defining citizenship. Though at the beginning of my research it was not yet clear what
that role is, unpacking that amendment — the the text, the process of ratification, and subsequent
early challenges to its implementation — offered me a starting point. As political scientist Megan
Ming Francis has pointed out, Reconstruction is presumed by scholars to be one of the “major
periods in which the governing institutions of the United States were constructed and transformed.”7
This claim is no doubt true. Consequently, scholarship investigating Reconstruction abounds.
Nevertheless, more recent work on the period that employs a developmental lens has shed light on
the political forces at issue in Reconstruction. Political scientist Richard Valelly, for example, has
argued that Reconstruction has much in common with the civil rights movement in the 1960s.
Namely, he observed that a “sudden, large increase in rates of black voting and office-holding has
taken place twice over the course of American political evolution.”8 The United States is, in fact, the
only democracy in the world to enfranchise a group as large as its black population during
Reconstruction, and then subsequently disenfranchise them soon after. The title of Valelly’s book,
The Two Reconstructions: The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement, suggests first that there are two
periods in U.S. history where black enfranchisement has been a key issue. But it also reflects an ebband-flow of citizenship traditions.

Bridging the Gap Between Ideas and Institutions
Since Aristotle, voting has been understood to be an important element of citizenship. If
voting rights are granted to an identity group and then taken away, then citizenship as an idea in the
state has changed over time. In addition, it points out that citizenship development in the United
States is not teleological or whiggish — it does not proceed uniformly toward an ideal end goal.
7

Megan Ming Francis. Civil Rights and the Making of the Modern American State. (New York, NY: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 16.
8

Richard M. Valelly. The Two Reconstructions : The Struggle for Black Enfranchisement. (American Politics and
Political Economy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), 1.
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Rather, citizenship in the United States is, just as Smith points out, subject to contestation across time
and plagued by repeated invocations of ascriptive hierarchy. Reconstruction, a formative time for
citizenship in the United States, therefore proved ripe for investigating from a developmental
perspective. As Smith has argued, the multiple (three) traditions of citizenship in American political
culture are
visible not only in this complex, contested Reconstruction history, but also in the sharply
divergent ways in which it has since been viewed….A multiple traditions perspective
suggests instead that it was politically and intellectually reinvigorated white racism— and
attachments to ascriptive hierarchies more generally— that played the most decisive role in
stirring the largely successful opposition to these changes.9
Smith’s argument shows multiple definitions of citizenship in contest, but he is less helpful at
bridging the gap from ideas of citizenship to their institutional uptake.
Political scientist Brian Glenn explains how scholarship in the realm of American Political
Development has often fallen into two separate camps.10 The first is made up of scholarship known
as “historical institutionalism.” Scholars in this area study (1) “how actors make their way through
the institutional setting,” (2) “how institutions themselves change over time” and what mechanisms
cause those changes, and (3) “ the mechanisms of path dependency and positive (or negative)
feedback loops.”11 The second camp is composed of “ideational scholars.” These scholars have
reminded us that “ideas matter for members of the cultural school, especially ideas about the nature
of American identity, about ‘us’ and ‘them’ and about what ‘we’ the people owe each other versus
what we owe outsiders.”12 Unfortunately, according to Glenn, “members of the two schools have
learned little from one another.”13 APD scholarship rarely bridged the gap between them. This
tendency leaves unexplored the intersection between ideas and institutions. As a result, not only have
opportunities for analysis been overlooked, but current studies that exist solely in one camp or the
other very likely remain incomplete. Indeed, work that bridges the two schools is demanding because
9

Smith (1997), 346.

10

Brian Glenn. "The Two Schools of American Political Development." Political Studies Review 2 (2004): 153-65.

11

Ibid:153.

12

Ibid: 156.

13

Ibid: 161.
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the “researcher must not only effectively capture all of the institutional and ideational variables
involved, but also provide a convincing explanation of how they interact with one another.”14
However, this increased workload is not without its rewards. Bridging the ideational and institutional
divide results in scholarship that is more valuable and comprehensive.
Operating from the hypothesis that institutions tend to have a relationship to political ideas, I
attempt to bridge this gap. I argue that scholars cannot fully account for the development of the
American state without paying attention to debates over citizenship and how they have interacted
with institutional development. I trace the intersection of new political ideas about citizenship
proposed during Reconstruction with political institutions of federal and state governments to see
how they interact. This investigation has lead to a multi-pronged argument. My overarching
argument is this: in the United States, ideational conversation is not ended by institutional action. The
American state is a fragmented entity. Federalism and separation of powers abound by intentional
constitutional design. As a result, I argue, dissenting political ideas can find voice outside the
dominant institutional framework, like in social movements or state governments. In the United
States, citizenship as a theory has been constantly subject to contestation. Because recognition by a
political institution is necessarily prior to any more substantive notion of citizenship, the state plays a
key role in the regulation and definition of citizenship. However, research in American Political
Development suggests that political institutions and ideas often conflict, and define state institutions
as in flux and developing (rather than in equilibrium) as different ideas and governing authority vie
for permanence and durability. Scholars of APD have pointed out that fragmented institutional
structure allows for endogenous development as political entrepreneurs and social movements exploit
the frictions created by institutional misalignments. Orren and Skowronek argue that insofar as
political change is “accompanied by the accumulation and persistence of competing controls within
the institutions of government, the normal condition of the polity will be that of multiple,
incongruous authorities operating simultaneously.”15 Seeing this condition as a “normal” part of the

14
15

Ibid: 162.

Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek. The Search for American Political Development. (Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 108.
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polity allows for a more robust account of institutional change, because it can produce
“contradictions for agents, entrepreneurs, and leaders to exploit and alternative for them to
imagine.”16 Ideational development in the polity may mark a shift in authority, but because the state
is so fragmented, old ideas never die. During Reconstruction, the fragmented American polity offered
myriad institutional pathways for dissenting and older political ideas that prioritized state citizenship
to return and fight once more for dominance. Put another way, I argue that Rogers Smith’s multiple
traditions ebb and flow across time precisely because the institutional arrangement in the American
state allows for it.
This principle argument, however, has several constitutive elements. First, I suggest that this
frame of analysis reveals a hole in the literature on Reconstruction. Until now, scholars of
Reconstruction had attributed its failure to exogenous explanations— a new political climate
resulting in a partisan shift in Congress, or the Compromise of 1877. Of particular note is historian
Eric Foner’s explanation for Reconstruction’s failure, the economic crash of 1873. 17 I suggest here,
though, that the ideational contestation over citizenship during Reconstruction that shaped political
institutions reveals that these exogenous explanations are incomplete. Rather, this thesis points to an
endogenous explanation for Reconstruction’s failure. Reconstruction failed not only because
exogenous shocks altered political calculus or eliminated those politicians most supportive of
Reconstruction policy. Rather, the new ideals of national citizenship that Reconstruction embraced
were under strain from the start, strain that was created by the existing constitutional design itself.
This argument fits the insights of APD, which highlight endogenous factors for explaining
institutional change.
Second, the overarching argument sheds light on citizenship as an idea in the United States.
Ideational scholars have studied citizenship in the United States with the intent to discover what
being a citizen means. Does being a U.S. citizen mean the “right to have rights”? Does it mean the
right to vote? Does it call upon a notion of civic responsibility and active participation in the polity?

16
17

Ibid, 116.

Eric Foner. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. (Updated Edition ed. New York, NY:
Harper Collins, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1988).
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What of economic freedom and the right to own property? My analysis reveals that perhaps there is a
reason pinpointing the “true” content of U.S. citizenship has been hard to pin down. Namely, perhaps
there is an institutional reason. The fragmented nature of the state leads to constant ideational
contestation. As a direct result of this, citizenship as an institutionally-defined idea is subject to
change over time, so it is perpetually unsettled.

Overview of the Analysis
The chapters that follow examine how and why Republicans in the wake of the Civil War
sought to remake the definition of citizenship in the United States by implementing institutional
change. To the Republicans, the Civil War was at least in part a product of an ideational divide over
the proper definition of citizenship between the North and the South. In the United States, citizenship
is two-fold. “Content” or “meaning” of citizenship aside, each inhabitant of the United States owes
allegiance to two competing sovereigns— the state in which they reside, and the nation as a whole.
One is both a citizen and inhabitant of, say, Arkansas, Massachusetts, or Colorado, in addition to
being a citizen of the United States. The dispute over which should be prioritized was, in part, at
issue in the Civil War. In very general terms, Southern Democrats preferred state citizenship over
national citizenship. They believed states should be the primary protectors of the rights of its citizens.
On the other hand, Northern Republicans argued that this lexical ordering of citizenship— state
before national— was one of the causes of the slavery problem. They viewed their victory in the
Civil War to mean that their vision of the national government, not the states, as the primary
protector of the rights of its inhabitants — that national citizenship should be prioritized over state
citizenship — had won. Republicans wanted to give the national government the power to protect the
rights of its citizens from infringement by both private individuals and state government. I argue this
dispute over citizenship shaped the direction and ultimate failure of Reconstruction.
The first chapter explains in detail the theory behind the analysis. It examines the literature
that argues for certain conceptions of citizenship over others, as well as the literature that offers
several definitions of citizenship in the U.S. Building on the work of Shane Phelan, Judith Shklar,
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Margot Canaday, and Stephen Engel, it explains why it is important to understand citizenship in the
context of political institutions, which in turn necessarily define and shape it. Understanding
citizenship as recognition forces a reorientation towards questions about the state and institutions.
The chapter uses the scholarship of APD to argue that the state’s fractured and fragmented nature
allows for several important avenues of political change. Ideas, it is argued, can take hold and fight
for dominance because of the unique nature of the U.S. polity.
The second chapter investigates the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment by beginning with
a close reading of the ratification debates to determine the intended institutional affect on citizenship.
Arguably, the purpose motivating the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment “was not to create new
rights, but rather to incorporate into the Federal Constitution the fundamental rights that individuals
already possessed under general constitutional theory, but that the states had failed to enforce
adequately.”18 In other words, citizenship was just not the elaboration of rights, but was also realized
through the enforcement that came from recognition and regulation by governing authority.
Reconstruction marked a turning point in notions of state power: the federal government, not the
states, was now the “main protector of citizens’ rights,” and, as such, the federal government took on
new responsibilities to recognize citizens specifically and distinctly beyond the capacities of state
governments.19 Richard Aynes suggests that even those who have a narrow view of the purpose of the
Fourteenth Amendment must concede that it was designed to establish a distinct set of “privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United States.20 The Reconstruction Amendments, it seems, were
designed at least in part to affirm national citizenship over state citizenship.21 This chapter examines
the ideas behind the Republican vision for the country, and explains how it manifested itself in the
Reconstruction Amendments.
18

Stephen J. Heyman. "The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment." Duke
Law Journal 41, no. 3 (1991): 509.
19

Eric Foner. "The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction— And Vice-Versa." Columbia Law Review
112, no. 7 (2012):1587
20

Richard Aynes. "Constricting the Law of Freedom: Justice Miller, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the SlaughterHouse Cases." Chicago-Kent Law Review 70, no. 627 (1994): 628, citing Charles Fairman. What Makes a Great
Justice?: Mr. Justice Bradley and the Supreme Court, 1870-1892, 30 B.U. L. Rev. 49, 77 (1950): 77.
21

Smith (1997), 327-337.
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The third chapter investigates the institutional friction that occurs within the American
federal system: the disagreement that arises between state governments, popular understandings, and
the national government. State governments and popular sentiment had differing understandings of
the true content of U.S. citizenship from Congress. As a result of this institutional disagreement, the
Republicans in Congress operated from a point of weakness from the start, despite their numerical
majority. This contrasts sharply with their apparent hegemonic position that resulted in the passage of
the three Constitutional Amendments and multiple pieces of legislation from 1863 to 1875.
Republicans faced a constant siege from ideational dissenters who held on to antebellum ideas of
citizenship. The first challenge came during the passage of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. Despite their majority in Congress and victory in the Civil War, Republicans had to
employ dubious constitutional maneuvering to get the amendments passed. Specifically, they did not
count southern state representation to get the Thirteenth Amendment through Congress, but they did
account for southern states to pass the necessary three-fourths of the states threshold for ratification.
And with the Fourteenth Amendment, they turned Southern states into military districts for
ratification purposes to ensure it could pass the required state-ratification threshold.
The next challenge came from the executive branch in the form of President Andrew
Johnson. Johnson was not sympathetic to the Republican project of union and national citizenship.
He championed states’ rights and believed that the federal government should not be the primary
enforcer of civil rights. To eliminate this threat at achieving full institutionalization of their vision,
Republicans promptly impeached Johnson. The third threat was a two-pronged attack. It came
simultaneously from two more zones that dissenting political ideas can find voice in the institutional
framework: state governments and the people themselves via social movements or civil society
organizations. State governments resisted the Republican project by institutionalizing Black Codes
and election laws that limited the franchise of freedmen. The Ku Klux Klan, a southern social
movement, also held to dissenting ideas of citizenship and terrorized freedmen and Republicans
throughout the south. The Republicans responded to these threats by enacting three pieces of
legislation and one more constitutional amendment in the early 1870s: the Enforcement Act of 1870,
the Enforcement Act of 1871, the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, and the Fifteenth Amendment. Despite
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these vigorous attempts by Republicans to entrench their vision for national citizenship, there was
still, to use the words of Richard Valelly, “incomplete institutionalization.”22 This is exhibited by the
states to enact miscegenation laws that prohibited the “mixture” of white people of European descent
and blacks of African descent.23
Until 1873, the Republicans had been largely successful at quashing attacks from those with
dissenting ideas of citizenship. Chapter four discusses an attack they could not overcome. It came
from the Supreme Court in 1873 in the form of the Slaughterhouse Cases. 24 The Republicans had
taken action to ensure the federal judiciary would be on their side to help bolster their project and
further institutionally embed their vision. They had manipulated the federal circuit courts to enable
them to appoint more Republican judges, and to ensure most southern states would be in one circuit.
In addition, they then stripped the Supreme Court of habeas jurisdiction. Despite this active
manipulation, and the general approval and enforcement of national citizenship in the lower federal
courts during Reconstruction, the Supreme Court was still able to exploit their position and deal a
fatal blow to the Republican vision for national citizenship. That attack came in 1873 with the
Slaughterhouse Cases. Despite more expansive lower court rulings, a bare majority of the Supreme
Court “strained to read constitutional protections of citizenship and personal rights in appallingly
narrow ways.”25 The court used this case to pick up antebellum ideas of state citizenship and
ascriptive hierarchy and put them once again on the path to dominance. Justice Miller’s majority
opinion re-articulated many of the ideas that President Johnson, state governments, and indeed some
social movements had held. The Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873 “virtually scratched [the Privileges or
Immunities Clause] from the constitution.”26 Justice Miller declared in the opinion that the
Fourteenth Amendment had “not fundamentally altered traditional federalism; most of the rights of
22

Valelly (2004), 701-71.

23

Martha Hodes. “The Sexualization of Reconstruction Politics: White Women and Black Men in the South after the
Civil War.” Journal of the History of Sexuality 3, no. 3, Special Issue: African American Culture and Sexuality
(1993): 403.
24

83 U.S. 36 (1873).

25

Smith (1997), 330.

26

Ibid, 78. Internal quotations omitted.
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citizens remained under state control, and with these the Amendment had ‘nothing to do.’”27 Due to
the Supreme Court’s unique position in the polity, however, they could not be reigned in by the
Republicans. As a result of this case and the Court’s subsequent decisions of United States v.
Cruikshank28 and The Civil Rights Cases of 1883,29 the Republican project, and Reconstruction
generally, failed.

American Political Development and Endogenous Sources of Change
The field of American Political Development has produced several mechanisms for
explaining change over time. This project not only employs these mechanisms for examining
development of the American state during Reconstruction, but it also reaffirms their applicability as
explanatory mechanisms of the development of American politics. These concepts can be best
understood with reference to the language of “exogeneity” versus “endogeneity.” Again, APD as a
discipline is tasked, in part, with explaining institutional and ideational change the absence of an
external crisis or “exogeneous shock” to the political arrangement. Though many types of
endogenous change are at issue in the analysis that follows, I highlight four key mechanisms here.
These four mechanisms, “layering,” “critical junctures,” the “reassociation of ideas for antithetical
ends,” and “recalibration,” are especially relevant in this project, and they will be referenced
throughout in order to provide an evaluative scaffold form much of the political history discussed.
The first, “layering,” helps to explain why the Republican project was doomed from the start.
Layering involves “‘the grafting of new elements onto an otherwise stable institutional framework.
Such amendments . . . can alter the overall trajectory of an institution’s development.’’’30 Layering
one policy arrangement onto another can cause confusion, and the resulting frictions shift the path of

27

Eric Foner. Reconstruction: America's Unfinished Revolution, 1863-1877. Updated Edition ed. (New York, NY:
Harper Collins, Harper Perennial Modern Classics, 1988), 529.
28

92 U.S. 542 (1875).

29

109 U.S. 3 (1883).

30

Daniel Béland. “Ideas and Institutional Change in Social Security: Conversion, Layering, and Policy Drift.” Social
Science Quarterly 88, no. 1 (2007): 22, citing Kathleen Thelen. How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy of
Skills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 35.
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institutional development. Applying this notion to the Reconstruction context can help explain why
the Republican project failed. At the close of the Civil War, the Republicans established a new vision
for the country that involved “grafting” several new constitutional amendments and many grand
pieces of legislation onto the already-established institutional framework. This layering of policy
arrangements is reflected in Chapter 3. As the Republicans attempted to wrangle the country to adopt
their vision for citizenship, antebellum ideas that held sway previously did not, of course, just
disappear. These older ideas remained vital and challenged the new ideational move in the meaning
of citizenship precisely because it was layered on top of an existing set of institutional arrangements
that might not fully (or rather, in this case, did not) support this nationalist vision.
The second key concept, critical junctures, explains why the Supreme Court’s 1873 decision
in The Slaughterhouse Cases was so crucial. Megan Ming Francis’s recent book Civil Rights and the
Making of the Modern American State chronicles how the actions of civil rights organizations, in
particular the NAACP, altered the path of state building in political and constitutional development.31
Francis points out that scholars tend to mistake the key turning point in the 1960s civil rights
movement as the Supreme Court case Brown v. Board of Education in 1954.32 Rather, she argues that
Brown in fact was a product of an arduous litigation strategy by the NAACP. Francis suggests that
this litigation strategy resulted in an important turning point for the civil rights movement. This
turning point was the Supreme Court’s decision in Moore v. Dempsey.33 This case, she argues, would
never even have reached the Supreme Court had it not been for the NAACP’s “tremendous
organizational effort.”34 Moore was, then, a “critical juncture” in the development of the American
state. Critical junctures begin path-dependent processes. As such, Brown operated in the wake of
Moore. This same principle can be seen in Reconstruction. As is argued in Chapter 4, Slaughterhouse
was similarly a critical juncture. It was the turning point for the Republican vision, and the
subsequent cases United States v. Cruikshank and The Civil Rights Cases operated in its wake.
31
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The third concept, the purposive reassociation of ideas to achieve antithetical ends, plays on
an initially unintuitive idea about institutional and ideational development. Nevertheless, it explains
how Slaughterhouse reached the Supreme Court in the first place. As further explicated in Chapter 4,
the attorney for the plaintiff was an ex-Confederate official and was a staunch advocate of states’
rights. He was staunchly against Reconstruction and the Republican project. And yet, the argument
he put before the Supreme Court relied on an expansive reading of the Fourteenth Amendment. He
wanted to use the recently-ratified Fourteenth Amendment to protect the rights of white butchers in
Louisiana. Perhaps the Framers of the Amendment would have supported the theoretical reading of
the Amendment, but the fact that it was being used to protect white butchers from state regulation of
their trade may have seemed odd to them. This practice of harnessing an old idea for new purposes is
what Skowronek has referred to as “reassociation of ideas” which enables the achievement of ends
antithetical to the original idea.35 Framing the attorney’s argument in this way helps to reveal the
overlapping nature of political traditions in the United States, and understand the complexity of
institutional development.
Finally, this project reaffirms the key insight of APD, namely that achieving stable and
lasting political change is extremely difficult. Skowronek and Orren define political development as
“a durable shift in governing authority.”36 A “durable shift” is a political change that lasts— it is
“durable” because it is resilient to future attempts for change. Political scientist Stuart Chinn argues
that moments of reform or institutional change are often succeeded by “a recurrent and clearly
patterned process of ‘recalibration,’ where recently enacted reforms are recalibrated in light of the
continuing influence of preexisting institutions and rights.”37 If the study of APD is heavily focused
on “change over time,” what does it have to say when there is no change? Indeed, scholars of APD
have been so focused on change that the have overlooked the fundamental lack or difficulty of
change. Chinn points out that studies of politics change in American history “largely fail to provide
35
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any systematic treatment of the incongruities between intended reforms and postreform
conditions.”38 In the remainder of this project, I begin to investigate why key moments of
institutional change are followed by these moments of “recalibration” that often revert institutional
reforms to their old state. I suggest that it may be a feature of the institutional structure itself.
This thesis exposes a deep irony behind the Republican project of Reconstruction. Not only
that, it also explains why that irony was able to occur. Despite vigorous attempts by the Republicans
to enact institutional change and embed their vision for national citizenship in the polity, they still
failed. Even three constitutional amendments and numerous sweeping acts of legislation were not
enough to sustain their vision. This was possible because of the heavily fragmented nature of the U.S.
polity itself. In sum, this suggests that the contestation over the meaning and content of citizenship
status between political institutions that took place during Reconstruction not only leads to an
endogenous explanation for its failure, but also sheds light on how the fragmented state leads to a
fragmented and inevitably unsettled definition of U.S. citizenship.
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Chapter 1
Towards Developmental Citizenship: Institutional Structure and Citizenship as Recognition

A precise definition of what U.S. citizenship means has been actively debated over the course
of U.S. political history by legal scholars and political scientists. Why has defining this concept been
so difficult, and what role have governing institutions played in trying to give that concept coherent
and consistent meaning? It is often unclear what a citizen is, what being a citizen means, and who
gets to decide who is a citizen and who is not. Indeed, there are multiple examples in U.S. history
where people were considered citizens, and yet clearly were denied rights. For example, with the
passage of the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920, women, who had been largely disenfranchised, were
granted the right to vote, a right some scholars define as a “gateway” right to other rights. However,
prior to 1920, women were still considered citizens. That is to say women fell within the purview of
the state’s acknowledgment. They were entitled to state protection from outside invasion, and they
were allowed to reside within the borders of the area under control of the state. Similarly, after the
ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, black men were legally entitled to vote, but their
participation was (and continues to be) limited through the use of qualifying measures such as
grandfather clauses, poll taxes, literacy tests, and whites-only primaries. Although the Fifteenth
Amendment was ratified in 1870, poll taxes were not fully outlawed until 1966. 1As such, citizenship
cannot be reduced to a cluster of rights. Nevertheless, political scientists, political theorists, and legal
scholars have often defined citizenship in terms of responsibilities, rights, or recognition. These
definitions are sources of contention. Additionally, normative theorists are also at odds with
empiricists as the former conceptualized what the status should mean while empiricists attempt to
trace how its meanings have changed over time. The debate over the content of U.S. citizenship
rages, and this project aims to assess this debate with particular attention to how and why the lack of
conceptual lucidity persists in the U.S. over time.
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To answer the question of why citizenship remains an open concept, this thesis turns to an
examination of the constitutional structure, or the horizontal and vertical relations between governing
institutions in the U.S: separation of powers and federalism. How have these types of institutional
design influenced how and why the meaning of citizenship shifts over time and remains openly
contested? This chapter delves into the theory that might indicate how institutions influence ideas
such as citizenship, and the chapters to follow examine how different governing institutions –
Congress, state legislatures, state courts, and the federal judiciary – have shaped the meaning of
citizenship. The thesis concentrates its examination of how political institutions affect political ideas
on one period when the concept of citizenship was open for robust debate at all levels of governance,
namely the Reconstruction Era from about 1863 to 1876.
This thesis contends that the institutional design of the polity fosters perpetual ideational
contestation, i.e., debate over the idea of citizenship. Ideas may experience periods of durability,
during which debates about them might appear settled, but these periods are temporary because a
settled definition is impossible. While a new notion of national citizenship was entrenched in the
Constitution via the Fourteenth Amendment, was supported by the passage of Civil Rights Acts
during Reconstruction, and was the cornerstone of a newly ascendant Republican party, it was
challenged from the outset by an older states’ rights and anti-nationalist sentiment that the Civil War
hardly vanquished. Perhaps, as suggested in later chapters, the deepest irony is that the Republicans’
apparent successful implementation of a new notion of national citizenship is revealed, upon closer
inspection, to illustrate how weak their position actually was, and how durable older notions of
citizenship remained, always already available to challenge the Republican vision. And indeed the
difficulty faced by the Republicans flowed from the very institutions in which they were situated. In
other words, the institutional design of U.S. governance keeps alternative ideas alive and permits
them to be picked up, deployed, and developed by elected officials, judges, and the people
themselves. This project examines the case of citizenship in the context of these considerations to
explore why citizenship remains an open concept.
This chapter begins with an examination of the scholarly debate about the meanings and
content of citizenship. The analysis is limited to political theory and political development work that
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focuses on the United States, since the case history that this thesis examines is confined to the United
States. This chapter draws heavily on Rogers Smith’s examination of citizenship as a contested idea
that changes over time. It contends that definitions of citizenship that are grounded mostly or entirely
in either liberal rights or republican responsibilities fail to capture the breadth and depth of U.S.
citizenship. Rather, Smith’s multiple-traditions theory more accurately describes the overlapping and
often contradictory traditions that influence the meaning and content of citizenship. Smith’s analysis
supports the claim that citizenship is not a settled concept and is constantly subject to contestation.
Nevertheless, Smith is less helpful when considering why and how certain notions of
citizenship gain dominance at particular periods. Why does a conception of citizenship grounded in
liberal rights resonate at one moment while more limited notions of citizenship, where those limits
are often grounded in ascriptive notions of prejudice, ascend at other times? Under what
circumstances do these limited notions of citizenship that reify existing systems of racial and gender
discrimination, that often seem so durable, give way? While Smith offers a way to categorize and
trace the many different conceptions of U.S. citizenship over time, he does not offer a clear
explanation of why or how these multiple traditions persist or change over time. This project
responds to that gap via an analysis of institutional design: the fragmented nature of U.S. governance
– federalism and separation of powers – and the ways that system may empower distinct actors at the
state or federal level or across the federal branches goes some way to explain why one tradition may
become durable or may falter.
Once the limits of liberal and republican notions of citizenship are defined, the chapter
evaluates the notion that citizenship is better understood as a form of recognition. This definition of
citizenship-as-recognition captures the state’s role in the regulation of citizenship. Importantly, this
project is not a normative; it does not attempt to settle the debate among citizenship theorists as to
whether citizenship is best defined as a rights-based status, a responsibilities-based notion, or a status
conferred by institutional recognition. Instead, it takes as its premise that state recognition is
necessarily prior to the exercise of rights or responsibilities.2 As such, for citizens to exercise rights
2

Stephen Engel. Fragmented Citizens: Changing Recognition of Gay and Lesbian Lives. )New York, NY: NYU
Press, 2016.) (Forthcoming. Manuscript on file with author).

Chapter 1

! 19

or responsibilities – for liberal citizenship or republican citizenship to be enacted – the individual
must first be recognized by governing authorities and other community members of being capable of
such action. In short, recognition is a necessary procedural condition of citizenship, and it is prior to
the substantive content of citizenship status, which may include an emphasis on either (or both)
rights and responsibilities.
This definition focuses less on the content of citizenship—what is conferred upon an
individual subject to the polity’s gaze, such as rights or responsibilities—and more upon the status
itself of the individual’s relationship with the state. By defining citizenship this way, the analytical
lens turns away from the citizen herself and toward the governing institutions and their role in
constituting the citizen. This move has at least two implications. First, it, leaves unexamined
stateless conceptions of citizenship, such as cosmopolitan citizenship and citizenship-as-practice.
These contentions, while valuable in recognizing that citizenship may be constituted in individual
action or community recognition, overlook the fundamental role that the state and its institutions
plays in defining the parameters of civic life. Second, since the aim of this thesis is to explore the
relationship between institutional and ideational development – how governing institutions have
affected the meaning of the idea of citizenship over time – citizenship as recognition reorients the
analysis away from the individual claiming a status and toward the institutional power that ultimately
confers the status. Linking citizenship, via recognition, to institutions enables that exploration. Put
differently, by defining citizenship in terms of governmental institutional recognition, I can examine
how institutional design and capacity can alter ideational development and thereby evaluate the
state’s role in constructing identity and, thus, citizenship.
Given my aim to assess how institutions have altered the definition of citizenship, I ground
this exploration in scholarship in American Political Development (APD) as this field’s analytical
tools are explicitly focused on tracing institutional and ideational change over time. Furthermore,
much APD research provides ways to comprehend the polity as fragmented, which helps when
grappling with why multiple traditions of citizenship may exist simultaneously and may be in tension
with one another. Specifically, APD rejects the notion that the standard condition of the polity is one
of equilibrium. Rather, institutions and ideas conflict, and the state consequently is continuously
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developing as different ideas and governing authority vie for permanence and durability within and
across various institutions that exert power over citizens.
Scholars of APD have pointed out that the polity as made up of multiple distinct and often
conflicting governing orders enables endogenous development. Either radical or gradual shifts are
not only the result of some exogenous shock, such as either an election that alters the partisan
makeup of government or a war or economic crisis. Instead, political entrepreneurs – such as elected
officials or more popular actors such as social movements –exploit the frictions and opportunities
created when governing orders are in tension.3
Ideational development in the polity marks a shift in authority, but because the state is so
fragmented, older ideas may never die, lying in wait either to be taken up by another institutional
actor or by the people themselves. As will be suggested in Chapters 3 and 4, such seemingly nondominant ideas may find repose either formal institutions – such as courts, legislatures, or the
executive branch bureaucracy at the federal or state level – or informal institutions such as social
networks and other groups that foster social movement. Political ideas that differ from the durable
dominant notions at a given moment can hibernate while other, possibly oppositional, ideas are
employed in formal institutional rules. The constitutional structure allows for ideational circulation. It
keeps clashing ideas in play often within but also outside the formal institutional structures of
governance, thus making a settled notion of citizenship – a stable equilibrium of the idea itself –
impossible. In short, the institutions of the U.S. state are fragmented, separated, and disjointed. This
analysis reveals just how fragile ideational durability is in the U.S. polity. Understanding our
institutional design in this way can help us uncover if, how, and why a settled notion of citizenship
not only eludes us but, in fact, never can and purposively never should be attained.

The Problem with Citizenship in the United States
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Rogers Smith posits that U.S. citizenship “often simply means that the person is legally
recognized as having American nationality and is able to carry a U.S. passport.” 4 However, the term
“citizen” has often carried with it much more demanding qualifications, and the content of
citizenship has been a subject of fierce debate in political theory. As Kymlicka points out, citizenship
is “intimately linked to ideas of individual entitlement on the one hand and of attachment to a
particular community on the other.”5 The stability of a modern polity depends not only on its basic
institutions, but also on the health and character of its citizens. An accurate definition of citizenship,
then, becomes a “necessary supplement to earlier theories of institutional justice.”6
Arguably the most dominant definition of citizenship conflates citizenship status with rights.
T. H. Marshall and Judith Shklar are among the more formative theorists who have contributed to this
liberal conception. 7 Marshall suggests that citizenship rights occupy one of three categories: civil
rights, political rights, and social rights. For many, this accords with their own definition of
citizenship, which is often colloquially understood to be “the right to have rights.”8 Judith Shklar
similarly suggests that citizenship in America has two defining marks, the equality of political rights
and the “overt rejection of heredity privileges.”9 Rights-centric theories of citizenship are often
blanketed under the term “liberal democratic” notions of citizenship. Kymlicka, however, argues that
standard liberal rights-based theories have unacceptable limits on tolerance, so we must supplement
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these traditional rights-based principles with a theory of minority rights. 10 Critics of rights-based
theories generally, however, suggest that they lead to an unhealthy passivity of citizens.
Accordingly, many commentators argue that we need to “supplement (or replace) the passive
acceptance of citizenship rights with the active exercise of citizenship responsibilities and virtues.”11
For these civic republican theorists, citizenship suggests not only rights, or perhaps even no rights at
all: citizenship suggests civic responsibility and participation. Liberal democratic theorists have
suggested what Kymlicka refers to as a “more deliberative model,” but civic republican theorists
remain unconvinced.12 Without citizens who display characteristics of willing and active political
participation, democracy may crumble in response to illiberal forces. Civic republicans suggest that
civic participation is intrinsically rewarding and, as such, is the hallmark of a citizen. They locate
citizenship in “the activity of ruling and being ruled in turn.”13 Civic republicans argue that a citizen
is not just a person subject to the laws of the state, nor is it a consumer of rights, but is “an active
member on the public deliberation and decision-making that produces law and policy.”14 Here is
where the idea of a “good citizen” or an “ideal citizen” finds its place.
However, critics have argued that these theorists sometimes struggle to explain why and how
civic participation can become lackadaisical among citizens. Additionally, liberal and feminist critics
point out that this account of citizenship offers grounds for unacceptable exclusions from the polity.
Due partly to these critiques, civic republican theories have failed to reach doctrinal dominance in
contemporary understandings of citizenship.
A different school of thought sees citizenship in terms of personal empowerment. For some,
to be a citizen involves an existential refusal of subjection, which in turn means that a citizen “seeks
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mastery over whatever pushes him or her back into subjection.”15 This suggests a broader, but
ultimately context-free, claim that citizenship asserts “the mastery of humankind over all
environments.” 16 In this vein, Castles and Davidson suggest citizenship implies a more inward and
abstract notion that citizenship means “acts that establish rule of law and not men.” 17
None of these single definitions of citizenship, however, has gained dominance or universal
acceptance in the literature. This seems at least partly because, as competing theories argue, each
theory runs into serious conceptual problems. Normative rights-centric models can lead to passive
and lackadaisical populace, and responsibility-centric models do not account for the fundamental
problem that one cannot exercise responsibilities without rights. More generally, and, as is important
here, none accurately and comprehensively describes what it means to be a citizen in the United
States. Recent developments in political theory have brought this conundrum to the center of
attention. Feminist and communitarian theorists have challenged liberal descriptions of citizenship,
while liberals in turn challenge civic republicans. In short, as Peter Reiseneberg has said, “there is no
single office in which [citizenship’s] essence is defined. It has no central mission, nor is it clearly an
office, a theory, or a legal contract.”18
In 1862, for example, when Attorney-General Edward Bates researched what is the true
content of citizenship in the United States, he found the effort “fruitless.”19 The concept of
citizenship was, he wrote, “now as little understood in its details and elements, and the question as
open to argument and speculative criticism as it was at the beginning of the Government.” 20 What
was then over eighty years of exercising citizenship under the Constitution had “not sufficed to teach
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us either the exact meaning of the word, or the constituent elements of the thing we prize so
highly.” 21 Nancy Cott points out that in Dred Scott v. Sanford, Justice Taney, writing for the majority,
could dismiss the fact that blacks did indeed vote in some Northern states as evidence of their
citizenship.22 Similarly, if white women were given the title of citizen, then the content of U.S.
citizenship could not include those things denied to them, like as office-holding, and jury and
military service.23 In his Dred Scott dissent, Justice Curtis wrote that, under the Constitution of the
United States, citizenship is “not dependent on the possession of any particular political or even of all
civil rights; and any attempt so to define it must lead to error.”24 Cott also argues that during the
nineteenth century, only a minimal definition of citizenship, “meaning the individual’s allegiance and
nation’s reciprocal guarantee of protection,” gained any sort of universal acceptance. 25 A
dichotomous understanding of citizenship as either a liberal claim on rights or a republican
expectation of responsibilities does not help us understand how and why the meaning of citizenship
may shift over time.
Rogers Smith’s work traces how notions of citizenship have changed in the United States
across time. He uncovers a constant battle among definitions of citizenship. He notes that different
traditions contend with one another: a liberal tradition that focuses on rights, a republican tradition
that focuses on responsibilities, and an ascriptive discriminatory tradition that invokes hierarchy. At
distinct times, one tradition may be more influential among political elites than another. He claims
ascriptive hierarchies are rampant in U.S. citizenship laws.26 Smith suggests a single definition of
citizenship, such as a liberal theory, a civic republican theory or a citizenship-as-practice theory, fails
to capture the distinct if overlapping traditions that constitute American political culture. His
multiple-traditions thesis holds that “the definitive feature of American political culture has been not
21
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its liberal, republican, or ‘ascriptive Americanist’ elements but, rather, this more complex pattern of
apparently inconsistent combinations of the traditions, accompanied by recurring conflicts.”27 His
detailed history of the concept of citizenship lends strong support to the view that the idea has always
been contested. As the battles between liberals and civic republicans intensify, especially after they
are joined by communitarian, feminist, cosmopolitan, and citizenship-as-practice theorists,
it has become clear that the concept of citizenship has lost none of its power, but that its place
in our common life is not a settled one. Citizenship is a powerful political ideal as well as a
legal status. The debates in political theory have in many ways been irrelevant to these
current struggles, because theorists have weighted the merits of republican versus liberal
citizenship as modes of participation and identification while debates in policy and law have
focused on legal status. All of these venues have important insights to offer about citizenship,
and it behooves us to consider them together rather than in isolation.28
Finally, Smith rejects a teleological definition of citizenship. Rather than showing that ascriptive or
illiberal moments in American citizenship laws are nothing more than temporary deviations from the
unending teleological progression towards some liberal notion of citizenship, his analysis shows
convincingly that Americans do share a “common culture but one that is more complexly and
multiply constituted than is usually acknowledged.”29 The American political tradition is, in fact,
necessarily defined by inconsistent, overlapping, and conflicting beliefs. His argument lends strong
support to the view that citizenship as a concept in the United States has always been contested. As a
result, to claim that there is a singular meaning of citizenship or that citizenship has a content or
meaning toward which American political development is progressing would be to deny the patterns
of American political development itself.

Citizenship as Recognition
Since disagreement persists among normative citizenship theorists over what the dominant
content of U.S. citizenship should be, i.e., rights or responsibilities, this thesis takes a different route
to uncover how citizenship has come to have distinct meanings over time. If Smith is correct in
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suggesting that our understanding of citizenship changes over time and continues to be contested,
then we can ask: what creates this condition, or more precisely, how do our political institutions
foster this ideational contestation? Defining citizenship as following from institutional recognition
helps to orient analysis toward this question.
Political theorist Iris Marion Young offers one entry point in understanding what citizenship
as recognition connotes. She contends that the person or citizen is at least in part “constituted by
another’s gaze.”30 While the subject requires recognition as a human capable of activity, she writes,
the subject also “receives from the dominant culture only the judgment that she is different, marked,
or inferior.”31 Queer theorist Shane Phelan also calls attention to the distinction between the citizen
and “strangers,” who are distinct from full citizens yet nonetheless members of the community. These
“strangers” ride the line between “us” and “them” because they have qualities of citizenship in
certain contexts, but not in others. Phelan illustrates this notion by referencing the circumstances of
the gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender communities, whose members are “not currently citizens
in the full political sense,” because heterosexuality is a prerequisite for full modern citizenship and
inclusion in the polity.32
More specifically, political theorist Judith Shklar reminds us that citizenship is not a notion
that can be analyzed or discussed outside of social and political context. She writes that “[w]hatever
the ideological gratifications that the mnemonic evocation of an original and pure citizenry may
have, it is unconvincingly and ultimately an uninteresting flight from politics if [citizenship]
disregards the history and present actualities of our institutions.”33 In other words, citizenship itself
needs to be understood in the context of political institutions; citizenship would be an empty concept
without institutions. Shklar’s efforts to “historicize citizenship,” rather than see it as an ideal towards
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which rights movements progress, remind us to understand citizenship in a political context and then
examine how that context has changed over time.34
By defining citizenship in this way, “the operative center of citizenship changes from the
individual claiming citizenship to the set of institutions that recognize or confer citizenship status.”35
Necessary for the exercise of both rights and responsibilities, therefore, is the prior notion of
recognition and acknowledgement. Phelan argues that law guaranteeing equal protection and political
participation rights are the “sine qua non for citizenship, both because they enact or deny state
acknowledgement of individuals and because such rights are a prerequisite for meaningful
participation.”36 To be deprived the protection of these laws means being barred from participation in
political institutions. Being denied this is the same as being denied the “acknowledgment that is the
heart of citizenship.”37 Accordingly, recognition by political institutions (especially, though not
limited to, the state) is a prerequisite to claiming rights, responsibilities, or duties. 38
Nancy Cott a similar method of analysis in her study of marriage and women’s citizenship in
the United States. She points out that throughout much of U.S. history, by marrying a foreign
national, women born in the United States were deprived of their citizenship status. She argues that
we must recognize marriage as an institution that “helps to found both men’s and women’s identity in
the polity.”39 The institution of marriage was, perhaps not coincidentally, one highly regulated by the
state: it “has thus been the vehicle for the state’s part in forming and sustaining the gender order—or,
it might be said, in forming and sustaining gender itself.”40 Because, then, marriage affects
citizenship and is an institution constituted by the state, the state has had a hand in regulating
citizenship through marriage. Marriage itself, though, involves a bond between persons. Citizenship
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as an idea, then, represents “not only the bond between an individual and the state but also a bond
between one individual and many others.”41
Examining citizenship as defined through processes of institutional recognition has enabled
numerous scholars to gain new insight into citizenship in the United States. Indeed, scholars have
shown how the state constitutes identities. For example, in her influential study of sexuality and
citizenship in the United States, Margot Canaday contends that the state “did not merely implicate
but also constituted homosexuality in the construction of a stratified citizenry.”42 Her study examines
how state institutions defined and treated sexual identities during several periods in U.S. history. She
reveals how the state was highly influential in the formation of sexual identity. It did this by crafting
citizenship policies that “crystallized homosexual identity, fostering a process by which certain
individuals began to think of their sexuality in political terms, as mediating and mediated by their
relationship to the state.”43 Necessary for her analysis is an understanding of citizenship as status.
She says that there are no formal categories of first or second-class citizens. Rather, she agrees with
Nancy Cott that citizenship can be “delivered in different degrees of permanence or strength.”44
Additionally, Canaday endorses Rogers Smith’s multiple-traditions thesis but adds sexuality
to the list of ascriptive traditions in American citizenship policies. In the United States,
homosexuality was sometimes defined as “outside” of citizenship through formal legal exclusion, but
more often someone suspected of “sexual perversion” (as it was defined but the state) was not
formally excluded from citizenship status, but would lose certain rights. Citizenship is, Canaday
argues, thus best conceptualized by an approach that involves “‘threshold questions’ regarding access
to the nation-state…alongside… ‘questions about the nature and quality of citizenship as practiced
within the political community.’”45 Her study reveals that state institutions were undeniably active in
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the construction of sexual identity through their regulation of citizenship policies. Both
homosexuality and citizenship arose in tandem with the development of the federal bureaucracy. The
timing, she argues, was not coincidental: “Rather, homosexuality and citizenship are both a type of
status that is configured (even, to some extent, conferred) by the state.” 46 In other words, the
consideration of citizenship as recognition and regulation in the context of the state was both
essential and the undeniable conclusion of her project.
Citizenship is, therefore, necessarily constituted in relation to a political context. Engel teases
out Phelan’s definition by explaining that full citizenship relies not only on the ability to claim or
exercise rights or responsibilities, but prior acknowledgment or recognition.47 Recognition is, then,
the necessary element for other definitions of the content of citizenship. Without recognition by
institutions, other accounts of citizenship are rendered moot. To rephrase Phelan, recognition by
institutions is the sine qua non of citizenship.
And yet, as political scientist Elisabeth Cohen has pointed out, there currently is a dearth of
investigations into how institutions, especially state institutions, have interacted with qualities of
citizenship. Rights, for example, require “specific political systems to make them legible.”48 Cohen
argues that “[r]ecognizing administrative rationality as a peer of liberalism and normative theories of
citizenship is crucial because it draws the state into the picture…”49 And, as is shown convincingly in
the work of Cott, Canaday, Phelan, and Engel, the state’s regulatory apparatuses play a crucial role in
defining, altering, and conferring citizenship.
Therefore, in the search for how the meaning of citizenship has changed over time in the
United States, an analytic reorientation from the individual making rights, duties, practice, or
responsibility claims to state institutions is necessary. 50 Because, as Engel writes, citizenship is a
relationship that links the individual to the state, it can, “if conceptualized as constructed through
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regulatory recognition, direct analytic focus to the state as one source of power over that
individual.” 51 Engel explains that doing so brings to the fore the idea that institutions exert power
over the individual and provides an opening to use developmental scholarship, which focuses on
ideational and institutional change, to analyze how citizenship in the U.S. has changed over time.52
Evaluating citizenship in a political context turns us away from normative claims about what
citizenship should mean to what citizenship content the state confers through recognition.

Institutions, Ideas, and Political Development
Re-conceptualizing citizenship as constituted in the process of recognition turns analysis
toward the institutions that do the recognizing. Adam Sheingate argues that institutions are often
understood as instruments of stability. 53 Indeed, rational choice institutionalists contend that political
institutions produce stability through “‘regulative, normative, or cognitive mechanisms’ that limit,
constitute, or constrain the range of alternatives actors confront.”54 And yet, this conception provides
little opportunity to engage questions of institutional change or how institutional contexts may
interact with ideas and alter the ideas, such as citizenship, over time.55 Indeed, ideas are mostly
treated as epiphenomenal of interests, with little to no political power or value of their own.56 When
evaluating studies that employ these assumptions of rational choice institutionalism, Robert
Lieberman points out that they are “limited in their capacity to account for the substantive course of
politics” because they are bound by the limitations of reductionism, excessive reliance on the affects
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of exogenous factors, and unnecessary emphasis on order and structure.57 They are, in a word, not
developmental. They lack the long-lens understanding of historical institutionalists.
If we are to capture an account of U.S. citizenship as an idea that is influenced by
institutional recognition, we must look elsewhere. Speaking to this objective, Lieberman exhorts
scholars to “find a way to treat ideas as analytically consequential in accounts of political action,
policy development, and institutional change, [and they must do so] without falling into the
characteristic traps…[such as] the ad hockery with which institutional accounts usually appropriate
ideas as explanatory factors.”58
Ideational approaches on their own, however, run into similar limitations as the institutional
approaches. They are plagued by the possibility of positing a “single, overwhelming, and, above all,
stable set of ideas as the driving force in politics.”59 Another problem present in ideational accounts
is exhibited by the works that “emphasize political ideas as central causal factors but give short shrift
to the political settings in which ideas become influential and to the causal mechanisms that influence
the section among ideas in concrete political choices.”60 Lieberman thus posits that any convincing
and accurate theory of political or institutional development must bridge the gap between ideational
and institutional approaches to political science, and must incorporate each element with equal
weight. This project attempts to blend these elements as Lieberman suggests.
In order to blend ideational and institution elements successfully, this projects draws insight
from American Political Development. APD scholarship dismisses the assumption that the state is
composed of “stable, orderly institutions and regularized behaviors.”61 It contends that institutional
design is never created in the absence of a preexisting political climate. Since this preexisting climate
was historically established, “political outcomes tend to be dysfunctional” and the institutional
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arrangements that arise “come to coexist often in direct conflict with each other.”62 This incomplete
displacement of one institutional arrangement by another can create tension within and between state
institutions.
APD is not concerned with “snapshots” of political circumstances. Rather, it is focused on the
longer view of political dynamics; it aims to uncover how politics are constructed in and over time.
APD scholars are concerned with processes of policy, institutional, and ideational change that tend to
be slow, nonlinear, and non-rational. Brian Glenn points to two separate schools of APD. This project
not only draws from both schools, but explicitly aims to bridge these schools. The first school is
made up of what Glenn refers to as “historical institutionalists.” Broadly, these scholars suggest that
the goals that “political actors choose to pursue, and those that they are able to pursue effectively, are
shaped by the institutional arrangements through which they and other political actors must
operate.”63 The other school is made up of “ideational scholars,” who hold the belief that “ideas
underpin broad swaths of significant policies in American politics.”64 These two schools bear a
noticeable resemblance to Lieberman’s two methods for explaining political change: institutional and
ideational. Glenn’s work shows that Lieberman’s criticisms, though not directly applied to APD
directly, still hold. If we are to use APD’s analytical perspective to construct a convincing account of
the intersection between citizenship and institutions, we must not continue separating analysis of
institutions from analysis of ideas. And so, this project bridges this gap by investigating how
institutional design affects political ideas, such as citizenship, by providing space for them to stay in
play, to never fall out of contention even if they are non-dominant. Crucially, this project suggests
that using the historical lens of APD allows us to understand how the institutional structure affects
the play of political ideas.
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Skowronek and Orren define political development as “a durable shift in governing
authority.”65 In turn, they define a governing authority in APD as “the exercise of control over
persons or things that is designated and enforceable by the state,” and a shift as “a change in the
locus or direction of control, resulting in a new distribution of authority among persons or
organizations within the polity at large or between them and their counterparts outside.”66 They even
call out citizenship specifically, which is at issue here, as an idea that builds and turns on the
“distribution of authority.”67
A key insight that APD offers us, that is of special relevance here, is that the polity is
“fractured.” Orren and Skowronek point out that the institutions in a polity are not created at the
same time. They necessarily arise in a preexisting political context. Rather, they are created “at
different times, in light of different experiences, and often for quite contrary purposes.” 68 Thus, the
search for political equilibrium is flawed. Rather, the state is made up of many regulatory bodies,
who address varying issues with varying jurisdiction, that were created at different times and with
different motives. These regulatory bodies do then, conflict with one another concurrently, or with
themselves non-concurrently. This is how the polity can be described as fragmented.
Engel suggests that the fragmentation of the polity is actually a product of how it is
constructed: “[a]s new policies are layered upon those in place, the juxtaposition and lack of
integration creates the ‘interplay of multiple institutions [which is] a source of both tensions and
opportunities.’”69 This political complexity provides opportunities for actors to push for, in the
rhetoric of APD, shifts in governing authority, where durable shifts — arrangements that appear to
hold over long spans of time — constitute political change. While rational choice approaches to
political science often suggest “clean separations — between parts, between inside and outside— and
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places those separations at the foundations of political analysis,” Orren and Skowronek suggest that
these notions are limited in their capacity to capture the overlapping, fragmented, and internally
contradictory aspect of a polity that developmental research like APD attempts to elucidate.
Attention to the fragmented state of the polity, to the notion that its institutions are hardly
ever in a state of coherent or consistent equilibrium leads to the supposition that endogeneity is a
“feature of APD research, not a malady.”70 That claim draws attention to the need to differentiate
between exogenous and endogenous sources of institutional change. This distinction is important
because, political scientist James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen point out, shifts that occur
endogenously “often unfold incrementally,” and are not accounted for when only “exogenous shocks
that bring about radical institution reconfigurations” are analyzed.71 Traditional approaches to
institutional change, such as those that emphasize “critical junctures,” focus heavily on exogenous
forces – that is, forces that occur beyond the bounds of the polity itself and that include such shocks
as wars, depressions, or public health crises. Change thereby “typically involves a dynamic of
‘punctuated equilibrium.”72 Long periods of institutional stability are, in this model, disrupted by
moments in which opportunities for significant institutional reform appear. These junctures are
“critical” because, political scientist Paul Pierson writes, they place institutional arrangements on
“paths or trajectories, which are then very difficult to alter.”73
APD scholars, utilizing the idea that the polity itself is fractured and composed of multiple
distinct governing authorities that are not necessarily aligned with one another, offer a model of
change that need not rely exogenous shocks as the only possible causal mechanisms. They challenge
the notion that these shocks force critical junctures by suggesting that such accounts say nothing
about the properties that makes an institution more susceptible to this type of force. Second, they
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contend that political institutions are not only altered by exogenous shocks that force them to emerge,
adapt, or break down. Instead, they also “evolve and shift in more subtle ways across time.”74 This
type of development arises as a result of endogenous forces within the institutional structure. In the
chapters that follow, I examine the fractured polity during the Reconstruction era. This analysis
reveals that political change can and does indeed arise from endogenous forces within the
institutional structure.
Dominant ideas can and do achieve dominance within political institutions. This does not,
however, negate political development. Though it seems acknowledging that durability of political
ideas in the polity directly conflicts with development, Orren and Skowronek point out that it does
not. The more durable the ideational shift, “the more resistant the arrangement is reconstructs should
be to subsequent alteration.”75 The relationship between ideational durability within the polity and
political development is more complex. Specifically, the more extensive the institutional
rearrangement, prompted by either exogenous factors, endogenous factors, or both, the more durable
it is.

Developmental Citizenship in the American State
The projects takes it as a given that citizenship in the United States continues to be subject to
contestation and proceeds to ask why. The answer is that the idea remains in flux because the
constitutional structure of governing institutions permits it. If institutional design enables ideas to
remain in contention, or at least provides the spaces through which non-dominant ideas of citizenship
may rest in repose until taken up to challenge and perhaps unseat more durable notions, then the
question that remains is how does such change occur. What are the mechanisms?
If citizenship is grounded first in the notion of recognition, then institutional design will
influence whether and how citizenship is consistently conferred. Ideas that have been rejected by the
governing authority may remain dormant in institutional crevices, ready to reappear and vie for
ideational dominance once again if context permits. A heavily fractured polity—such as the United
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States—allows for at least two possible explanatory mechanisms of change over time: first, elite
political entrepreneurs, such as elected representatives or judges, may exploit such “frictional gaps”
among different governing institutions for ideationally transformative purposes, and second, social
movements or the people themselves may exploit these frictions and tensions and bring a disregarded
conception of citizenship one again to the fore.
Scheingate describes the actors who exploit these frictional gaps as “political
entrepreneurs.” 76 These political entrepreneurs are those “whose creative acts have transformative
effects on politics, policies, or institutions.”77 His work suggests that political entrepreneurs are
individuals. However, single individuals are not the only ones to have “transformative effects” on
politics. In the U.S. polity, states offer opportunities for political entrepreneurs to exploit. Legal
theorist Heather Gerken points out that federalism offers a place where dissenting ideas can find
voice outside the dominant framework. She suggests that federalism allows for minorities to rule
without sovereignty by allowing dissenting voices to find voice.78 Federalism acts as a mechanism
for dissenters to exercise power. In this way, states offer a zone for non-dominant political ideas to
become institutionalized and establish a foothold from which they can fight again for dominance.
Similarly, as Reva Seigel argues, social movements operate in similar ways: “[s]ocial
movement conflict, enabled and constrained by constitutional culture, can create new forms of
constitutional understanding—a dynamic that guides officials interpreting the open-textured language
of the Constitution’s rights guarantees.”79 She employs the concept of “constitutional culture” to
explore how “changes in constitutional understanding emerge from the interaction of citizens and
officials.”80 It both “licenses and limits change” by constantly challenging the distinction between
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politics and law by people and officials the “resources to question and to defend the legitimacy of
government, institutions of civil society, and the Constitution itself.”81
The American constitutional order, Siegel writes, needs “forms of citizen participation to
ensure its continuing authority,” and citizen engagement through social movements is part of the
constitutional culture that uphold the Constitution’s democratic legitimacy.82 Siegel emphasizes,
however, that constitutional culture requires two conditions on those who advocate constitutional
change. The first is the “consent condition,” which requires that a social movement does not violate
accepted understandings of how citizens and officials interact when their Constitutional views
diverge – for example, it would prohibit violence. The second condition is the “public value
condition,” which requires that advocates and social movements “justify new constitutional
understandings by appeal to older constitutional understandings that the community recognizes and
shares.”83 Social movements, therefore, act in similar ways to the individuals who normally qualify
as political entrepreneurs by harboring old ideas that could be disfavored in formal institutional
structure, and reasserting them in attempts to make them dominant once again. As such, this thesis
takes the term “political entrepreneur” to include both individuals and groups, who take the form of
social movements. Both act as temporary strongholds of old, unfashionable, or losing political and
constitutional ideas, and exploit the frictional gaps in the formal institutional structure to bring them
back into play. The chapters that follow will examine the work of individual political entrepreneurs
such as members of Congress or particular Justices on the Supreme Court as well as social movement
actors, such as abolitionists and political party members, and state governments.
Sheingate argues that treating political entrepreneurs and their innovative actions more
seriously can bear fruit in the study of institutional change. First, it forces greater attention to how
institutional structure itself shape opportunities for change. Second, entrepreneurship focuses
attention “on the boundaries between institutions and the complex characteristics of the American
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political system as a whole.”84 Third, understanding political entrepreneurship makes an endogenous
account of political change possible. An endogenous account of change that takes entrepreneurship
into account is one that does not rely on “the occurrence of some critical juncture or exogenous shock
that disturbs an institution in equilibrium.”85 In other words, Sheingate’s investigation of political
entrepreneurship presents us with a method for investigating endogenous change.
First, though, we must understand how the institutional structure in the polity can affect the
ideational context and, thus, how a settled definition of citizenship may be impossible. Scheingate
provides helpful insight here, too. The most important determinant for how susceptible institutional
structure is to the actions of political entrepreneurs, Scheingate suggests, is complexity. Complexity
describes a “system of multiple, overlapping, and heterogeneous components connected together in a
dense network of interrelated links.’”86 When Scheingate describes “complexity” within political
institutions, he is referring to the same characteristics as Orren and Skowronek when they describe
the American polity as “fragmented.”87 The consequences of having a complex (or fragmented)
institutional structure are threefold. First, they are rampant with uncertainty that presents
opportunities for acts of innovation on the part of political entrepreneurs. By uncertainty, Scheingate
is referring to the difficulty of predicting intended and unintended outcomes, which are caused by the
ripple and feedback effects that are characteristic of complex system. Because of these factors, he
writes, “complex systems are often in flux, system components are related through reciprocal
causation, and single events can have large aggregate effects. As a result, it is impossible to predict ex
ante how change in one component will impact other parts of the system. Yet it is precisely this
uncertainty that presents entrepreneurs with speculative opportunities.”88 Similarly, Mahoney and
Thelen argue that endogenous institutional change occurs when “problems of rule interpretation and
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enforcement open up space for actors to implement existing rules in new ways.”89 More specifically,
as discussed earlier, Orren and Skowronek contend that a polity is rife with internal contradictions
and overlapping authority relations, and this condition opens up opportunities for political
entrepreneurs, agents, and other leaders, either individual or groups. Such a polity provides
contradictions for these agents and entrepreneurs to exploit, and “alternatives for them to imagine.”90
Second, Scheingate posits, their inevitable heterogeneity provides the resources for the
opportunities to be exploited. Third, the “multiple and overlapping character of components within
complex systems can produce ambiguous relations among actors and institutions.”91 With increased
complexity comes blurred boundaries between system components: “[h]ierarchies are flattened as
networks spanning institution replace rigid orders differentiated along functional lines. Put another
way, increasing complexity render the boundaries separating components less clearly defined and
more permeable: rising complexity lowers entry barriers”92 As an example of a highly complex
institutional system, Sheingate uses the United States: “the common observation regarding the
fragmentation of the American political system can be described in terms of complexity. Separated
powers, federalism, bicameralism, congressional committees, and executive agencies together
constitute a complex system of multiple and overlapping sources of authority.”93 If the American
system is extremely complex, then, as has been shown, it is very susceptible to the actions of political
entrepreneurs. If the political entrepreneurs, both individuals and groups in the form of social
movements, take advantage of the openings presented to them by the complexity of the American
system, then creating a new institutional arrangement and, thus, political development, will follow
with ease.
Scheingate’s work, then, lends strong support to the view that the structure of the American
system may in fact be institutionally structured to foster a definition of citizenship in the United
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States that is in flux and changes over time or means different things at one time depending on the
governing institution that is recognizing the individual as citizen. The only settled definition of
citizenship we may be able to find, then, is the procedural or developmental one. This definition
rejects teleology and is depleted of substantive content, such as rights or responsibilities. This
definition is, namely, that of citizenship-as-recognition.
To investigate how state institutions have affected what might be meant by or included in the
status of citizen, the following chapters will focus on one particular generative moment in the
redefinition of citizenship by the state: Reconstruction. During Reconstruction, which covers
1863-1877,94 three amendments to the U.S. Constitution – the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth –
actively contemplated the meaning and parameters of citizenship and how citizens would be
recognized by the state.

Conclusion
What citizenship means has vexed scholars and political leaders alike. Normative theorists
have described citizenship in terms of rights, responsibilities, duties, and practice. However, just the
fact that this debate over the content of citizenship continues with its current strength suggests
something else may be at work. In the United States, the institutional structure may actually be
predisposed to make a resolution of this debate impossible. As has been shown by Adam Sheingate,
the more complicated the institutional structure in a polity, the more susceptible it is to the work of
political entrepreneurs who can exploit the frictional gaps to produce shifts in governing authority
and, thus, political change. Additionally, if we recognize that citizenship is regulated by institutions
and thus employ the narrow and logically prior definition of citizenship, that of citizenship as
institutional recognition, we can begin to understand how and why citizenship has continued to be
such a fiercely contested concept.
To investigate this claim, this project draws insight from American Political Development.
APD scholars have noted that complex interplay and overlap between political institutions gives rise
94
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to “unexpected and unforeseen frictions.”95 This friction is important for political change and
political development in two ways. First, endogenous political change is a result of this friction.
Second, endogenous factors are more likely to cause political change if this friction exists. The
endogenous factor most pertinent to this study is that of ideational context, specifically that of
citizenship. The work of political entrepreneurs who bring differing ideas back into play serves as
one example of how this friction can allow for political change.
The work of political entrepreneurs and institutional friction is what will be explored in the
following chapters. By investigating the moments of incomplete displacement of “governing
authority,” the subsequent examples will illuminate how state institutions have affected the definition
of citizenship in the United States. Though such moments are temporary the “institutions they
produce have consequences that skew political debates and outcomes for decades, if not centuries.”96
Based on what has been shown here, if we find institutional disagreement over definitions of
citizenship, both concurrently and across time, then a developmental citizenship that is constantly in
flux will have been strongly supported, and the larger claim about a constitutional structure that
makes this outcome inevitable will be validated.
This suggests that institutional disagreement over the meaning and content of citizenship has
two dimensions. First, different state institutions can simultaneously disagree over what citizenship
is. Second, a state institution can define citizenship differently at different times. The lens of APD
suggests that when different doctrines conflict “unexpected and unforeseen frictions may
continuously arise.”97 This project investigates this institutional disagreement – as it is made manifest
in the earliest attempts by Congress, the Supreme Court, the states, and the people, to interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment– and its resulting friction and unforeseen consequences, in order to uncover
how and why a settled notion of citizenship eludes U.S. democratic development.
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Chapter 2
To Preserve the Union: Reconstruction, Congress, and Citizenship

Reconstruction, the years between 1863 and 1876, when Southern political institutions and
state constitutions were redesigned in the aftermath of the United States’ Civil War, broke open the
idea of citizenship for consideration by multiple political actors at the federal and state level.
Citizenship as a political idea was unsettled, undefined, and up for grabs during and after the Civil
War. Historian Eric Foner considers Reconstruction to have left an indelible impact on contemporary
Americans precisely for this very reason. Issues that agitate U.S. politics, especially ones that relate
to citizenship, including how the political community is defined, how are rights conferred, the
respective powers of the state and federal governments, and the “relationship between political and
economic democracy,” are all Reconstruction questions.1 As we have seen, the definition of
citizenship in the United States is subject to contestation even if it appears durable during particular
periods. As long as questions of citizenship, rights, freedom, and democracy persist in our society,
“so too will the necessity of an accurate understanding of Reconstruction.”2
The primary purpose of Reconstruction, namely to outlaw slavery and reposition the newly
freedmen for some form of acknowledgment by the polity, was addressed through three amendments
to the United States Constitution. First, slavery was prohibited explicitly by the Thirteenth
Amendment. Second, the Fourteenth Amendment conferred citizenship status on African-Americans,
which brought them within the polity’s acknowledgment insofar as they might have civil rights, e.g.,
the rights to enter into contracts or serve on juries. It also altered the balance of powers between state
and national governments to prevent another civil war grounded in a states’ rights claim. Third, the
newly freed slaves and free blacks were acknowledged to have political rights, namely the right to
vote, by the Fifteenth Amendment.
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These three Amendments differed radically from notions of citizenship embraced during the
antebellum period. Prior to Reconstruction, the individual states “defined the status and secured the
rights of the inhabitants of the United States.”3 They did this, legal historian Robert Kaczorowski
writes, through their state legal institutions, statutes, and courts. However, some antebellum legal
theorists contended that the ability to secure the rights of inhabitants of the United States (as distinct
from the rights of inhabitants of the several states) should lie not with the states, but with the national
government. Kaczorowski explains that the debate over whether the national or state governments
“possessed ultimate authority to determine the status and enforce the rights of American inhabitants”
resulted in a fierce national political debate that ultimately culminated with the secession of the South
in 1861.4 As a result, the Civil War was a partisan war. Republicans advocated emancipation and
Union, but Democrats stood for lenience with Confederate secessionists and slavery.5 The
Republican ideals of Union, national sovereignty, and emancipation were ultimately victorious in
battle. Consequently, Reconstruction policy was ultimately controlled and implemented by
congressional Republicans.
These northern Republicans favored national protection of rights over state protection of
rights because they held that state protection of rights had failed. The Republican-controlled 39th
Congress of 1865-1867 sought to establish national protection of citizens’ rights, and thereby
prioritizing national citizenship over state citizenship. The political context of antebellum and Civil
War-era civil rights deprivations compelled Congress to “take effective measures to secure the
fundamental rights of American citizens.” 6 Their efforts resulted primarily in the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, Republican idealist notions of “social harmony” ultimately failed.7 Between
1893 and 1911, political scientist Richard Valelly points out, Congress formally abolished 94 percent
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of the election statutes passed during Reconstruction.8 Republican efforts failed in other ways, too.
Historian Eric Foner argues that the depression of 1873 explains why Reconstruction’s aims were
never fully realized. The depression, Foner writes, “marked a major turning point in the North’s
ideological development.”9 The depression, which “rudely disrupt[ed] visions of social harmony,”
resulted in “widespread tension between labor and capital.”10 The Republican ideals of equal rights
and dignity of labor “gave way before a sense of the irreducible barriers separating the classes and a
preoccupation with the defense of property, ‘political economy,’ and the economic status quo.”11 For
Foner, then, the Republican project to institutionalize a new vision of national citizenship over state
citizenship and equal rights collapsed with the economic downturn of the 1870s.
This chapter puts forward an alternative explanation. The Republican vision to reshape the
balance of powers between the state and federal governments, and reorient the tiers of citizenship
was redefined because of the constitutional structure of political institutions, which the various
Reconstruction Amendments did not substantively alter. In other words, the separated and
fragmented nature of the polity permitted disagreement about the meaning of these Amendments
among and within political institutions to persist, opening space for the original aims of the
Republicans to be challenged and ultimately displaced. Political scientists James Mahoney and
Kathleen Thelen argue that when analyzing institutional change, most scholars point to “exogenous
shock that bring about radical institutional reconfigurations,” but they ignore or overlook the
importance of endogenous changes that “often unfold incrementally.”12 If that claim is applied to the
collapse of Reconstruction ambitions, Foner is no doubt correct that the economic depression of the
1870s, which was an exogenous shock to the political system, altered the path of institutional
development. Nevertheless, Foner’s explanation does not examine endogenous sources of change
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that may follow from the design of political institutions themselves. Specifically, Foner overlooks
that the polity is set up in such a way to permit older political ideas to be brought back into a policy
or constitutional conversation even when another idea appears dominant. In short, he ignores a key
insight of American political development, namely that the polity is constituted by multiple orders
potentially in tension. This chapter aims to articulate the Republican definition of citizenship and
how it differed from definitions that had been dominant before the Civil War. This chapter begins the
story of how congressional Republican ideals of Reconstruction fell victim to the structure of the
polity itself. As will be further explain in the chapters that follow, Republicans were unable to
maintain their dominance in a fragmented institutional context where opposition forces could gain
and build a foothold and challenge the Republican project from the start.
This chapter explores Reconstruction and the Fourteenth Amendment to shed light on how it
was intended to alter the meaning of U.S. citizenship. To begin the examination of institutional
conflict over citizenship, this chapter looks exclusively at Congress and the ideas about citizenship
that permeated its understanding. The Republican-controlled 39th Congress endorsed a Republican
definition of citizenship that reflected their vision for the future of the country. Representative John
Bingham and the other drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to use the national government
to protect the rights they believed states were infringing upon. Their understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment prioritized national citizenship over state citizenship. These various framers, but
Representative John Bingham in particular, had a clear idea about how they intended to alter
citizenship when they drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. This is shown by their floor
speeches in the House of Representatives in the 39th Congress, prior to the ratification of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Once ratified, this Republican idea of citizenship pushed forward by
Bingham achieved a brief period of, to use the rhetoric of APD, durability, namely during the years
1868-1873. Orren and Skowronek use the term durable to describe a shift in “governing authority,”
such as an ideational shift, that is “not fixed,” but that has achieved “stability or change in any given
historical instance [that] must be regarded as contingent.”13 Achieving durability in governing
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authority, as manifested in political ideas, is the “constant object of political conflict.”14 Durability of
their preferred idea of citizenship was the object of Reconstruction-era radical Republicans during
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment. As will be shown in this chapter, Republicans succeeded
at establishing a period of brief durability for their political ideas between 1868-1873. A shift that can
call itself “durable,” Orren and Skowronek write, is one that lasts at least half a century. 15 This
ideational shift, however, because it lasted for less than a decade, was not durable. The shift was
broad, as it was reflected in many institutions, but it was not deep, because it failed to displace old
ideas. It must not be forgotten that a durable shift in governing authority is not immune to ideational
challenges for future governing authority. Rather, the more durable the shift, the harder it will be to
displace. A durable shift merely “set[s] the conditions for subsequent politics.” 16 Over these six years,
the Republican project to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship achieved the higher
ground. Importantly, though, opposing ideas were manifesting themselves elsewhere in other
political institutions, particularly at the state level and in the state and federal judiciaries, and finding
voice to challenge the Republican project from the start. As will be shown in later chapters, the
crucially formative moment for political development in the U.S. came from the Supreme Court in
1873, when it became clear that the Republican shift was crumbling under the ideational attacks.
This chapter begins with an explanation for why our analysis of citizenship in the American
polity begins with Reconstruction. Next, it investigates the Reconstruction-era Republican Party and
shows how their motto “Free Labor, Free Soil, Free Men” captures a vision of nation, union, and
U.S. citizenship. Third, it shows how the Republican vision was captured in the Reconstruction
project, namely in the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. It explains
the intended meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment by investigating one of its principal drafters,
Representative John Bingham. Bingham’s life story, beliefs, and floor speeches indicate that he
intended the Fourteenth Amendment to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship. The final
section shows how the Republican-driven project to prioritize national citizenship over state
14
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citizenship achieved dominance in the polity by being taken up in several other institutions.
However, the developmental moment the Republicans achieved was a broad, but not deep shift.
Accordingly, it was a shift, but not a durable shift, because opposing ideas were manifesting
themselves elsewhere.

Reconstruction and Citizenship
Reconstruction marked a turning point in the development of the American polity. Our
investigation in whether there is indeed a structural reason that explains why a settled definition of
U.S. citizenship continues to elude narratives of democratic development in the United States begins
with Reconstruction precisely because one of the animating aims of Reconstruction, if not the
primary aim, was the reconceptualization of who counted as a citizen and what the relationship
between the citizen and the government would be. Historian Eric Foner writes that the specific
questions that agitated the country during Reconstruction were “how our society would respond to
the destruction of slavery. What system of labor would replace slave labor? What system of race
relations would replace the race relations of slavery? What would be the role of former slaves in
American life?”17 More broadly, however, the fundamental question the country faced was “who was
entitled to American citizenship, and what rights were those citizens to enjoy?”18 Arguably, there is
no other time in American history where the concept of citizenship was as much up for grabs. Legal
scholar Bruce Ackerman suggests that Reconstruction marked a turning point not just in
constitutional development, but also specifically in the definition of U.S. citizenship. For Ackerman,
the ratification of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, known together as the
Reconstruction Amendments, was a period of “higher lawmaking.”19 The struggle over the
Fourteenth Amendment specifically, he writes, was “the greatest constitutional moment in American

17

Eric Foner. "The Supreme Court and the History of Reconstruction— And Vice-Versa." Columbia Law Review
112, no. 7 (2012): 1585-1686.
18
19

Ibid, 1586.

Bruce Ackerman. We the People (2): Transformations. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University,
1998).

Chapter 2

! 48

history.”20 During this period, as was also the case during the Founding of the republic after the
Revolutionary War nearly a century earlier, “constitutional law became the preeminent language
through which American debated and defined their national identity.”21 Specifically, it was the
conflict over civil rights and state power in the wake of a shattering civil war that led congressional
Republicans in the 39th Congress to reject the apparent assumption by the original Framers of the
Constitution that states could be relied upon to adequately protect the rights of their citizens. Rather,
congressional Republicans, specifically the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment sought to redefine
citizenship by incorporating a “right to protection by state government into the Federal
Constitution.”22
At no other point in history was the content and meaning of U.S. citizenship this up-forgrabs. The Civil War and the subsequent reconstruction of the Union offers a unique opportunity for
insight into the institutional conflict over citizenship, so, since we are investigating if the American
polity is structured to keep citizenship an unsettled concept, it is fitting that our story begins here.

The Dignity of Labor and the Pursuit of Happiness
In 1857, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a fateful decision. In Dred
Scott v. Sandford 23 the Court declared that Congress was powerless to abolish slavery and that black
people could never become citizens of the United States. In the aftermath of this decision, the
country fought the Civil War, one of the bloodiest wars in its history. The question of slavery and
who was a member of the political community established the context for Reconstruction. As a result
of this crisis, Congress and the states enacted a series of statutes and constitutional amendments that
for the first time in U.S. history “established as a matter of federal law the principle of equal rights
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for all citizens regardless of race.”24 Why, though, did Congress not stop with the Thirteenth
Amendment and its categorical abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude? What was the purpose
behind the Fourteenth Amendment? Did it suggest something broader about the political agenda of
the radical Republicans and the direction they wanted to push the nation after the Civil War? The
conflict over slavery forced the nation to confront the meaning of U.S. citizenship, and to decide
whether a citizen owed primary allegiance to a state or to the nation as a whole.
The Republicans were the self-proclaimed party of “Free Labor, Free Soil, Free Men.”25 The
Republicans, Carl Schurz, a leader of the Republican party said to a Milwaukee audience on May 26,
1860, “stand before the country, not only as the anti-slavery party, but emphatically as the party of
free labor.”26 The goal of the Republican party was to make labor honorable.27 Foner summarizes
their platform.
For the concept of “free labor” lay at the heart of the Republican ideology, and expressed a
coherent social outlook, a model of the good society. Political anti-slavery was not merely a
negative doctrine, an attack on southern slavery and the society built upon it; it was an
affirmation of the superiority of the social system of the North—a dynamic, expanding
capitalist society, whose achievements and destiny were almost wholly the result of the
dignity and opportunities which it offered the average laboring man.28
The roots of antebellum Republican ideology can be largely traced backed to Protestantism, which
suggested that the pursuit of wealth was a way of serving God, and labor, “which had been imposed
on fallen man as a curse, was transmuted into a religious value, a Christian duty.”29 Republican
ideology itself, though, had evolved and adapted to fit modern society. Though its roots were indeed
in Protestantism, by emphasizing social mobility and economic growth, Republicans “reflected an

24

Foner (2012): 1587.

25

Eric Foner. Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1970).

26

Ibid, 11, quoting Carl Shurz, Speeches of Carl Shurz (Philadelphia 1865), 108.

27

Foner (1970), 11.

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid, 12-13.

Chapter 2

! 50

adaptation of that [Protestant] ethic of the dynamic, expansive, capitalist society of the ante-bellum
North.”30
There were, of course, several strands of Republicanism in antebellum America. Of particular
note are the radicals. Though it is difficult to define the radicals precisely, Foner cautiously
categorizes radicals as those who had a “persistent refusal to compromise with the South on any
question involving slavery.”31 Broadly, although the radicals shared the dignity of labor component
with their conservative and moderate counterparts in the Republic party, they had strong beliefs not
only about labor and slavery, but also about the direction of the Union more broadly. Radical
Republicans attempted to embed the notion of “equality among Americans (a principal not mentioned
in the original Constitution) into our laws and social reality.”32 For most Republicans, the
preservation of the Union after the Civil War was an end in itself, and to maintain it they attempted to
temper anti-slavery rhetoric. Radicals, however, contended that the Union was a means. They held,
according to Foner, that the Union “had been established for the noble purposes of securing the right
of all Americans to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, and that the founders had intended that
slavery should one day cease to exist in the nation.”33
Foner points out that it is important to recognize just how revolutionary the Republican
agenda was. Prior to the war, slavery was “an intrinsic part of the Constitution and federal law,” and
both northern and southern states “practiced widespread discrimination against black Americans,
slave and free.”34 And, under the original Constitution, the States, and not the federal government,
held the primary responsibility for “both defining and protecting American” rights.35 After the
Revolutionary War, the rights that had been previously conferred (or, as was more often the case, not

30

Ibid, 13.

31

Ibid, 104.

32

Foner (2012): 1587.

33

Foner (1970), 139.

34

Foner (2012): 1856.

35

Kurt T. Lash. The Fourteenth Amendment and the Privileges and Immunities of American
Citizenship. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 67.

Chapter 2

! 51

conferred) by the British crown transferred to the newly independent states. As a result, State laws
determine which rights and privileges to grant to their citizens, and those citizens expected the “equal
enjoyment of those privileges and immunities secured to them by their state’s constitution.”36
However, prior to the ratification of the Constitution of 1787, it was not at all clear what would
become of these rights when a citizen of one state traveled to another state. A remedy to this
conundrum was included in Article IV of the Articles of Confederation, and a “streamlined version”
became Article IV of the Federal Constitution in 1787: “The Citizens of each state shall be entitled to
all the Privileges and Immunities of Citizens of the several States.”37
During the first half of the nineteenth century, the meaning of this clause was hotly debated.38
However, as the country entered the period of the Civil War, Constitutional theorist Kurt Lash argues,
the jurisprudence of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV was “theoretically clear and
surprisingly stable.” 39 The cases of Corfield v. Coryell (1823),40 Campbell v. Morris (1797),41
Livingston v. Van Ingen (1812),42 Abbot v. Bayley (1827), 43 and Baker v. Wise (1861)44 all embrace
the same principle: the privileges and immunities of Article IV referred to a “limited (if especially
important) set of state-secured rights.” 45 In other words, no court read this provision as protecting any
national rights, substantive or otherwise. It is for this reason that prior to the Civil War, the states
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“served as the traditional guardians of life, liberty, and property, and through their institutions,
statutes, and court decisions, defined the status and rights of different groups of state residents.”46
However, the stability of antebellum understanding of Article IV presented a major problem
for the Republicans. Limiting the scope of the privileges and immunities clause had, as Lash notes,
the effect of “maximizing the scope of state regulatory autonomy, a states’ right result that protected
the policy-making power of both free and slave states alike.”47
It is in this vein that the Supreme Court decided Dred Scott v. Sandford. In the Opinion of the
Court, Chief Justice Taney relied on the antebellum reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause
of Article IV (the Comity Clause). By holding that slave owners had a constitutional right to carry the
slaves, as property, into any territory, Chief Justice Taney appeared, at least to the Republicans, to be
laying the groundwork for the nationalization of slavery.48 This rejection of the power of the federal
government was seen by the Republicans as the cause of the Civil War because it opened the door to
expanded state rights.49 Additionally, the reading of the Comity Clause reflected in Dred Scott had a
strongly limiting power on the federal government. Dred Scott therefore proved problematic for the
Republicans in two ways. First, it opened the door to the nationalization of slavery. Second, it relied
on skewed reading of the Comity Clause that Republicans believed led to an inevitable but
inappropriate expansion of state rights. However, there was a solution.
The new American states after the Revolutionary War enjoyed the sovereign right to confer
rights upon its citizens. The adoption of the Federal Constitution in 1787, however, added a new
layer. Under this new constitution, citizens of the United States were granted rights both as citizens
of the United States and as citizens of the state in which they resided. Federalism created for
inhabitants of the United States a form of dual-citizenship. As the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
wrote in 1811, the Constitution “clearly recognises the distinction between the character of a citizen
46
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of the United States, and of a citizen of any individual states; and also of citizens of different
states.” 50 Individuals living in the United States were considered to be both citizens of the nation and
citizens of a state. The citizen, legal historian Robert Kaczorowski writes, owed allegiance to both
the nation and the state, and “both the national and the state governments theoretically possessed the
constitutional authority and obligation to enforce and protect the fundamental rights of citizenship.”51
However, prior to the Civil War, the states functioned as the “primary guarantors of the fundamental
rights of American citizens,” party due to the limited reading of the Comity Clause. 52 Kurt Lash
points out that the “privileges and immunities qua US citizens were simply not the same as one’s
privileges and immunities qua state citizen.”53 In other words, the privileges and immunities one was
granted by being a citizen of the United States did not vanish when crossing state lines. Importantly,
there was an key difference between one’s status as a citizen of a state and as a citizen of the U.S. as
a nation. Prior to the Civil War, the prior was prioritized over the latter.
Though the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship were quite narrow and limited, they
were entirely distinct from those granted by individual states. This point carried particular weight in
antebellum America because of the incorporation and creation of new territories that were not yet
under the control of a state government. These “rights of national citizenship” were often discussed
in the context of U.S. treaties of cession. These agreements, Lash explains, promised the inhabitants
of newly acquired territory that, “once they were fully admitted into the Union, they would enjoy all
the privileges and immunities of US citizens.”54 Similar language appeared in the Treaty of
Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 and the Treaty with Stockbridge Tribe of Indians in 1843. There was,
therefore, a common understanding in antebellum American law that there existed “rights and
immunities” or “privileges and immunities” of national citizenship that different completely from the
privileges and immunities of state citizenship. The conflict over slavery forced the nation to address
50
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head on the question whether a citizen owed their “primary allegiance to the national or state
government, and which of these governments had primary authority over the status and rights of the
individual.” 55 A heavy-handed endorsement of state allegiance and state power was causing problems
for the Republicans. It followed, then, that they should endorse national citizenship and national
power.
That is what the Civil War and Reconstruction-era Republicans did. As Foner argues, they
emerged during the winter of 1860, also known as the “secession winter,” as the united defender of
the Union. Foner argues that the Republicans, but the radicals in particular, “abandoned their
commitment to states rights and adopted an unqualified Unionism, once it became apparent that they
would further the antislavery cause.” 56 The Republicans, it must be noted, were not enemies of
federalism. They did not want the federal government to usurp or supplant state power entirely. They
held, however, that the States “must be kept within their proper orbit, an orbit that would keep them
from colliding with the rights of the individual.”57 Republicans insisted that state secession could not
be recognized because it was “inconsistent with the ‘nationality’ of the United States.”58 Particularly,
Republicans “of all factions” were in agreement that the United States was a nation, and not just a
league of sovereign states.59 The Republican position during and after the Civil War was, Foner
writes, that the Union
should be revered and defended not only for itself, but also because of the purposes for which
it had been created. high among these purposes was the spread of freedom, which, in the
1850’s, meant the confinement of slavery. To preserve the Union by undermining this
purpose would be to subvert the foundations of the Union itself. The goals of Union and free
soil were intertwined, and neither could be sacrificed without endangering the other.60
The preservation of the Union and allegiance to it as a Union was the Republican cause. They
favored a unified and cohesive nation over a league of friendship among sovereign states, at least
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partially because this league gave the states too much say over the citizenship rights of its
inhabitants, and the states were not using this authority for good. For the Republicans, but especially
the radicals, giving the national government power over citizenship rights was the means to securing
their ultimate goal of “free soil, free labor, free men.” Their project was, therefore, to prioritize
national citizenship over state citizenship— to tip the balance of the dual-citizenship status of
Americans towards U.S. citizenship, in lieu of state citizenship.

John Bingham, Congress, and the Fourteenth Amendment
The project of the radical Republicans took the form of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, known together as the Reconstruction Amendments. The motivating purpose
behind these amendments, but the Fourteenth Amendment specifically, was to embed Republican
ideas about citizenship into the polity, namely by prioritizing national citizenship over state
citizenship. As has been shown, Republicans saw the prioritization of state citizenship as the enemy
of abolition and the dignity of labor, as well as the reason for the Civil War. It was in this context that
the Fourteenth Amendment was drafted. After the Civil War, some congressional Republicans
embraced a natural law theory of American constitutionalism— that the national government had
always possessed the power to protect the natural rights of U.S. citizens.61 Legal scholar Robert
Kaczorowski argues that because they believed that national citizenship was primary, and “state
citizenship derivative,” the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment believed that “Congress possess
primary authority to secure the civil rights of United States citizens.”62
The author of the Section 1 of the Amendment was John Bingham, a congressman from
Ohio. Bingham was a Republican, and his views on the Fourteenth Amendment confirm that it was
meant to alter the definition of U.S. citizenship by giving Congress the power to protect
infringements on rights, thus conferring and recognizing national citizenship status, and prioritizing
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the nation over the states. By seeking to alter the definition of citizenship, upend the balance of
power, and catalyze political change, Bingham was acting as an elite-level political entrepreneur.
In a recent notable biography on John Bingham, legal scholar Gerard Magliocca shows how
Bingham and “the abolitionist dream that was his life’s pursuit were both rooted in the emerald hills
of western Pennsylvania and eastern Ohio.”63 Until the age of twelve, John Bingham lived in the
small town of Mercer, Pennsylvania. After the death of his mother in 1827, he moved to Cadiz, Ohio
at his father’s wishes. His family, friends, community, and faith were all aligned, Magliocca writes,
“in their fervor for abolitionism, devotion to God, and hostility to the Democratic Party.”64 In 1835,
Bingham enrolled in Franklin College, which in 1849 merged with Marshall College to become what
is now Franklin & Marshall College. Bingham worked as a lawyer after he moved back to Cadiz in
1840, but he was “eager to make contacts and establish a reputation,” so he quickly involved himself
in politics. 65 He worked on Whig campaigns for many years while he worked as an attorney, but he
did not become a candidate himself until 1846, when he ran for prosecutor of Tuscarawas County and
won with 55 percent of the vote.66
Parts of Bingham’s background and some statements he made during early debates over the
Fourteenth Amendment have lead critics to question whether he truly was an abolitionist, and
whether he intended the Fourteenth Amendment to radically alter the federal balance. Indeed,
Bingham made no recorded public statements about slavery until 1848.67 However, as Magliocca
notes, a letter Bingham wrote to Salmon P. Chase, a leader of what would become the Republican
Party, in 1845 dispels any doubt we may have about his abolitionist sentiments. In it, Bingham
requests assistance from Chase to advance the antislavery cause:
We try to be as active as possible, in efforts to advance the cause, though we labor under
many discouragements. The counties of Scioto, Lawrence, Jackson, Gallia, and Meigs, are
63
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collectively, perhaps as inveterately Proslavery, as the same number of contiguous counties
anywhere else in the State. If there be any portion of the Ohio field demanding a greater share
of anti-slavery Labor than any other, it would seem that these central frontier counties
embrace that portion, and yet we have been wholly neglected….I pray you if possible, send
us a laborer for a short time this fall, one who has a missionary spirit, whose heart and soul is
in the cause; who will be willing to address small meetings or large ones, who will go from
neighborhood to neighborhood, from one appointment to another for a few days until this
half-dead community shall begin to wake up and show signs of life.68
As this letter, Bingham’s background, and his future public statements denouncing slavery should
make clear, John Bingham was a staunch abolitionist. Indeed, on March 14, 1854, during his first run
for Congress, Bingham addressed a gathering in Cadiz. A Democratic newspaper reported him as
pronouncing that he had now gone “completely over to the abolitionists.” 69
John Bingham had unusual Constitutional views for the antebellum era. They oozed
skepticism of states’ rights, and presumed a strong national government. He believed (prior to any
proposal of a draft of the Fourteenth Amendment) that Congress had “broad authority to regulate the
territories under Article Four, Section Three,… and that this included the authority to ban slavery.” 70
He also believed that states were “equal in many respects, but they were ‘unequal in the right to do
wrong,’ and thus did not have an equal right to bring slaves in the territories.”71 Bingham believed
that the original thirteen states had an unbridgeable right to have slavery since they predated the
Constitution, but that states admitted after ratification did not have such a right. In other words, he
believed that federal courts could invalidate laws in some states that were constitutional in the
original thirteen. Specifically, he believed that the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 did not apply to the
original thirteen states, but did grant Congress the power to oversee state laws in other states. Though
the Supreme Court disagreed in 1850 in Strader v. Graham,72 saying that the Northwest Ordinance
no longer applied once a territory became a state, Bingham argued that the Court’s holding was

68

Letter from John A. Bingham to Salmon P. Chase et al., Aug 6, 1845, 1 (Pennsylvania Historical Society), cited in
Magliocca (2013), 29.
69

Cadiz Democratic Sentinel, July 12, 1854, cited in Magliocca (2013), 40.

70

Magliocca (2013), 53.

71

Ibid, 54, quoting Congressional Globe, 34th Cong., 3d Sess. app., 137.

72

51 U.S. 82, 95 (1850).

Chapter 2

! 58

“irrelevant because the principles of the ordinance were adopted in the Bill of Rights.”73 Bingham’s
invocation of Bill of Rights is the key point here. He concluded that “[t]he Act of 1789 adopting this
ordinance, as also the amendment incorporating its great principles in the Constitution, were ‘statute
restrictions upon the institution of new States’ perpetual obligation.”74 This view, Magliocca notes, is
basis for holding that the Bill of Rights applied to the states as well as the federal government. It
seems Bingham believed this was possible through Article IV’s Comity Clause. Bingham was
convinced that the original Constitution imposed an obligation on the states to protect the rights
enumerated in the Bill of Rights. It was on this view that Bingham based the first draft of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
After he was reelected to Congress in 1865, Bingham confronted head-on the concerns facing
the country. General Lee’s surrender in April, 1865, which marked the official end of the Civil War,
had raised massive questions about the future of the country. Arguably the most important question
involved the conditions that were to be imposed upon the conquered southern states as the cost of
readmission to the Union. Bingham, like most Republicans, felt that “the South should be compelled
to do more to protect the freed slaves.”75 He dismissed the claim that the former Confederate States
could retain the rights they had prior to the war, as states with significant autonomy. One of
Bingham’s primary concerns was to guarantee that every “natural born citizen of the United States”
was “entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens.”76 So, when Bingham returned to
Congress in December of 1865 for the 39th Congress, he proposed an initial draft of what would
eventually become the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, Bingham’s solo effort was quickly institutionalized when he was appointed to the
Joint Committee on Reconstruction in 1866. In January of 1866, he spoke to Congress: “The Party of
the Republic proposes only to take security for the future,” and ensuring this security meant refusing
the “horrid blasphemy…that this is a Government of white men,” and securing “equal and exact
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justice to all men.”77 Bingham’s solution, Magliocca writes, was a constitutional amendment that
would “give Congress and the federal courts the authority to enforce fundamental rights.”78
Specifically, Bingham proposed an amendment that would give Congress the power to pass “all laws
necessary and proper to secure to all persons—which includes every citizen of every State— their
equal personal rights.”79 Additionally, to prevent rights of citizens of one state not being respected by
another state, Bingham wanted the “Federal judiciary clothed with the power to take cognizance of
the question, and assert those rights by solemn judgment, inflicting upon the offenders such penalties
as will compel a decent respect for this guarantee to all the citizens of every State.” 80 In short,
Bingham desired an amendment that would massively empower Congress to recognize, define, and
defend the rights of citizens against encroachment by state governments.
Into this amendment, Bingham poured his “basic theory of citizenship, natural rights, and
constitutional government.”81 Specifically, Bingham rejected Justice Taney’s theory from Dred Scott
that national citizenship was derivative of state citizenship. Rather, he contended that national
citizenship and the privileges that came with it existed outside of state citizenship. The first draft
gave Congress the power to pass “all necessary and proper laws to secure to all persons in every
State of the Union equal protection in their rights of life, liberty, and property.”82 By doing so,
Bingham sought to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship into the Constitutional
structure. Specifically, Bingham believed that the Comity Clause “pointed away from state-secured
rights and toward the rights of national citizenship.” 83 Thus, this first draft represented a nuanced,
albeit unusual constitutional theory: that the Comity Clause bound the states to protect and ensure
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rights that were listed in the federal Bill of Rights.84 Importantly, Bingham believed that this new
amendment gave Congress no new powers. He believed that Congress already possessed these
powers under the Comity Clause. However, the failure of the states to respect the rights they were
already constitutionally bound to protect “justified the addition of an amendment that authorized
congressional enforcement of enumerated constitutional liberty.”85 Bingham addressed Congress:
And sir, it is equally clear by every construction of the Constitution, its contemporaneous
construction, its continued construction, legislative, executive and judicial, that these great
provisions of the Constitution, this immortal bill of rights embodied in the Constitution,
rested for its execution and enforcement hitherto upon the fidelity of the States. The House
knows, sir, the country knows, the civilized world knows, that the legislative, executive, and
judicial officers of element States within this Union within the last five years, in utter
disregard of these injunctions of your Constitution in utter disregard of that official oath
which the Constitution required they should severally take and faithfully keep when they
entered upon the discharge of their respective duties, have violated in every sense of the word
these provisions of the Constitution of the United States, the enforcement of which are
absolutely essential to American nationality.86
Bingham, then, believed strongly that the states were bound to uphold the Bill of Rights both because
national U.S. citizenship was already more important, and to help protect it.
There was, however, strong disagreement over what precisely Bingham’s proposal meant.
Democratic Congressman Andrew Jackson Rogers thought that the effect of Bingham’s proposed
amendment was to “take away the power of the States; to interfere with the internal policy and
regulations of the States: the centralize a consolidated power in the Federal Constitution which our
fathers never intended should be exercised by it.”87 Additionally, radical supporters of Bingham’s
proposal relied on theories of unenumerated federal power that had foundations in Prigg v.
Pennsylvania88 to define and protect any and all common law civil rights in the states. Some other
Republicans insisted that Bingham’s “Article IV-based draft would do nothing more than authorize
federal enforcement of the Comity Clause of the Article IV as traditionally understood,”89 while
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Republican Congressman Robert Hale of New York was not convinced. Hale argued that Bingham’s
proposed amendment “threatened to ‘utterly obliterate State rights and State authority over their own
internal affairs,’” so the balance of federalism would be disrupted.90 Yet other Republicans assumed
that the proposed amendment referred not to Article IV and the Bill of Rights, but “to the same
common law state-protected rights discussed in antebellum cases and treatises.”91
Bingham’s views themselves, however, seemed to have evolved. Though he initially claimed
that Article IV protected a “national set of rights,” which included the Bill of Rights,92 as Lash points
out, he later adopted the more common view that the first eight amendments “constituted the
American Bill of Rights.”93 This may partially explain why Bingham produced a revised second draft
of the Fourteenth Amendment after Congress moved to postpone the full consideration of the
amendment until April 1866. When Bingham and the other members of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction began to reconsider the amendment, they did so cautiously, since they were fully
aware that varying interpretations and theories of federalism, national power, natural and civil rights,
and, thus, citizenship existed in and outside Congress. On April 21, 1866 the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction began to look again at Bingham’s proposal, but they did so “fully aware of their
colleagues’ objections to national control of common law civil rights.”94 Concerns about
overreaching federal power through enforcement of civil rights ultimately lead to the demise of
Bingham’s first draft. In other words, Bingham’s project to institutionalize national citizenship over
state citizenship was being met with skepticism and objections.
The language that Bingham proposed as a second draft survived debate unedited and
ultimately became Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment:95
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No States shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any States deprive any person of life, liberty or
property without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.96
This second draft reflected Bingham’s ultimate goals to prioritize national over state citizenship by
protecting the substantive liberties listed in the Bill of Rights from state infringement. Here Bingham
used language about national citizenship that was not new. Specifically, it used the language “of
national citizenship and antebellum legal treaties [such as the Louisiana Cession Act] recently
discussed in widely published statements and congressional speeches.”97 This language reflected
Bingham’s overall constitutional theory, which legal scholar Richard Aynes suggests has four parts:
the (1) national citizenship; (2), Bill of Rights; (3) compact, and; (4) enforcement theories.98 The first
theory, the national citizenship theory, we have already seen. It holds that “the Privileges and
Immunities Clause [the Comity Clause] of Article IV, Section 2 protects rights of national rather than
state citizenship.”99 This is the theory reflected more precisely in Bingham’s first draft. Bingham
believed, as did many other Republicans, that state infringement on rights was an unconstitutional, or
at very least improper, violation, since there existed rights of national citizenship that should be held
out of the reach of the states. The second part of Bingham’s theory, the Bill of Rights theory, argues
“the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens include, at a minimum, the provisions of the Bill of
Rights.”100 The third component, the compact theory, holds that “even before the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the Constitution prohibited states from abiding the first eight
Amendments.”101 The fourth and final component, the enforcement theory, holds that the Fourteenth
Amendment “provides the enforcement power absent from Article IV, Section 2.102 In sum, then, it
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seems that Bingham may have believed his proposed amendment was redundant, since it reiterated
and elucidated what he believed was already in the Constitution. However, because others in
Congress did not share his constitutional theory, the amendment, which was intended to “enforce the
Bill of Rights against the states,” was necessary to nationalize citizenship, promote the Republican
agenda, and prevent another civil war.103
Senator Trumbull, a moderate Republican and chair of the Judiciary Committee, supported
Bingham’s proposed amendment. American citizenship, he claimed, “would be little worth if it did
not carry protection with it.”104 Representative James Wilson of Iowa agreed. The federal
government, he claimed, must have the power to protect civil rights, since they were derivative of,
and necessary for the exercise of, natural rights. If the national government did not do this, then the
“Constitution fails in the first and most important office government.”105 Therefore, as legal scholar
Stephen Heyman argues, the 1866 debates “make clear that the Framers understood the Civil Rights
Act and the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate a fundamental right to protection by the
government, with a corresponding obligation on the states to afford such protection.”106
Reconstruction, therefore, marked a turning point in notions of state power: the federal
government, not the states, was now the “main protector of citizens’ rights,” and, as such, the federal
government took on new responsibilities to recognize citizens specifically and distinctly beyond the
capacities of state governments.107 Richard Aynes suggests that even those who have a narrow view
of the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment must concede that it was designed to establish a distinct
set of “privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.108 The Republican purpose of the
Reconstruction Amendments, but the Fourteenth Amendment specifically, then was to “preserve their
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Civil War victory over state sovereignty and slavery, …[and to] establish in law the primacy of
United States citizenship and with it the primacy of Congress’s authority to secure the rights of
American citizens.”109 The Reconstruction Amendments were, therefore, designed at least in part to
recognize and affirm national citizenship over state citizenship.110 It was through these amendments,
as well through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, that Republicans in Congress imposed upon the nation
their view of national supremacy: “sovereignty centered in the nation the primacy of citizens’ alliance
to the nation, the primacy of national citizenship, and the primacy of national authority to secure and
enforce the civil rights of United States citizens.”111

Durability of Citizenship: 1868- 1873
Reconstruction-era Republicans succeeded at tipping the scales in favor of the Union, and
prioritizing national citizenship over state citizenship. Not only had the Reconstruction Amendments,
which reflected their constitutional vision, been ratified, but also other political institutions endorsed
similar visions for national citizenship. Authority had been redistributed. As will be discussed in
Chapter 4, due partially to action taken on the part of Republicans to harness them to their advantage,
both federal and state courts, but especially lower federal courts, decided cases that endorsed
Republican understandings of the new Amendments. The Department of Justice also began enforcing
the federal primary authority over citizenship. Republican ideas about citizenship had, therefore, won
the day. To use the rhetoric of APD, Republicans had achieved a shift in governing authority.
However, as Orren and Skowronek make clear, no shift in governing authority, such as this one, is
permanent precisely because no shift in governing authority occurs in a political vacuum. Rather,
political development is the story of multiple governing authorities, each failing to entirely displace
the other. The more complete the displacement, the more durable the shift; the less complete the
displacement, the less durable the shift. The more fractured the polity, the more difficult it becomes
109
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to displace the old institutional arrangement. Orren and Skowronek claim that a “durable shift” is a
shift “in authority that hold on for a half-century, in the same polity, and within some broader context
of years, without getting reversed or deflected by other events, are, prima facie, durable in a way that
shifts that hold for a decade or less are not.”112
Given that the U.S. polity is heavily fractured, it would, therefore, be extremely unlikely that
the shift the Republicans achieved a high level of displacement. So, unsurprisingly, they failed to
entirely displace the old institution arrangement. The shift the Republicans achieved was broad
because it was reflected in several political institutions, but it was not deep: they did not vanquish
other opposing political ideas. Rather, the opposing ideas – in this case Democratic ideas of
citizenship, federalism, and national and state power – lay dormant for several years while the
Republican-driven shift exercised what little durability it had, waiting their chance to fight again for
dominance. The dearth of depth in the Republican-driven shift is the reason it had little durability—
it lasted less than a decade.
The shift in governing authority that resulted from the actions of Reconstruction Republicans
lasted until 1873. Between 1868 and 1873, state and federal judiciaries, as well as the Department of
Justice adopted ideas about citizenship that accorded with those of the Republicans. Prior to 1873,
Kaczorowksi writes, “all federal courts and most state appellate courts evaluating the Civil Rights
Act of 1866 adopted the Republican theory of the thirteenth amendment and found the Act to be
constitutional.” 113 Additionally, federal judges and legal officers, “interpreted the fourteenth
amendment as a delegation of primary authority to enforce civil rights, regardless of the source of
infringement,” thus partially the Republican view, which indicated just how little durability this shift
had.114 For example, in United States v. Rhodes,115 Supreme Court Justice Noah Swayne, sitting as a
Circuit Court Justice, articulated the Republican theory of congressional rights-enforcement
authority. Prior to the Reconstruction Amendment, Justice Swayne explained, “the power to [define
112
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the status and rights of citizens] belonged entirely to the states.”116 The amendments, however,
“reversed and annulled the original policy of the constitution.”117 He reasoned that these amendments
conferred upon all inhabitants of the United States a common status and a uniform set of rights as
U.S. citizens. “What the several states under the original constitution could have done [to define the
status and secure the rights of U.S. citizens], the nation has done by” Reconstruction Amendments.118
By upholding the Thirteenth Amendment in this case, Justice Swayne was “[e]mbracing the
Republicans’ nationalist theory of constitution interpretation.”119
Additionally, Kaczorowski notes that every federal judge who considered the
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, another Republican project, upheld it. 120 In In re
Turner, Justice Salmon Chase upheld the statue and argued that the Thirteenth Amendment
“establishes freedom as the constitutional right of all persons in the United States.” 121 Similarly, In
United States v. Hall,122 future Supreme Court Justice William B. Woods articulated ideas about the
Fourteenth Amendment and its relation to national citizenship that were identical to those of the
Republicans:
By the original constitution citizenship in the United States was a consequence of citizenship
in a state. By [the citizenship clause] this order of things is reversed. Citizenship in the
United States is defined; it is made independent of citizenship in a state, and citizenship in a
state is a result of citizenship in the United States. So that a person born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to its jurisdiction, is, without reference to state constitutions or
laws, entitled to all the privileges and immunities secured by the constitution of the United
Sates to citizens thereof.123
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And in Georgia v. Stanton,124 the Supreme Court refused to overturn the Reconstruction
Amendments, citing their lack of jurisdiction over political questions. Federal judges, Kaczorowski
notes, uniformly interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as a “constitutional delegation of
congressional authority to secure the fundamental rights of citizens,” which would not have been
possible prior to the amendment.125 Though there was no grand ringing endorsement, the judiciary
between 1868 and 1873 did uphold Republican ideas about citizenship, federalism, and national and
state power, suggesting that the Republican-driven project constituted a shift in governing authority
that had at least a modicum of durability.
The Department of Justice (DOJ) also endorsed the Republican understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Since they were now armed with “judicially sanctioned legal authority
to secure citizens’ rights,” DOJ attorneys began a crusade against the Ku Klux Klan in 1870.126
Hundreds of Klansmen were prosecuted, convicted, and imprisoned by, importantly, federal courts
between 1870 and 1873 for “violating citizens’ rights to life and property, to freedom of speech and
assembly, to keep and bear arms, to equal protection of the laws, and to vote.”127
However, as was noted, the shift in governing authority that resulted from the Republican
project did not entirely displace the old regime. Differing ideas about citizenship remained during
this period, but they were articulated outside of the dominant narrative. All the while, President
Andrew Johnson and other Democratic opponents to the Republican ideology “vehemently insisted
upon the primacy of state citizenship.” 128 Proponents of the primacy of state citizenship included
President Andrew Johnson, 129 Illinois Representative Anthony Thornton, 130 Indiana Representative
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Michael Kerr,131 and Maryland Senator Reverdy Johnson.132 Similarly, the dissent in State v.
Washington133 “stands out for its clear and comprehensive articulation of the Democratic
Conservative critique of the Republican theory of congressional civil rights enforcement” and
national citizenship. 134 Justice Crokett, writing in dissent, said that if the Reconstruction
Amendments have the power the Republicans claim they do, then Congress “has the supreme
authority over all our civil rights, and may at its discretion change, modify, or abolish all State laws
relating to personal security or the acquisition and enjoyment of private property, and substitute
others in their stead, on the pretext that it is necessary to do so in order to secure personal freedom to
all.”135 Justice Crockett believed that the federal government having the primary power to secure
rights, thus rejecting state citizenship, was an impermissible violation of federalism. Under these
powers, Congress may “define tenures of property, regulate the laws of descents, provide appropriate
remedies for violation of every right of property, and practically supersede all State laws on these
important subjects.” 136 If Congress exercised these powers, “the States government had as well be
abolished,” since they would have no operative value, Crocket concluded.137 Justice Crockett was,
here, rejecting the Republican idea of citizenship. Importantly, however, he was dissenting, because
during this period it was the Republican idea, that of the primacy of national citizenship, held sway.
Though there was a shift in governing authority that resulted from the Republican project to reaffirm
the Union and prioritize national over state citizenship, it did not, therefore, entirely, displace the old
ideational context. This is because the fractured polity allows for old ideas to stay in play, in, for
example, judicial dissents. The polity allows for these ideas to come back into play, thus producing
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change endogenously rather than exogenously. These ideas about citizenship were relegated behind
the dominant idea until 1873, when another ideational shift occurred.

Conclusion
On the eve of the Civil War, contrasting political ideas abounded. These ideas applied to
slavery, state power, national power, federalism, and citizenship. After the surrender by the southern
states, Republicans in Congress sought to embed a narrower and consistent set of political ideas that
followed from the victory of and definition of Union into the fabric of the Constitution. They wanted
to ensure “Free Labor, Free Soil, Free Men.” This slogan represented an endorsement of the dignity
of labor and natural rights. Preserving but refining the Union was a necessary part of their project.
They sought to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship for two reasons. First, they
believed prioritization of states’ rights was the evil that caused the Civil War, and, second, it was still
allowing impermissible infringements on civil and labor rights, which was a hindrance to the
maintenance and preservation of natural rights. Their project took the form of what we know today as
the Reconstruction Amendments: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. These
amendments tipped the balance of federalism away from the states and towards the national
government, and marked a shift towards the prioritization of national citizenship. As has been shown,
this is evident through the work of John Bingham specifically, the drafter of Section 1 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The Republican project in the terminology of APD, produced a durable shift in governing
authority insofar as Republican ideas were broadly accepted by Congress and judicial authority (and
inasmuch as opposition to them by the executive resulted, in part, in impeachment). The political
ideas of Republicans achieved dominance, and a new concept of national citizenship had been
implemented. However, it was not a durable shift. Due to the fractured nature of the American polity,
dissenters that rejected the primacy of national citizenship were allowed to harbor their ideas in other
ways. As has been explained, because political change never happens in a vacuum, the Republican
project was not immune to challenge. Eric Foner has argued that the project of Reconstruction was
eventually derailed by the economic downturn of the 1870s, an exogenous shock. However, as has
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been foreshadowed here, there may be another reason. Specifically, the Republican project for
national citizenship fell victim to the constitutional design of the fractured polity. Their ideas did
indeed achieve dominance for a short period, between 1868 and 1873. Opposing ideas about the
future of the nation, federal power, and citizenship lay in repose, however, waiting for their moment
to return to the spotlight and fight again for dominance. Dissenting ideas of citizenship soon lay siege
to the Republican project. They sought to deconstruct what the Republicans had built, and embed a
different idea in the dominant institutional framework. Reconstruction-era Republicans did not have
the final word on the subject of U.S. citizenship — far from it. The Republican ideas merely found
solid footing for a brief period.

Chapter 3
Incomplete Institutionalization of the Shift: Challenging Reconstruction Constitutionalism

In the midst of Reconstruction, the Republicans tried desperately to complete their project to
establish the federal government as the primary protector of citizenship rights. Implementing their
new vision for the country required quite a bit of luck, and substantial work due to the fragmented
and complicated nature of the institutions that make up the American state. With the passage of the
Reconstruction Amendments, they had achieved a major milestone for the pragmatic and practical
needs of reincorporating the southern states back into the Union, as well as a significant victory for
institutionalizing their vision for national and state power, federalism, and citizenship. However, as
highlighted in Chapter 1, Scheingate reminds us the American polity is a complex entity full of
overlapping and conflicting institutions.1 Because of this fragmentation, achieving fuller
institutionalization and a durable shift in governing authority would require more than the
Reconstruction Amendments – it would require multiple federal institutions, state institutions, and
social movements to endorse the Republican view of citizenship and federal balance.
In fact, what appears to have been a string of Republican victories in the name of a new
vision of citizenship, i.e., the passage of the Amendments, the passage of Civil Rights Acts to protect
the newly freedmen, and the impeachment of an obstructionist president, together actually reveal that
the Republican project was under siege from the start, so they never operated from a place of
strength. It also reveals the degree to which the institutional structure of American governance
challenges the rise, implementation, and entrenchment of new ideas. Achieving a shift in governing
authority that could stand the test of time became significantly harder than Republicans anticipated,
not only because pockets of ideational dissent remained and were growing, but also because the
institutional structures of governance provided harbor for these contrary notions. Each attempt by
Republicans to entrench their vision in the institutional structure was challenged. But, Reconstruction
is not just a story of Radical Republicans slowly being displaced over time, challenged by more
1 Adam
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moderate visions and ultimately unseated by exogenous shocks such as the Panic of 1873. Rather, the
Radicals and their vision were challenged from the start given the institutional design in which they
operated and which they did not remake. Republicans layered their policies upon old ones, which
resulted in the frictions that proved problematic for them. They “‘graft[ed]… new elements onto an
otherwise stable institutional framework.’”2 Republicans responded with multiple attempts to
entrench their vision in the face of ideational opposition, each more desperate than the last. This story
reveals a paradoxical picture: though the Republicans ideals were victorious on the battlefield in
Civil War, they did not win after the Civil War. Reconstruction is not a story of triumphant
Republicans instituting the vision that won the war. Rather, Republicans layered their constitutional
vision on an institutional structure that would ultimately thwart their shift in governing authority.
From the start, their vision was challenged— first by the President, and his obstruction was overcome
via impeachment. Then their definition of national citizenship in the newly proposed Fourteenth
Amendment failed, unable to secure the necessary support from three-quarters of the states. To meet
that challenge, the Republican Congress employed procedural anomalies that call the legitimacy of
the Amendment into question. In the face of this obstruction and as their electoral coalition began to
crumble, the Republicans sought to guard their vision by ratifying the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870,
and then passing a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871. Finally, as the Supreme Court dealt
a final blow to Radical vision in 1873 with its ruling in the Slaughterhouse Cases, the increasingly
besieged Republican Congress attempted one last-ditch effort to entrench their vision in the
institutional structure of the US polity by passing the Civil Rights Act of 1875. In short, once all of
the institutional barriers to the new Republican vision of national citizenship are assessed,
Republican efforts look far less like the actions of victors. Instead they reveal just how difficult it was
to dislodge a resilient idea of citizenship so opposed and despised by the Radicals.
As was shown in the previous chapter, the Republicans did succeed at spreading their vision
of citizenship across several institutions. Their vision for the prioritization of national citizenship
over state citizenship was implemented horizontally— across the Department of Justice and parts of
2
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the federal judiciary. It also saw temporary partial institutionalization vertically— in some state
judiciaries, legislatures, and bureaucracies. Yet Democrats continued challenge national citizenship
by prioritizing state power and rejecting national power. Because of this ideational pushback and the
actions its entrepreneurial proponents pursued, the Republican vision for citizenship and federal
power amounts to what political scientist Richard Valelly has called “incomplete
institutionalization.”3 Why was there incomplete institutionalization? What was happening in the
states and at the popular movements during this time? Where were dissenting ideas harbored?
Whether it was explicit racism or if it was an externality of their belief in the primacy of state
citizenship, Democratic efforts intended to deny blacks full membership of the political community.
But after the Civil War, these older ideas about citizenship did not die— they reappeared and found
voice in new places. Zones of ideational dissent about citizenship remained, and entrepreneurial
actors seized them without challenge, so the Republican project crumbled. Specifically, during
Reconstruction two features of the U.S. polity specifically created domains where the ideas about
citizenship that conflicted with Republican visions could find voice: state governments and social
movements. This argument attempts to bridge the divide between the two schools of American
Political Development as Brian Glenn has described them.4 The gap between “historical
institutionalism” (the first school) and “ideational approaches” (the second) is narrowed by the
broader argument in this chapter that ideational development in the polity is related strongly to
institutional development over time. Though Republicans had achieved what might have appeared to
be a durable shift in governing authority by altering the language of the Constitution itself, they
layered this shift upon the existing systems of federalism and democracy. As a result, dissenting ideas
exploited the frictional gaps and found strong footing to challenge the Republican-driven shift. As
was explained in chapter one, it is a feature of the U.S. polity than these zones even exist— states
and social movements both factor into the “complex” nature of the U.S. polity Adam Scheingate
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describes.5 The U.S. constitutional structure, in fact, relies on social movements to maintain
democratic legitimacy so there is always a place where disfavored ideas can rest in repose and
potentially unsettle the seeming dominant and durable ideas. Similarly, states can act, in the words of
Supreme Court Justices Sandra Day O’Connor and Louis Brandeis, as “laboratories” for democracy
and policy.6 Importantly, it is a feature of the federalist system specifically that states can endorse and
institutionalize non-dominant political ideas. As legal theorist Heather Gerken suggests, federalism
promotes voice by offering a place where non-dominant ideas can be institutionalized outside of the
national institutional arrangement.7 Gerken reminds us that federalism “promotes choice, fosters
competition, facilitates participation, enables experimentation, and wards off a national Leviathan.”8
She explains how a key component of the federalism system in the U.S. is its ability to allow what
she has called “dissenting by deciding.” This occurs when “would-be dissenters— individuals who
hold a minority view within the polity as a whole—enjoy a local majority on a decisionmaking body
and can thus dictate the outcome.”9 By providing places where old, minority, or disfavored ideas can
find voice, the structure of the U.S. polity itself allows for the recirculation of political ideas.
After the Civil War, Republicans tried and failed to build what Orren and Skowronek call a
durable shift in governing authority. 10 They did indeed succeed at building a shift— but not a durable
one, because the vision Congressional Republicans had was under siege from the moment it began.
This chapter analyzes how the states, social movements, and indeed the President acted as zones of
ideational dissent by harboring non-dominant ideas about citizenship while the Republican-driven
shift held sway. Gradually, ideas about citizenship that challenged Republican notions began to erode
5
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the dominance of the Republican ideas.. After the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, there was
constant ideational dissent from multiple places, and the political actors that held those ideas
exploited the fragmented nature of the U.S. polity to attack the Republican project. The Republican
project was challenged first by President Andrew Johnson, then by the states’ refusal to pass the 14th
amendment, then by popular social movements such as the KKK, and finally by the Supreme Court.
The Republicans took action every time to eliminate the threat to their vision, but they ultimately fell
victim to the federalist institutional structure of separated powers. The complicated, convoluted,
fragmented, and overlapping nature of the U.S. polity makes ideational stability impossible. To
illustrate this notion, this chapter begins with a discussion of what Richard Valelly calls
“Reconstruction Constitutionalism,” which refers to the Republican ideas described in the previous
chapter—that national citizenship should be prioritized over state citizenship and that the federal
government should take a more active role in protecting the rights of citizens from infringement by
states and by other people. Second, I discuss the ratification process of the Fourteenth Amendment. A
victorious and dominant Republican party that had just successfully eliminated a dissenting President
Johnson might seem to have an easy time ratifying an amendment that reflected their vision for union
and national citizenship. However, hamstrung at every turn, Republicans implemented some dubious
constitutional maneuvering to get the Fourteenth Amendment ratified.
Third, this chapter discusses the impeachment trial of President Andrew Johnson. President
Johnson was one of the most prominent ideational dissenters; he had to be impeached if Radicals
were to entrench their vision. Fourth, Republicans realized their project was incomplete in the early
1870s. Zones of ideational dissent remained. I discuss a two-pronged attack the Republicans faced in
the late-1860s and early 1870s. It came both from (1) the states in the form of Black Codes, and (2)
from the people themselves in the form of political violence and intimidation. Southerners articulated
their dissenting political ideas through a social movement: the Ku Klux Klan. The KKK contested
emergent Republican conceptions of citizenship with violence and terror. The KKK served as a
temporary stronghold of older notions of limited citizenship and collectively acted as a political
entrepreneur by exploiting the frictional gaps in the formal institutional structure to bring the ideas
back into play. To respond to these attacks and give further life to their project, the Republicans
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pushed the Fifteenth Amendment through the ratification process, and passed three statutes that gave
life to that Amendment and put it to work protecting the new rights of national citizenship from
infringement in the states. These statutes were the (1) Enforcements Act of 1870, (2) the Enforcement
Act of 1871, and (3) the Second Enforcement Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.
Fifth, this chapter explains how incomplete institutionalization led to the downfall of the Republican
project. This chapter focuses on one example that demonstrates there was incomplete
institutionalization of the Republican project. Racial animus and the re-establishment of interracial
marriage bans in state governments, after very brief periods where they were often considered to be
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment between 1868 and 1871 show that the Republicans failed to
fully embed their vision for union and national citizenship across the complex and fragmented U.S.
polity. State laws regulating “miscegenation” ran directly counter to the more egalitarian ideals of the
Republican party. These laws sought to preserve the “racial purity” of the white population, and they
rejected the idea that non-whites could hold equal citizenship status to whites. Importantly, to justify
the legitimacy of these laws, their proponents drew on states’ rights arguments to justify their
legitimacy, and condemned the Republican project to prioritize national citizenship over state
citizenship. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which, I
argue, was a final, desperate attempt by the Republicans to institutionally entrench their vision for
Union national citizenship.

Republicans and Reconstruction Constitutionalism
With the passage of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, the Republicandominated Congress emancipated the slaves and proclaimed that national citizenship should now be
prioritized over state citizenship. However, they did not stop there. In order to both fully
institutionalize their vision and to more fully protect the ideals they had instituted, further action on
the part of the federal government was necessary. Robert Kaczorowski writes that national authority
over citizenship was now primary because “national rather than state citizenship now determined the
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status and rights of individuals as citizens.” 11 As a result, Congress, as opposed to state governments,
was now authorized to secure the rights of citizens “in any manner that it deemed appropriate,
consistent with the Constitution.”12 Political scientist Pamela Brandwein shows how the
disagreement between Reconstruction-era Republicans and Democrats over what precisely was “the
problem” of slavery animated Reconstruction constitutionalism.13 Democrats saw “the problem” to
be remedied by formal emancipation, but the Republicans were not so sure. Republicans dismissed
the notion that “formal emancipation was a clean break with the past.”14 For them, slavery was still
alive in the postwar South, even after the ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment. Racially
motivated crimes were among the continuing threats of what Republicans believed to be “the
problem” of slavery. Brandwein points out that some speeches by both Moderate and Radical
Republicans, despite the formal (legal) prohibition of slavery, refer simultaneously to the end of
slavery and to the continuation of it. Republicans, then, saw situations in which states and popular
actions treated blacks poorly by limiting their social and political rights as part of “the problem” that
Reconstruction was trying to remedy. They believed that simple formal emancipation as achieved in
the Thirteenth Amendment was insufficient to remedy the problem.
The Republicans could not watch states enact statutes limited the social and political rights of
blacks, both previously free and newly emancipated (states later did with poll taxes, literacy tests,
grandfather clauses, as well as violence and intimidation) and do nothing. Unless rules were
established that prohibited states from disenfranchising black men, southern states would gain a great
advantage in political strength. Under a population-based apportionment scheme, black citizens
would count for assessing the total number of representatives a state had in the House of
Representatives. Thus, Brandwein notes, “Southern states would gain political power at the national
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level by using a black population that they were disenfranchising at home.”15 In general, Republicans
believed that the political process needed protection from future abuse by ex-Confederates who
“sought to accomplish by legislation what could not be accomplish on the battlefield.”16 ExConfederates may have accepted the legality of the Thirteenth Amendment and the formal
emancipation it required, but, Representative Sydney Perham of Maine said, “they still believe that
slavery is the best condition for the colored race, and it is but reasonable to suppose that as far as
possible this idea would, if they were allowed to govern, be embodied in law, and carried out in their
intercourse with the colored people.”17 Therefore, for both ideological and political reasons,
declaring the national citizenship would now be prioritized over state citizenship in the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments was not enough— they would also have to ensure citizenship continued
to be defined this way by using the arm of the federal government to protect the new national
citizenship from infringement.
However, as many noted, using the federal government in this way could destroy American
federalism. As Kaczorowski writes, “the supremacy of national sovereignty so centralized power in
the national government that the states as separate and autonomous political entities could have been
destroyed.”18 Importantly, however, Republicans were no doubt aware of this concern and,
consequently, made it clear that they did not want to destroy federalism. Brandwein cogently
explains that answering the question “did Republicans intend to protect freemen’s rights at the
expense of traditional limits on federalism?” either negatively or affirmatively rather misses the point
because it overlooks important nuances. She explains that if the “traditional federal system” refers to
“state authority over civil rights (the nineteenth-century definition of civil rights and the Bill of
Rights, as practiced before the war and as defined by the Court in Barron [v. Baltimore (1833)]19,”
which held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states, then Republicans expressed the goal of
15
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changing it.20 On the other hand, if the “traditional federal system” refers to “a general notion of
limited government, then the Republicans wanted to keep this system.”21 Republicans did not want to
do away with the principle of separation of powers in government by leaving some duties up to the
states. What they did, however, was reorient it so the states could not tread on the rights of national
citizenship as expressed in the Bill of Rights and through the Fourteenth Amendment.
Federalism itself was preserved, and robustly so, but Republicans imagined a new,
reorganized federalism that redefined the “lines of jurisdiction between national and state
authority.”22 Foner elaborates on this new boundary by explaining that Republicans believed that
only when states failed to protect citizens’ rights (of national citizenship) would federal action be
necessary.23 It became clear that the Republicans wished states to respect free speech, press, jury, and
protection from cruel and unusual punishments. Without these guarantees, Republican Senator
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts proclaimed, “emancipation will be only half done. It is our duty to
see it wholly done.”24 Brandwein argues that Republicans interpreted Lincoln’s belief in Unionism
(the belief that a state cannot legally secede) in a unique and important way.25 Namely, Republicans
used it to legitimize federal oversight of matters that had belonged to the states before the war. The
dilemma presented to them, however, was that most of the rights they sought to protect with federal
power “had always been state concerns.”26 The Republican project to secure rights of national
citizenship with the power of the federal government “raised the specter of an undue ‘centralization’
of power.” 27 To counter these criticisms, the Republicans reiterated their stance on the improper use
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of state power before and during the war. Improper exercise of state power, they said, was what
caused the war in the first place.
Political scientist Richard Valelly describes this Republican project to institutionalize national
citizenship over and above state citizenship as “Reconstruction constitutionalism.”28 This doctrine
held that the constitution was not merely a set of limits on government, but was rather a “source of
sovereign, positive, regulatory government able to establish and enforce national rights.”29 Adherents
of this “nationalist sensibility,” Valelly writes, envisioned a “potent reserve power” in the U.S.
government for protecting the rights of national citizenship when they were being tread upon in the
states.30 For a time, the Republican vision appeared to be gaining traction. During the mid to
late-1860s, national citizenship as embodied and pushed for by the Republicans in Congress took
precedence by being embedded in multiple institutions. State and federal appellate judges, for
example, “generally held that the citizenship and privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment incorporate natural rights, including Bill of Rights guarantees, as nationally enforceable
rights of the newly defined American citizenship.”31 They also held that these rights were to be
secured by national power. Prior to 1873, when there was a turning point in how judges defined
citizenship (which will be discussed at length in the next chapter), both federal and state appellate
court decisions “generally acknowledged that a revolution in federal citizenship had been wrought by
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments” and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.32 This is evident in
cases like United State v. Rhodes.33 Additionally, the Republican vision become embedded in the
institutions of the U.S. Army and the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen and Abandoned lands, otherwise
know as the Freedmen’s Bureau. Under the Freedmen’s Bureau Act of July, 1866, and from a war
powers argument, federal officers were instructed to enforce the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the ideals
28
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of the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Republican vision generally. Federal officers from the
Freedmen’s Bureau tasked with arresting persons who were charged with offenses against citizens
“in cases where the civil authorities have failed, neglected, or are unable to arrest and bring such
parties to trail…” and bring them to trial in the federal courts. 34 However, there was significant
pushback against federal enforcement that hindered the ability of federal officers to protect the rights
of national citizenship. This pushback came from every direction— the states, local governments,
state courts, the people themselves, and the federal executive. The Republican project to embed their
vision of national citizenship in the institutional structure of the U.S. polity, and thus create a durable
shift in governing authority, was under siege.

Ratification of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments
The ratification process of the first two Reconstruction Amendments reflects this challenge.
Upon learning that their vision was under attack, congressional Republicans implemented some
highly unusual (or even suspect) constitutional maneuvering. To further bolster their vision and
embed the prioritization of national citizenship, the Republicans proposed the Fourteenth
Amendment. As was explained in the previous chapter, the Fourteenth Amendment itself reflected
the Republican vision for union, federalism, and national citizenship. Ratifying the Amendment,
however, was not an easy process. Congressional Republicans understood that their project was
under siege from the start. Embedding their vision in the constitutional framework therefore required
some defensive maneuvering— not the easy, smooth ratification that might appear to follow from a
victorious and dominant Republican party. From 1861 until 1875, both houses of congress were held
by Republicans.35 Because of this, passing the Fourteenth Amendment and sending it to the states for
ratification might appear easy. On the contrary, however. Republicans were challenged here, too.
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In 1864 and early 1865, Reconstruction was at its zenith. The second session of the ThirtyEight Congress was indeed, as Foner puts it, a “historic occasion.” 36 In 1865, the Senate approved the
Thirteenth Amendment, which abolished slavery throughout the Union, with a vote of 38 to 6.
However, it failed to garner the required two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives. But on
on January 31, 1865, the Amendment passed this threshold in the House with a vote of 119 to 56 and
it was forwarded to the states for ratification. Foner chronicles its passage:
The vote set off wild cheering in the galleries, while Congressmen “joined in the shouting…
[and] wept like children. The following morning [activist and abolitionist Edward] Atkinson
dated a letter, “Year 1 of American Independence.”37
When the Amendment was approved in Congress, delegates from 25 states were counted in the
Senate, and delegates from 27 states were counted in the House. Importantly, house members and
senators purporting to represent the defeated southern states, however, were not included in the floor
votes for either chamber. On February 1, 1865, the Amendment was then forwarded to the states for
ratification in accordance with Article V of the Constitution. On December 18, 1865, however, when
Secretary of State William Seward proclaimed that the Thirteenth Amendment had been ratified
because it had passed the requisite threshold of three-fourths of the states, the defeated southern
states were included. At that time, he asserted there were 36 states in the Union. 38 Curiously, then, the
southern states were simultaneously both counted and not counted in the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment.
This occurred because the Southern states were not represented in Congress. Two weeks
earlier, on December 4, 1865, when the Thirty-Ninth Congress met for the first time, the Republican
majority, sensing a threat from the Southern states and their delegates, rejected admission of all but a
single Southern state, Tennessee.39 Indeed, as legal scholar Bruce Ackerman points out, by the end of
its deliberations, the Thirty-Ninth Congress had “publicly declared that ‘no legal state governments’
36
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existed in the other ten states of the South.”40 Legal historian Akhil Amar explains that Congress
continued to operate without widespread Southern representation until mid-1868. But in 1866, the
Fourteenth Amendment was proposed.
The Fourteenth Amendment passed the Senate on June 8, 1866 and the House on June 13,
1866, by votes of 33-11 and 120-32, respectively. Importantly, however, this Article 5 hurdle would
not have been cleared, Amar notes, had the eighty Southern members been present. The Fourteenth
Amendment only passed through Congress because the Republicans excluded the Southern states
from participating, not because the Republicans were necessarily dominant. On June 22, 1866, the
text of the Fourteenth Amendment was forwarded to the states for ratification. But here, yet again,
the Republicans were challenged. The states to whom the proposed Amendment was forwarded
included the states whose members had been excluded from Congress. And so, by December, 1866,
seven southern states had rejected the proposed amendment, but by February 1867, that number had
climbed to ten.41
Despite their comfortable majority in Congress, Republicans were far from being wholly
dominant. They were under siege. The tricky constitutional maneuvering they had used to exclude
southern states from Congress in order to push forward their vision for union and national citizenship
was not enough. The Republicans continued to be hamstrung by Democratic opposition from the
South. To fight back, the Republicans employed yet more questionable constitutional maneuvering.
Several options were proposed in Congress. They included three points that seemed “fully settled”
among Republican leaders: (1) existing Southern governments should be replaced; (2) “rebels” (exConfederate leaders and Democrats) should hold no place in those new governments; and (3) “the
negroes should vote.”42 More radical proposals were floated around, however, including “widespread
disenfranchisement, martial law for the South, confiscation, and impeachment of the President.”43
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First, Radical Republicans in Congress moved to seize the legislative initiative. Representative
Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania introduced a bill that would require the Southern government to
hold constitutional conventions, “elected by manhood suffrage with the exception of former
Confederates, who would be deprived of citizenship for five years.”44 Next, Republican James
Ashley of Ohio proposed a yet more radical idea— sweeping away the Southern governments
entirely. John Bingham, however, found these proposals too radical. They treated white Southerners
as “alien enemies.”45 What was needed, the moderate Republicans argued, was not a hasty, forceful
decimation of Southern power and autonomy in favor of Republican ideals. Rather, only a
“prolonged period of federal control would enable loyal public opinion [to the Republicans] to sink
deep roots and permit ‘Northern capital and labor, Northern energy and enterprise’ to venture South,
there to establish ‘a Christian civilization and a living democracy.’”46 As Foner chronicles,
Representative George Julian of Indiana suggested that the South should be “governed directly from
Washington and only readmitted at ‘some indefinite future time’ when its ‘political and social
elements’ had been thoroughly transformed.”47
Julian’s speech, Foner notes, struck a chord in Congress.48 The Joint Committee on
Reconstruction quickly approved a bill to transform the Southern states into military districts. For the
moderates, military rule of the southern states was, as Curtis points out, a “distasteful constitutional
anomaly.”49 Republicans, Curtis continues, only accepted it with substantial misgivings. John
Bingham, however, had an idea. On February 12, 1867, Representative John Bingham proposed that
the southern states be readmitted on the condition that they ratify the Fourteenth Amendment and
establish black suffrage.50 And so the Reconstruction Acts were born in the spring and summer of
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1867. These statutes transformed the ten Southern states (all eleven, minus Tennessee) into five
military districts and placed the Union army in control of their transition back to statehood.51 Without
explicitly decimating the southern state government, the Reconstruction Act of 1867 laid out steps for
states to take to establish new governments that could be recognized by Congress. In effect, the
Republicans in Congress were conditioning the readmission of each state to the Union upon that
state’s ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Foner argues that the Reconstruction Act of 1867 reflected the circumstances of its creation.
It did not arise out of purely ideological reasons. The Republicans were not riding a wave of support
for their principles and Reconstruction generally. Rather, it reflected the pragmatic and practical
necessity of “finding a program upon which two thirds of Congress could agree and the Northern
electorate would support, and the deeply held beliefs and prejudices that places limits upon
Congressional action.”52 Passing the Fourteenth Amendment was not an easy task because the
Republicans faced significant obstacles and vehement opposition. By expelling the Southern states
from Congress, and then conditioning their readmission both to Congress and the Union upon
ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Republican principles of national citizenship and
federal power, the Republican Congress was employing creative and questionable constitutional
maneuvering that did not reflect a place of strength. Rather, it showed the Republicans were
operating from a place of weakness because their project was under siege.

The Vision Under Siege: The Impeachment of President Andrew Johnson
The next attack on the Republican project came not from the states, but from the President.
On January 8th, 1867, Republican Senator George Williams of Oregon stood before the Senate and
proposed that the President report any violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to the Senate. His
proposal was agreed to:
Resolved: That the President be requested to inform the Senate if any violated of the
act entitled “An act to protect all persons in the United States in their civil rights and furnish
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the means of their vindication” [the Civil Rights Act of 1866] have come to his knowledge,
and if so what steps if any have been taken by him to enforce the law and punish the
offenders.53
And so, early in 1867 President Johnson reported to Congress. Generals Grant and Howard submitted
to Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton a list of 440 violations. Secretary Stanton, Kaczorowski notes,
was the only member of President Johnson’s cabinet who supported federal enforcement of national
citizenship.54 This was not the entire story, however. There would undoubtedly have been more than
440 violation had federal agents not been requested to only report violations of certain sections of the
law— namely, section 4, 8, and 9.55 Nonetheless, the 440 violations that were reported were
condemned within the administration. The Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, considered the
reported violates to be “an omnigatherum of newspaper gossip, rumors of negro murders,
neighborhood strifes and troubles…vague, indefinite party scandal and General Howard and his
agents had picked up…”56 Secretary of the Interior, Orville Browning, accused General Howard and
his agents of collecting exaggerated claims in a “mean [and] malicious” attempt to force President
Johnson to
send out to the country, endorsed by him as facts, these prejudiced and in many instances
false, and in almost all exaggerated statements, or place himself, by refusing to send them to
Congress, in a position where they could falsifly [sic] but plausibly charge him with the
suppression of the facts.57
As a result of these accusations and the President’s own partisan leanings, the number of violations
ultimately presented to Congress was a mere three. Kaczorowski suggests that by doing so, President
Johnson wished to convey the message that “local authorities in the South were adequately securing
freemen’s rights and that the federal presence there was unnecessary.”58 Johnson’s political ideas
were becoming clear: he held a different idea about federal protection of citizenship rights than did
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Republicans in Congress. Johnson and his administration, it seemed, were pushing back on the
Republicans, thus becoming a significant obstacle to full institutionalization of the Republican
vision.
For Republicans, Johnson embodied the first mortal threat to the durability of the shift in
governing authority they had built. Racism, although important, was not, Kaczorowski argues, the
sole factor determining Johnson and his administration’s stance on federal rights enforcement and
national citizenship. Rather, Johnson’s political philosophy drew on ideas that preferred state
citizenship to be prioritized over national citizenship. He championed states’ rights and Democratic
Conservative political ideas. The stance his administration took on federal rights enforcement
rendered the “federal enforcement of the civil rights of Southern blacks and Republicans at the
expense of the local authority of Southern Democrats antithetical to its political interests and political
values.”59 The Johnson administration’s stance discouraged federal officers from actively enforcing
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and promoting national citizenship. The attorney general “consistently
refused to instruct” other federal officers about the duties and and responsibilities they had under the
Civil Rights Act of 1866.60 By leaving federal officers to act on their own, the attorney general
induced inaction in federal rights enforcement. Johnson was a “remarkably activist” president.61 By
enacting executive orders and by allowing old provisions to collapse, Johnson “simply cleared away
Congress’s earlier Reconstruction policy.”62 Within the state apparatus, the Republican vision was
operating from a weak, defensive position.
Republicans, then, needed to eliminate the threat. The Fourteenth Amendment itself acted as
a campaign platform for the elections in 1866. Republicans hoped voters would see it as an
alternative to Johnson’s policy, and it seems they did. Republicans won massive gains in that
election.63 Political Scientist Rick Valelly shows how they moved to beat Johnson by drastically
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expanding the party’s electoral coalition to include southerners. Congressional Republicans managed
to “forcefully” establish a “new, politically winning coalition that joined together about seven
hundred thousand black southern men and the northern white male Republican electorate” to help
preserve their dominance and protect their policies.64 Doing so was in a way a method for the
Republicans to make their shift in governing authority more durable. The “coalition of 1867-1868,”
as Valelly calls it, was created through land reform policy, use of the military to enable black suffrage
in the South, the creation of “soldier-citizenship” for black men, “educational and religious
emancipation,” and mobilizing regional voters. 65
The Republican Party responded to the threat that Johnson’s hostility posed by “expanding its
electoral coalition and building a cross-sectional organization.”66 Despite their efforts, Johnson
continued to threaten the Republican vision. They had not eliminated the threat. Valelly points out
that by this point, Republicans has run out of electoral options to use against Johnson. In order to
protect their vision and further ensure national citizenship could be embedded in state institutions,
Republicans impeached and tried Johnson in February of 1868. Johnson was brought up on eleven
articles of impeachment. Nine hinged on Johnson’s removal of Secretary of War Stanton, who had
been appointed by Lincoln and was sympathetic with the Republican project, and the two others
“charged the President with denying the authority of Congress and attempting to bring it ‘into
disgrace.’”67 None of the charges, though, reflected the real reason Republicans sought to relieve
Johnson of his duties: “his political outlook, the way he had administered the Reconstruction Acts,
and his sheer incompetence.”68 By impeaching Johnson, the Republicans had eliminated the next
threat to their vision of achieving a durable shift in governing authority.
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After the impeachment, however, Republicans realized that simply declaring national
citizenship to be prioritized over state citizenship in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was
not enough. They faced yet more attacks, and would have to take further steps to ensure the
enforcement of their ideals. The Republican project that began with the Reconstruction Amendments,
therefore, took shape in the form of the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871.

Extending the Republican Vision: Legislation of National Citizenship
The Enforcements Acts of 1870 and 1871 were enacted by the Republican Congress as a
defense measure to protect their shift in governing authority against a two-pronged attack. The acts
served as means for further embedding their vision for union and national citizenship in the
institutional structure in the face of challenges from the states and from the people themselves. Until
the mid-1870s, it largely manifested itself in attempts to use state power to limit the political and civil
rights of blacks through Black Codes.The second prong of the attack, the attack from the people, took
the form of popular social movements that vehemently opposed the Republican project. Specifically,
the rise of the Ku Klux Klan as a social movement that used violence and intimidation to fight
against the institutionalization of national citizenship reflects this attack. Both types of attacks on the
Republican project were done in the name of state power (as opposed to national power), antiRepublicans, pro-Democrats, and pro-state citizenship. The unifying theme of these attacks was their
rejection of federal protection of national citizenship in favor of a state’s ability to define the
meaning and parameters of its citizenship. Importantly, though, each type of attack was only possible
because of the unique nature of the U.S. polity. Both federalism and social movements are necessary
parts of the fragmented and complex American state.

1. Under Siege by the States: Black Codes and Election Laws
Decentralized power and overlapping jurisdiction is a feature of American state structure.
Interestingly, however, it provides unique and robust opportunities for dissenting ideas to find voice
in the polity, and reach a level of institutionalization that otherwise would be impossible. Legal
scholar Heather Gerken points out that in America, we offer more to minorities than the rights to
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speak and vote: we offer them federalism. Federalism, Gerken argues, can serve as a robust
mechanism for minorities to institutionalize opposition and dissenting views.
By providing a mechanism for dissenting voices to find voice, federalism allows minorities to
rule: they can exercise rule without sovereignty. 69 Gerken’s describes federalism as a mechanism for
dissenters to exercise power. She points first to the obvious examples: states in America, and to cities
within those states. States have differing policies. Some states have polices distinctly different from
what may come close to a national consensus on an issue. Gerken points out that when examining
disputes between states and the federal government, courts often “turn to functional accounts that are
keyed to the role states play in preserving a well-functioning democracy.”70 Though Gerken
acknowledges that cities are often included in accounts of federalism, she asks why we have not
moved farther. “Indeed, some think that localities represent better sites for pursuing federalism’s
values because they are closer to the people, offer more realistic options for voting with one’s feet,
and map more closely onto communities of interest.”71 We can thus look at these various local
governing bodies as “governing separate and apart from the state, just as proponents of sovereignty
envision states governing separate and apart from the nation. We can think of cities as meaningful
exit options for minorities, just as we do with states.”72 Why not push federalism all the way down?
Why not view a governing body such as a school board, a PTA, or a local zoning conference as sites
ripe for inclusion in our federalism? Gerken’s federalism all-the-way-down incorporates these small
local bodies into a tally of our federalist institutions. These institutions, she says, rule without
sovereignty.73 The phenomenon she calls dissenting by deciding thus occurs: “would-be dissenters—
individuals who hold a minority view within the polity as a whole—enjoy a local majority on a
decision making body and can thus dictate the outcome.”74 In the U.S. polity, therefore, dissenting
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ideas and minority rule can exist and can be institutionalized outside of the national government.
Gerken’s account of federalism points out that those who hold dissenting or different political ideas
can exercise voice and rule outside of the national legislature, and, in fact, federalism guarantees this
by offering institutionalization of those ideas.
During Reconstruction, the states did precisely that. The states acted as zones where ideas
about citizenship that disaccorded with the Republican project of union, national power, and national
citizenship could find voice and institutionalization. They did this by enacting legislation that
rejected the Republican project, and exhibited a firm belief that state citizenship should be prioritized
over national citizenship. Many states wanted to maintain control of their citizenry by defining its
boundaries themselves. Laws limiting the political and economic rights of newly-freed blacks were
one way for the states to do so.
As a response to the Civil War and the emancipation of slaves by the Thirteenth Amendment,
many states passed Black Codes. These codes were a series of state laws that intended to define the
newly-freedmen’s “new rights and responsibilities.”75 Foner explains that the centerpiece of the
Codes was “the attempt to stabilize the black work force and limits its economic option apart from
plantation labor.”76 In other words, they intended to ensure that the black population could not
compete with the white population for jobs. Near the end of 1865, Mississippi and South Carolina
had enacted the first two and most severe Black Codes. Mississippi required all blacks to possess
“written evidence of employment for the coming year.”77 Additionally, laborers who left their jobs
before the contract expired would be required to forfeit wages already earned and then be subject to
arrest by any white citizen.78 South Carolina’s Code was designed to “reinvigorate paternalism and
clothe it with the force of law.”79 It barred blacks in the state from pursuing any occupation other
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than farmer or servant, except by “paying an annual tax ranging from $10 to $100.”80 Virtually all
former Confederate states enacted similar statutes. These laws, Foner points out, fulfilled rather
completely the prediction of Radical Benjamin F. Flanders as Louisiana’s legislature assembled:
“Their whole thought and time will be given to plans for getting things back as near to slavery as
possible.”81 The Black Codes were, then, an attempt by the states to limit the citizenship status of
black Americans by trying to get as close as possible to re-instituting slavery.
The immediate negative response in the North to the Black Codes implemented in the South
led some Southern states to modify the language, but not the underlying purpose, of their laws
regulating the newly freed men. 82 By the end of 1866, most states had repealed the provisions in their
laws that mentioned race specifically, thus, as Brandwein suggests, conforming to a model of “formal
equality.”83 Importantly, however, “unequal enforcement of racially neutral language remained a
problem.”84 States that had supposedly “neutral” laws were applied simply to confine the economic
and civil rights of blacks. Southern states passed racially discriminatory, though facially neutral, laws
which required “special head taxes, criminal punishments, restriction of weaponry, and denials of
political or juridical representations and access to education,” often with the tacit or express approval
of the Johnson administration (prior to his impeachment).85 Simply removing the racial language
from the state statutes did not mean equal treatment of blacks in the South. To use the multipletraditions language of Rogers Smith, despite appearing liberal and egalitarian, these laws were rife
with ascriptive tendencies. Smith explains that agents from the Freedmen’s Bureau sometimes
checked “procedurally unfair and physically brutal punishments” that the Black Codes often
imposed, but their role was constricted because their own policies “often aimed at similar goals of
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black contractual employment.”86 Even though it was their job to enforce the rights of national
citizenship, many federal officers were affected by their racist tendencies. They were, Smith notes,
“unable to accept that blacks would labor as readily as whites if properly rewarded.”87 As a result,
federal officers tasked with enforcing the Republican project of union, equality, and national
citizenship, actually aided the effort to repudiate the Republican shift by using state laws as a means
of ideational dissent. This state strategy not only displayed “lack of genuine commitment of free
labor principles,” it also expressed “virulent racist white beliefs in black inferiority.” 88 Congressional
Republicans still believed that the newly-established rights of national citizenship as granted by
Fourteenth Amendment continued to be denied, and they were correct. Thus, during Reconstruction,
states, through the implementation of Black Codes affecting the economic and political rights of
blacks, exploited the complicated and fragmented nature of the American state to express their belief
that state citizenship should not become subservient to national citizenship.

2. Under Siege by the People Themselves: The Ku Klux Klan and Popular Racial Animus
The second prong of the attack in the mid to late-1860s came not from the states, but from
within the states yet outside the complex and fragmented state itself. More specifically, the rise of the
Ku Klux Klan, the “nation’s most notorious terrorist movement,” during Reconstruction sheds light
on how the fragmented and complex nature of the U.S. polity itself offers yet another zone for
ideational dissent, this time outside of the formal state structure.89 Social movements are a necessary
part of the U.S. polity. In the United States, “the people themselves” are relied upon to be the source
of power and sovereignty. Legal theorist Larry Kramer reminds us that the United States, at the time
of its founding, was the only country in the world “with a government founded explicitly on the
consent of its people, given in a distinct and identifiable act, and the people who gave that consent
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were intensely, profoundly conscious of the fact.” 90 The founders sought to “preserve popular control
over the course of constitutional law.”91 In fact, popular sovereignty and the importance of "the
people themselves" as an important actor (or set of actors) in the political process has so pervaded
American political discourse that it is is often employed in rhetoric attacking political ideas to make
them seem illegitimate. For example, Brandwein points out that during the ratification debates over
the Fourteenth Amendment, Rep. Samuel J. Randall of Pennsylvania equated Southern secession and
Republican reforms. Both were threats to the government and the Constitution, he argued, because
“both were rejections of popular sovereignty doctrine.”92
As a result, since the legitimacy of the government depends upon notions of popular
sovereignty, social movements are a necessary part of the already complex and fragmented American
polity. Teasing out the notion of popular sovereignty, Reva Siegel argues that conflict between social
movements can create new forms of constitutional understanding.93 Siegel employs the idea of a
“constitutional culture” to demonstrate how social movements are linked to constitutional
understanding. Constitutional culture, she writes, can be said to explore how “changes in
constitutional understanding emerge from the interaction of citizens and officials.” 94 Siegel suggests
that constitutional culture shapes both popular and professional claims about the Constitution and
“enables the forms of communication and deliberation engagement among citizens and officials that
dynamically sustain the Constitution’s democratic authority in history.”95 Constitutional culture links
politics and law, to people, citizens, and officials. It provides the resources to explore the “legitimacy
of government, institutions of civil society, and the Constitution itself.” 96 Importantly, Siegel argues
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that constitutional culture is a normal feature of the democratic constitutional order in the United
States. Popular understandings of political ideas play an important and necessary role in the
American polity.
Seeing social movements through this lens sheds light on the dynamic of political ideas
during Reconstruction. As the Republicans in Congress tried to embed national citizenship in the
institutional structure and bolster their shift in governing authority, social movements, namely the Ku
Klux Klan (KKK), acted as an ideational harbor for dissenting ideas— those of state citizenship,
ascriptive hierarchy, and racism. As Southern state governments began to be captured by Republicans
after 1867, the KKK emerged as a “terrorist wing of the Democratic Conservative parties of the
South.”97 Their political purpose was to unseat the Republicans and to disenfranchise Southern
blacks. Kaczorowksi explains that the “paramilitary structure” of the KKK made their usually violent
intimidation of blacks and white Republicans “more systematic and effective.”98 In the late 1860s
and early 1870s, the Klan’s actions represented “the common concerns of Southern whites who
wished to retain a racial hierarchy.”99 In effect, Foner argues, the Klan was a “military force serving
the interests of the Democratic party, the planter class, and all those who desired the restoration of
white supremacy.”100 The Klan vehemently disagreed with the Republican project of Union and
national citizenship, and took it upon themselves to restore the political and social structure in the
South to its antebellum state by means of violence. Klan tactics ranged from property destruction, to
whipping, maiming, castration, and murder. Their targets were blacks and white Republicans.
Republican leaders barricaded and fortified their homes, and left their homes armed. When the law
tried to stem the onslaught of Klan violence, its members terrorized law enforcement officers and
judges, or intimidated or murdered witnesses. The primary enemy of the Klan was the Republicans,
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but “the Negro was the mainstay of that party.”101 Olsen argues that there existed very little room for
accommodation between Klan principles and the Republican “egalitarian principles of
Reconstruction.” 102
Klansmen ruled the south. The law appeared “impotent in the face of this terror.”103 The
Republicans again faced a mortal threat— both to their project and to their supporters. Republicans
viewed violence by the Ku Klux Klan as a continuing threat of the institution of slavery, and as a
threat to the political process they sought to protect. Their vision for national citizenship was under
siege in the South. In order to more fully institutionalize their vision and protect their shift in
governing authority, the Republicans had to take action.

3. Stamping Out the Opposition: The Republican Response to the Two-Pronged Attack
The Republican response to the attack from the states in the form of Black Codes, and from
social movements in the form of the KKK, was swift and deliberate. In 1870 and 1871, congressional
Republicans enacted yet another constitutional amendment and three key pieces of legislation to try
to eliminate the threats to their vision. Brandwein explains that Republicans developed and mobilized
a distinction between “arbitrary (slave) power and (legitimate) established right in order to bring
certain traditionally local matters under federal oversight”104 They extended federal control of
citizenship rights to beat back the two-pronged attack. The Republican response began with the
ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in March, 1870. It helped reify the federal government’s
protection of citizenship rights by establishing federal oversight of voting rights, but, crucially, it also
played a significant part in Republican party-building.
Many congressional Republicans believed that nationwide black suffrage was not only
important ideologically, but for pragmatic political reasons as well— it would ensure they had a
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stable base of support in the electorate. They believed, however, that it could not easily be achieved
by statute. Valelly points out that state-level Republican parties outside the South “varied widely in
the openness to the idea, making it hard to proceed state by state.”105 Additionally, state election
statutes could always be repealed by Democrats. The Republicans did not want to stand passively by
as African Americans were “completely shut out from the political process, their citizenship rights
were wantonly denied in the South and the legal process did not provide them with full equal
protection.” 106 This would “threaten the goal of perfecting American democracy” that equated to a
strong, equal, and robust national citizenship that was sincerely held by key Republican leaders.107
Giving the federal government the power to protect voting rights by passing the Fifteenth
Amendment, then, was both a strategic and ideological commitment to national citizenship. After the
Amendment was ratified on March 30, 1870, the true shape of the Republican project to
institutionalize their vision for an egalitarian “free labor” democracy with a robust national
citizenship began to take shape. For both political and ideological reasons, Republicans quickly
beefed up the Fifteenth Amendment by enacting a series of Enforcement Acts that gave the federal
government additional oversight of citizenship rights and status.
After the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment in March of 1870, Valelly explains,
Reconstruction constitutionalism “truly burst forth.” 108 There were three Enforcement Acts: the
Enforcement Act of 1870, the Enforcement Act of 1871, and the Enforcement Act of 1871 (the Ku
Klux Klan Act). These acts, Foner notes, “embodied the Congressional response to violence.”109
Together, they extended the federal government’s ability to ensure and protect national citizenship.
Their result was to further entrench the Republican project in the institutional framework. The
legislative debate over these acts reveals that they did indeed seek to extend the federal government’s
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power to protect citizenship rights, and thus reifying the prioritization of national citizenship over
state citizenship in the U.S. polity. Valelly points out that a critical aspect of the legislative debates
concerned “the federal government’s authority to act on behalf of or against private citizens.”110
Senator John Pool, a Republican from North Carolina, claimed that the federal government has the
right to “enforce the rights of the citizens against all who attempt to infringe upon those rights.”111
Consider the first act, the Enforcement Act of 1870. Passed on May 31, 1870, this act
established “a criminal code on the subject of elections.” It authorized further federal oversight of
citizenship rights by forbidding state officials from discriminating among voters on the basis of race.
It also authorized the President to appoint election supervisors, who had the power to remove cases
involving electoral fraud, the bribery or intimidation of voters, and “conspiracies to prevent citizens
from exercising their constitutional rights,” to federal court, instead of leaving them in state court. 112
Section 1 of the act gave the federal government power to protect citizens’ exercise of their new
rights of national citizenship under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments by
defining violation of those rights by either public officials or private citizens as felonies. The second
Enforcement Act, also known as the Enforcement Act of 1871, protected similar provisions, but was
more specifically targeted at Democratic practices in large Northern cities, as opposed to in the
South.
As violence persisted, however, Congressional Republicans enacted “a far more sweeping
measure,” the Ku Klux Klan Act of April, 1871.113 This act for the first time made certain crimes
committed by individuals as offenses punishable by federal law, not only by state law:
Conspiracies to deprive citizens of the right to vote, hold office, serve on juries, and enjoy the
equal protection of the law, could now, if states failed to act effectively against them, be
prosecuted by federal district attorneys, and even lead to military intervention and the
suspension of the write of habeas corpus.114
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This act marked a significant shift in federal power and federal balance. Prior Reconstruction laws
like the Reconstruction Amendments, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the Enforcement Acts, had
left private criminal acts within the realm of local law enforcement officials. Now, however, by
making actions within states by private individuals federal crimes, this act “pushed Republicans to
the outer limits of constitutional change.”115 These acts drastically increased the power of the federal
government in the realm of rights-enforcement and reaffirmed yet again that the Republican project
was to prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship. The Ku Klux Klan Act was quite effective
at eliminating Klan violence. In total, between 1871 and 1884, 5,386 cases were brought under the
Enforcement Acts. 116 Though the three Enforcement Acts together were targeted largely at Klan
violence, they were later used to “combat non-Klan political intimidation, ballot-box stuffing, and
other types of election fraud.” 117 Together, the Enforcement Acts fortified the Republican project, and
significantly reduced violence, intimidation, and election fraud in the states. They proved an effective
means to respond to the Democratic attack on national citizenship from the states and from social
movements.

Incomplete Institutionalization
However, despite the widespread federal prosecution of rights violations, the
“disenfranchisement of the Negro proceeded apace.” 118 By 1877, historian Everette Swinney notes,
the voting power of black Americans had been “largely neutralized” and the Democratic party had
regained control of the south.119 As history shows, the Republicans failed to entirely displace the old
regime. Their shift in governing authority was incomplete, and lasted less than a decade. Valelly
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explains that the electoral coalition the Republicans had built in 1867-1868 through their institutional
embedding of national citizenship plainly continued to have life after the Compromise of 1877:
Republicans maintained an active southern policy, as indicated by (1) the Republican
platforms’ emphasis on voting rights, (2) Republican-led Senate investigations of southern
electoral fraud and intimidation, (3) the processing of contested southern elections cases, (4)
the fostering of a new constitutional basis in Article 1 for federal electoral regulation, and (5)
agreements and cooperation with biracial insurgencies such as the Virginia Readjusters—
which, for a time, was an extraordinary experiment in biracial democracy. Indeed, the
coalition’s continuing existence generated a surprising turn in the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence.120
And so, we ask, what happened? The Republican project was extensive, and they responded
to several attacks that arose from multiple zones of ideational dissent. They passed three monumental
constitutional amendments and several key pieces of legislation that successfully rejiggered the
federal balance in favor of the national government, combatted political violence and electoral fraud,
and prioritized national citizenship over state citizenship. Why, then, was their shift in governing
authority not durable? Should there not have been more to the picture? Many promising Republican
institutions emerged after 1868. Why did this institutional change not set black electoral
incorporation on a better pathway to the future? Plainly there was “incomplete
institutionalization.”121 Plainly, the Republicans failed to eliminate all zones of ideational dissent.
Despite the apparent extensiveness of their project, they failed to fully embed their vision for union
and national citizenship in the institutional framework of the American state. State miscegenation
laws during Reconstruction illustrate this.

Miscegenation Laws Exhibit Incomplete Institutionalization
In the antebellum south, sexual liaisons between white women and black men, historian
Martha Hodes explains, threatened the idea of racial slavery in a way that sex between black women
and white men could not. 122 Sex between white men and black women was seen as more permissible,
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likely due to socially constructed ideas of white male sexuality. However, when children were born to
a white mother and a black father, not only were racial boundaries eroded, but “boundaries of slavery
and freedom were eroded too, as free people of African ancestry endangered racial slavery.”123
Nonetheless, such liaisons were tolerated in the antebellum south, due in part, Hodes argues, to white
ideology about the “sexual depravity of white women outside the planter classes.”124 Thus, white
ideology about lower-class female sexuality could overshadow white ideology of black male
sexuality. But after the Civil War and the demise of legal slavery with the Thirteenth Amendment,
toleration for sex between white women and black men crumbled. “Mixture” of white people of
European descent and blacks of African descent became a more serious taboo:
Because it was the men among the former slaver population who gained suffrage rights and a
measure of political power— and who therefore had the potential to destroy the racial caste
system— whites focused on the taboo of sex between white women and black men with a
new urgency.125
After the war, white alarm about black sexuality reached new and unprecedented levels. As a result,
sex and politics became intertwined in the minds of southerners during Reconstruction.
In the postwar South, citizenship rights were equated with manhood. Hodes remarks that
Southern white men wanted to withhold rights of national citizenship from black men because their
exercise of suffrage and political participation, and equal status threatened the manhood of white
men.126 One way they could do so was to enact laws prohibiting interracial marriage. Kaczorowski
reminds us that the concept of “equal rights” in the nineteenth century still permitted segregation.
Consider schools: equal rights required states to provide schools for black children, but still allowed
the state to segregate them. If they did not, however, courts held that black children must be admitted
to schools established for white children. Analogously, laws prohibiting interracial sex and marriage
were upheld so long as they applied equally to both races. The right to “an equality in state conferred
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rights was understood within the context of separate but equal.”127 Examining miscegenation laws
during Reconstruction is important here because it provides an example of how incomplete
institutionalization of the Republican project allowed dissenting ideas, through the complex and
fragmented institutional structure of the American state, led to its repudiation and ultimate downfall.
Examining miscegenation laws in the mid 1860s reveals that Republicans appeared to have
won here, too. State laws governing miscegenation (coming from the latin miscere, to mix, and
genus, race) were largely eliminated during the mid to late-1860s. After the Civil War, many
lawmakers both in and outside the former Confederacy “concluded that the combination of the end of
slavery and the passage of Reconstruction civil rights legislation would render the remaining
[miscegenation] laws inoperable.”128 Between 1860 and 1871, eight states repealed their laws
banning interracial marriage: New Mexico (1866), Louisiana (1868), South Carolina (1868),
Washington (1868), Mississippi (1870), Arkansas (1871), Illinois (1871), and Florida (1871).129 As
Reconstruction continued in full force during this period, laws banning interracial marriage were
increasingly challenged in courts and declared unconstitutional. Altogether, historian Peggy Pascoe
explains, in seven of the eleven former Confederate states, Republican principles of Union, national
citizenship, and equality appear to have been institutionalized. These seven states either repealed
miscegenation laws, removed them from state codes, or declared them unconstitutional in the
courts.130 On one level these challenges to miscegenation laws merely reflected the driving force of
Reconstruction in the political climate. When radical Republicans were pushing for federal assertion
of power over state actions, many southerners “feared that the Democrats’ prediction that
Republicans intended to make miscegenation [legalize interracial marriage] the law of the land might
really come true.”131 Indeed, bans on interracial marriage and miscegenation laws were seen as
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violations of the Constitution between 1868 and 1871. In and outside of the South, when local
prosecutors brought interracial couples to court for violating state law, they “discovered that laws
against interracial marriage faced significant new obstacles,” including the key assumption that laws
banning interracial marriage were a remaining product of slavery, a belief that marriage was a
“contractual right of free citizens,” and the possibility that the Fourteenth Amendment really did
guarantee what it seemed: equal protection of the laws.132
Ultimately, though, the Republican project and the institutionalization of their ideas of
citizenship began to crumble under siege, and state bans on interracial marriage reappeared.
Brandwein shows that “northern Democrats used race and ‘miscegenation’ as political weapons
against Lincoln and the Republicans.”133 This time, those weapons worked. In 1870, Indiana state
statutes prohibited any person with at least one-eighth “negro blood” from marrying “any white
women of this state.”134 In November, 1870, Thomas Gibson, a sixty year old laborer “having one
eighth part of negro blood,” came to trial in Evansville Criminal Court in Indiana for charges of
being in a relationship with a “white” woman.135 At the time, it seemed as though the judge would
strike down Indiana’s miscegenation statute. Gibson had a fierce attorney, Andrew L. Robinson.
Robinson had been a Democrat, but became a free soil abolitionist Radical Republican after finding
religion during the Mexican-American War. 136 The stakes in the Gibson case, Pascoe writes, would
prove determinant for miscegenation laws across the country, because it would offer judges across
the country unsympathetic to the Republican project “a template for using state police power to
sidestep federal guarantees of civil rights” and national citizenship.137 Pascoe continues by arguing
that Robinson’s argument that marriage, like Gibson’s, were civil contracts protected under the

132

Ibid, 49.

133

Brandwein (1999), 27.

134

Indiana Statutes, 1870.

135

Pascoe (2009), 47, citing Vanderburgh County Marriage Records, vol. 6, July 12, 1867-May 21, 1870, p. 536,
Reel 1479312, Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Family History Center, Salt Lake City, Utah.
136

Pascoe (2009), 49.

137

Ibid, 50.

Chapter 3

!104

contract clause of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 would seem to be good, binding law. But, when the
case reached the state supreme court, it came before justices “absolutely unwilling” to uphold the
marriage of a “negro” man and a “white” woman.138 In the Gibson decision, Indiana Supreme Court
Justice Samuel H. Buskirk wrote a vehement defense of miscegenation law by rejecting the Civil
Rights Act of 1866 and other Reconstruction-era legislation. Buskirk wrote,
We deny the power and the authority of Congress to determine who shall make contracts or
the manner of enforcing them in the several states….[and] we utterly deny the power of
Congress to regulate, control, or in any manner to interfere with the states in determining
what shall constitute crimes against the laws of the state, or the manner or extent of the
punishment of persons charged and convicted with the violation of the criminal laws of a
sovereign state. 139
In upholding Indiana’s miscegenation statute in 1871, Justice Buskirk was not only claiming that
state laws are more important that federal laws and rejecting the Republican project and national
citizenship, he was providing both a pathway for the reinstitution of miscegenation laws across the
country and an avenue for dissenting political ideas to find more robust voice. Because of the Gibson
case in 1871, miscegenation laws came back on the books in dozens of states’ laws during the next
several decades.140
Some, however, still believed that federal courts would be more sympathetic zones to
challenge state miscegenation laws by taking federal civil rights legislation more seriously. This,
however, revealed just how strong the dissent from Republican ideas of citizenship remained. Statesrights arguments that rejected the premise and prioritization of national citizenship abounded. During
the 1870s, few interracial couples brought their cases to federal court. Only a handful succeeded in
getting federal district courts to hear their cases. The outcome of their cases, Pascoe explains,
demonstrates “just how much power the connection between marriage and states’ rights could
muster.” 141 In all but one of these cases, federal judges “solved the conflict between state
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miscegenation laws and federal civil rights laws by adopting states’ rights arguments,” 142 thus
rejecting the prioritization of national citizenship.

The Institutional Entrenchment Hail Mary: The Civil Rights Act of 1875
By the mid-1870s, the political climate had transformed. It looked entirely different than it
did even five years before. What only a decade before had been a Republican congress trying, and
partially succeeding, to defend itself from attacks from multiple places within and outside the state
structure was now gone. The Republican majority in Congress was getting progressively smaller.
After 1873 and the Supreme Court’s decision in The Slaughterhouse Cases, which will be discussed
the next chapter, it became clear that the Republicans were fighting a losing battle. The Forty-Third
Congress in 1875 would be, because of the recent Democratic landslide victory the last time
Republicans would control both the White House and both Houses of Congress for the near future.
With political violence having erupted again in the South, and their party’s power in Washington
about to expire, the Republicans proposed a final desperate attempt to entrench their vision for freesoil, union, and national citizenship in the institutional structure. They wanted to make the shift in
governing authority they had achieved last as long as it could. Benjamin Butler, then a
Representative from Massachusetts, and other Republican stalwarts “devised a program to safeguard
what remains of Reconstruction.” 143 Their proposals included another Civil Rights Bill, another
Enforcement Act that would expand the President’s power to quash conspiracies aimed at
intimidating voters and to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, a two-year army appropriation to limit
the incoming House from curtailing the military’s role in the South, a bill expanding federal court
jurisdiction, and a subsidy for the Texas & Pacific Railroad.144 Taken together, Foner suggests, the
proposed package embodied a “combination of idealism, partisanship, and crass economic advantage
typical of Republican politics.”145
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The Civil Rights Act of 1875, however, was unlike previous Reconstruction legislation.
Cognizant of the recent decision in Slaughterhouse, proponents of the bill sought to convince fellow
legislators that it was a constitutional piece of legislation. The Court had decided that the privileges and
immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not “as broad as the ‘sands of the sea’ or the
common law, and that the amendment did not radically change the whole theory of federal-state
relations.” 146 As a result, proponents of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 sought to convince opponents that
they were not relying on a “general, unspecified constitutional basis or on the privileges and immunities
clause alone.”147 Instead, debate over the bill prior to its passage centered on the equal protection clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.148

Much of the project, however, was derailed by further attacks, including parliamentary
maneuvers in Congress, an insurrection in Louisiana in September, 1874 that preoccupied and
embarrassed President Grant, and division within the Republican party. Foner explains that even the
Civil Rights Bill reflected the division within the Republican party. The proposed law represented an
“unprecedented exercise of national authority, and breached traditional federalist principles more
fully than any prevision Reconstruction legislation.”149 Ultimately, the Civil Rights Act of 1875 did
become law after passing the 43rd Congress in February, and being signed by President Grant March
1. Nonetheless, the myriad hurdles necessary to clear in order to enact this final, last-ditch attempt by
the Republicans to entrench their vision for national citizenship reflect the party’s weakness. The
inability of the Forty-Third Congress to agree on a policy for the South shows that the Republicans
had lost and Reconstruction was doomed. They had succumbed to the attacks that arose from the
Republican inability to fully entrench its vision across the complex and fragmented state. The shift in
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governing authority they had achieved was short-lived, and was dying. Reconstruction itself, Foner
writes, was doomed. 150

Conclusion
Even at the beginning of Reconstitution, the Republicans operated from a place of weakness.
The Union victory in the Civil War validated their project, and they held a majority in both houses of
Congress, but they could not entrench their vision for union, federal power, and the prioritization of
national citizenship over state citizenship. They faced the daunting and ultimately impossible
challenge of institutionalizing their vision across the complex and fragmented American state. The
Republican project was never easy precisely for this reason. The Republican project was under siege
from the start. First, they had to overcome institutional hurdles to ratify the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments. They had to employ questionable constitutional maneuvering in order to get the
necessary numbers for ratification. Next, the Republicans faced an attack from President Johnson.
They responded to this attack by impeaching him and replacing him with President Grant.
However, even though they held both Congress and the White House, Republicans could not
give the shift in governing authority they had achieved even a modicum of durability. They faced yet
more attacks. In the late 1860s and early 1870s, they faced a two-pronged attack: dissenting political
ideas found voice in the states and in social movements. The states tried to recapture control of
citizenship by passing Black Codes that limited the civil and political rights of blacks. The people
created a social movement that used violence and intimidation to wreak havoc on the Republican
project in the South. This movement, the Ku Klux Klan, and the Black Codes, were targeted by the
Republicans with yet another constitutional amendment, the Fifteenth, and a series of Enforcements
Acts in the early 1870s. Together, the Reconstruction Amendments and the Enforcements Acts gave
massive power to the federal government to protect the rights of national citizenship.
Yet, it was still not enough. The complex and fragmented American state continued to
provide zones for dissenting ideas to find voice. The Republican project was layered upon an already
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stable institutional arrangement.151 It did not vanquish the old and replace it with something entirely
new. The fact that the Republicans layered their ideationally-motivated policies and institutions on
top of old ones explains why their project faced so much pushback from the start. And so, though
state miscegenation laws were largely eradicated while the Republicans were at the height of their
power, they reappeared. One fateful judicial decision in 1871, Indiana v. Gibson, provided grounds
for the reestablishment of miscegenation laws. These laws and their proponents drew on states’ rights
arguments that necessitated a repudiation of national citizenship in favor of state control over
citizenship rights. The Republican project was losing. In 1875, as their power was waning the,
Republicans, plagued by internal contradiction and external threat, enacted the Civil Rights Act of
1875 as a final, last ditch attempt to give their shift in governing authority some durability.
Ultimately, however, the Republican project was unsuccessful. It fell victim to the complex,
overlapping, and fragmented American state. No matter how hard the Republicans tried to fight it,
ideational dissent found voice both inside and outside the traditional state institutional apparatus. By
1873, it became clear the Republicans had lost. Ideational dissenters that favored states’ rights and
state control over citizenship gained traction, and ultimately found voice in the Supreme Court.
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Chapter 4
Repudiation of the Dominant Shift: The Reappearance of Dissenting Citizenship Ideas in the
Courts

As Congressional Republicans fought desperately during the late 1860s and early 1870s to
bolster their ideational shift in governing authority— prioritizing national citizenship— the greatest
threat to the vision was brewing. For a brief moment in the mid-1860s, it appeared as if the
Republicans had successfully created a shift in governing authority that would, in the words of Orren
and Skowronek, prove durable. The Republicans had embedded a vision for union, free labor, and
national citizenship within the institutional framework— both vertically and horizontally. It was
entrenched in constitutional text, protected from attacks by states and social movements, and shielded
from the actions of an antagonistic president. Yet, as discussed in the previous chapter, this vision
operated from a place of weakness and the opposing ideas of state citizenship and ascriptive
hierarchy challenged it from within.
For a time it seemed as though the only threats the Republicans would face would be from
the executive branch, the states, and from the people themselves in the form of social movements.
The Republicans repeatedly tried to stamp out ideational dissent by passing several constitutional
amendments, and they bolstered these with enforcement statutes. Nevertheless, the clearest and
deepest challenge they would soon face was an attack they ultimately were unable to withstand. It
came from the Supreme Court beginning in 1873. This chapter documents the story behind this attack
congressional Republicans could not beat. The Supreme Court’s decision in the Slaughterhouse
Cases of 18731 sharply rejected the intended meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, at least insofar
as it was explicated in Chapter 2. In doing so, the Court rejected the new Republican vision of
national, egalitarian citizenship in favor of the older antebellum state-centered, ascriptive definition
of citizenship.
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The story documented in this chapter gets to the crux of the argument in this project as a
whole. Had it not been for action taken by the Supreme Court in Slaughterhouse, the Republicans’
vision may have been more deeply embedded, and they may have succeeded at creating a durable
shift. As a result, because that vision of citizenship was a fundamental part of Reconstruction,
Reconstruction as a whole may not have failed. Scholars who argue that Reconstruction’s failure can
be attributed exclusively to exogenous factors like a new political climate resulting in a partisan shift
in Congress, the economic crash of 1873, or the Compromise of 1877, overlook the important
interaction between institutional design and political ideas. Indeed, they overlook how a fragmented
state enables oppositional ideas to gain traction. The interplay between differing conceptions of
citizenship in political institutions during Reconstruction suggest that this interaction between ideas
and institutions is crucially important for political development in the United States. That differing
ideas of citizenship in the United States were actively disputed within and between political
institutions during Reconstruction sheds light on how endogenous state change played a key role in
its failure. Indeed, as Kaczorowski cogently explains, as far as the Republican project for national
protection of citizenship rights was concerned, “Reconstruction ended long before the Compromise
of 1877.”2 In other words, the failure of Reconstruction followed from the institutional design laid
out in the Constitution itself.
More specifically, until 1873, ideas that state citizenship should be prioritized over national
citizenship remained in dissent. As documented in the previous chapter, these ideas were voiced
outside of the national institutional structure, in state governments and social movements, and within
the structure of the federal government by the President and even to a small extent, as will be
explained in this chapter, by the Supreme Court. Until 1873, however, these threats to the Republican
position of ideational dominance in the institutional framework did not successfully gain a strong
institutional foothold. Each threat was quelled by Republican defensive action. But, as Orren and
Skowronek, and Sheingate remind us, the American state is an unusually complex or fragmented
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entity.3 Political ideas that have been rejected by the dominant governing authority find institutional
crevices to remain dormant, ready to reappear and fight for ideational dominance once again if
context permits. Because the United States is a heavily fractured polity, opportunities for political
entrepreneurs to bring ideas to the institutional fore abound. Political entrepreneurs can exploit the
“frictional gaps” between different governing institutions for ideationally transformative purposes.
In 1873, the Supreme Court and its Justices brought previously dissenting ideas to the helm.
The Justices articulated ideas about citizenship that had to this point been in opposition— ideas about
state citizenship that had been finding voice outside the dominant narrative, in state laws and social
movements. Even as Republicans held both houses of Congress and the White House, ideas that
citizenship in the United States should prioritize state over national citizenship found an institutional
pathway to challenge the Republican vision. Justices on the Supreme Court in 1873 did something
crucially important for state development in the U.S.: they picked up those dissenting ideas and put
them on a path to dominance.
This judicial move proved formative. By stressing ideas of citizenship that emphasized stateover-nation, re-articulated ascriptive hierarchy, and rejected federal protection of citizenship rights,
the Supreme Court struck a decisive blow to the Republican project. This chapter, then, suggests that
a major turning point or critical juncture for the dominant conception of citizenship was the Supreme
Court’s ruling in the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873. This case marked a shift in dominant citizenship
doctrine in the United States. After this case, which read into the Fourteenth Amendment a different
definition of citizenship than what its framers intended, the antebellum notion of citizenship
decisively surfaced. As has been argued throughout this project, after the Civil War but prior to 1873,
Republican ideas of national citizenship held sway. However, 1873 marked a return from a
Republican, national and rights-based notion of citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, to the
more state-centered and ascriptive understanding of citizenship.
This chapter reveals how the Supreme Court during the 1870s and 1880s waged, in Rogers
Smith’s words, the “mounting repudiation of Reconstruction egalitarianism and inclusiveness in
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favor of an extraordinarily broad political, intellectual, and legal embrace of renewed ascriptive
hierarchies.”4 Though some Republicans continued to push institutionalization of national citizenship
and racial equality, their ideational dominance in the polity was displaced. Because the Court
exploited the opportunity inherent in the fragmented polity and picked up non-dominant ideas of
citizenship, future legislators under this subsequent shift in governing authority were able to agree on
“new legal system of racial and ethic subordination and exclusion.”5 The period following
Reconstruction, namely the years 1876-1898, were thus, as Smith calls it, “the Gilded Age of
Ascriptive Americanism.”6
To uncover this story of political development, this chapter begins with a brief discussion of
the Court’s actions before 1873. Though Republican ideals of egalitarian, nationally enforced and
protected citizenship remained dominant, it was becoming clear that they would face an attack from
the Supreme Court they could not beat. Until 1873, though, the Court did not explicitly challenge
Republican dominance. In fact, the Court, and the federal judiciary generally, largely enforced the
Republican definition of national citizenship and federal power. Republicans enacted several pieces
of legislation to ensure the federal judiciary would not be an institutional pathway for dissenting
ideas about citizenship to challenge their project. By 1872, however, Republican actions to discipline
the judiciary proved insufficient. In late 1872 the Court foreshadowed its rejection of national
citizenship rights in its decision in Blyew v. United States.7 And in 1873, the Justices jumped at the
opportunity to attack the Republican-led shift in governing authority when a case ripe for the
opportunity presented itself. This case, The Slaughterhouse Cases, its background, and the argument
the Justices in the majority make are discussed in this chapter’s second section. That the Court could
challenge the Republican shift in governing authority despite its apparent support, as evidenced by its
decisions prior to 1873, illustrates just how fragile shifts in governing authority are in the American
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state. This fragility is caused at least in part, I argue, by the fragmented, complex, layered, and
sometimes internally-contradictory nature of the American polity.
Third, I examine some of the Court’s subsequent decisions that continue to reflect this postSlaughterhouse definition of citizenship— one that contrasted sharply with Republican definitions.
United States v. Cruikshank (1875)8 and The Civil Rights Cases (1883)9 are discussed in this section.
Cruikshank involved charges brought under the Enforcement Act of 1870. The Court ruled that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the First and Second Amendments against the states. In
doing so, they rejected national citizenship and the power of the federal government to regulate
actions within states, including protecting the rights of blacks against private encroachment. The
Civil Rights Cases expressly rejected the final last-ditch attempt by the Republicans to entrench their
vision of national citizenship, the Civil Rights Act of 1875.

An Increasingly Hostile Court
While Reconstruction was in full-swing in the mid to late-1860s, the Republican ideals of
union, free labor, and national citizenship were dominant. Republicans had successfully achieved a
functional shift in governing authority through the passage of the three Reconstruction Amendments
and several important pieces of legislation that increased the federal government’s power to protect
the rights of citizenship. As documented in the previous chapter, however, the Republicans were not
free from challenge. Their project was under siege from the start— by President Johnson, then by the
statutes and by the people themselves. The federal judiciary, however, was initially not a zone where
dissenting ideas of state-centered ascriptive citizenship found voice. Indeed, for a time, bolstered by
the Republican project to increase their jurisdiction and assist in enforcing national citizenship, the
federal judiciary embraced ideas of national citizenship, free labor, union, and egalitarianism. This
was no coincidence, however. Republicans took action to ensure the federal judiciary would be
sympathetic to their project. They altered the makeup of the Supreme Court by constricting its
membership, consolidating federal circuits, and stripping the Supreme Court of jurisdiction in select
8
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cases. But as Reconstruction continued, the Republicans continued to face attacks, support for the
Republican project in the judiciary started to wane and the Supreme Court started to exploit the
inevitable frictional gaps that arose.
Prior to 1873, lower federal court decisions generally acknowledged and supported the
Republican project. Its initial readings of the Reconstruction statutes and Amendments were
“expansive.”10 They endorsed the idea that through Reconstruction, the Republicans sought to
prioritize national citizenship over state citizenship. Kaczorowski notes that federal and even state
appellate court decisions “generally acknowledged that a revolution in federal citizenship had been
wrought by the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and the statutes enacted to enforce them.”11
This outcome was likely because the Republicans in Congress specifically manipulated the federal
judiciary in order to solidify their shift in governing authority. Engel points out that Republicans used
strategies both of “undermining judicial legitimacy and harnessing judicial power” to ensure the
federal judiciary would not be hostile to Reconstruction policy and their project of national
citizenship.12 Many of Congress’s actions toward the judiciary during the Civil War and
Reconstruction were motivated by the same desire to entrench their vision for national citizenship
and make durable their shift in governing authority as the impeachment of President Johnson and the
dubious ratifications of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.13 In other words, the federal
judiciary “was conceptualized as a threatening and conspiratorial opposition supporting Slave
Power” and hostile to the entrenchment of national citizenship over state citizenship. 14
In an effort to ensure the federal judiciary would be an ally to the Republican project,
between 1862 and 1870, congressional Republicans passed five separate pieces of legislation that
tinkered with its structure and jurisdiction. First, the 1862 Judiciary Act “re-configured the state
10
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composition of the judicial circuits.”15 Engel argues that this first act reveals a Republican hostility
not towards judicial review itself or the judiciary as a “structurally undemocratic institution,” but
rather to the influence of “Southern Slave Power” on the bench.16 This act consolidated all exConfederate and Southern states into just three federal circuits— down from five— thus limiting the
influence of the tradition of appointing a justice from each circuit district. Major reform, however,
came in 1866 with the Judicial Circuits Act. This act reorganized the federal circuits again, partially
to account for newly admitted states, reduced the total number of circuits from ten to nine, and
trimmed the membership of the Supreme Court from ten to seven. The 1866 Act prevented President
Johnson from appointing judges who shared his hostile feelings towards the Republican
Reconstruction policy to lower federal judgeships. Together, these two pieces of legislation had the
effect of limiting Southern influence on the Supreme Court and “rout[ing] out opposition” to the
Republican vision in the judiciary.17
Manipulation of the judiciary worked in other ways, too. It seems the Republicans in 1867
believed the lower federal judiciary might be a faithful ally (at least relative to southern state courts)
to their project as a result of their manipulation through recent legislation: they passed the Habeas
Corpus Act, which significantly expanded the jurisdiction of federal courts. Passed on February 5,
1867, this act amended the Judiciary Act of 1789. It gave federal courts the ability to review and
grant petitions “in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of
the constitution, or any treaty or law of the United States.”18 Specifically, it granted federal courts
jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions for prisoners in the custody of states. This is noteworthy for
two reasons. First, it extended the reach of the federal government into the protection of citizenship
rights from state infringement, thus bolstering national citizenship. Second, it only happened after the
Republicans had already taken deliberate action to harness the power of the judiciary in their favor.
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Republicans only granted more power to the federal judiciary after they had already taken action to
turn that branch into an ally. At the same time, however, the Republicans stripped the highest federal
court, the Supreme Court, of jurisdiction. Under the impression that the Supreme Court could use
cases arising under the Habeas Corpus Act of 1867 to challenge the Republican Reconstruction
vision by declaring Reconstruction legislation unconstitutional, Congress repealed the Supreme
Court’s jurisdiction to hear appeals under the act.19
But active manipulation of the judiciary did not end there. Structural manipulation continued
in 1869 with the passage of another Judiciary Act. This act, also known as the Circuit Judges Act of
1869, fits the pattern of “eliminating a threatening opposition from its entrenchment in the federal
judiciary.”20 The act increased the Supreme Court membership to nine justices and established a new
intermediate circuit of appellate courts. It also gave Republicans control over appointments to the
lower federal judiciary. Engel argues this act can also be understood as a measure by Republicans to
harness the power of the judiciary to support their project.21 The Republican actions to manipulate
the judiciary in their favor were “driven by a desire to secure their partisan objectives,” and they
follow from their keen awareness that “they could not hold their status as the single constitutional (or
even dominant) party and [their understanding] that they could use the judiciary, while they held
presidential and congressional power, to promote their constitutional vision and entrench their
interest against the Democratic alternative.”22
Congressional Republican action to forcefully wrangle the Court was only partially
successful. Lower federal judges “uniformly adopted the expansive understandings of the fourteenth
amendment and the Civil Rights Act of 1866” that animated the Republican theory of national
citizenship.23 Additionally, as Kaczorowksi writes, despite the “the seemingly overwhelming adverse
pressure and conditions in which they operated, the federal courts generally upheld the authority of
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the federal government under the Enforcement Acts of 1870 and 1871.”24 Similarly, the fact that even
unsympathetic Southern federal judges who were ideologically hostile to the prioritization of national
citizenship largely upheld the constitutionality of Republican civil rights legislation during
Reconstruction “demonstrates how strongly held their view that the judicial function was to
implement Congress’s will unless it was obviously unconstitutional.”25 Republican manipulation of
jurisdiction and circuit consolidation, therefore, successfully harnessed the lower federal judiciary as
an ally. Attacks on the Republican project did not come from the lower federal judiciary. But despite
their victory in the Civil War and their ability to enact their project for union and national citizenship,
congressional Republicans were far from a hegemonic delegation. Their calculated manipulation of
the federal judiciary and constant defense from attacks from elsewhere in the polity suggest,
somewhat counterintuitively, that the Republicans were always operating from a point of weakness.
Republicans sensed the Supreme Court could not so easily be disciplined as the lower courts.
This sensibility is indicated by their 1868 jurisdiction-stripping. Additionally, although the lower
federal courts tended to support and bolster the Republican project, historian Eric Foner notes the
Supreme Court “tend[ed] to obstruct congressional Reconstruction policy.”26 Despite their deliberate
efforts to entrench their vision in the polity, the Republicans would soon face a clear adversary in the
Supreme Court.
In 1866, in Ex Parte Milligan,27 the Supreme Court voided the wartime conviction of a man
from Indiana by a military court established by Republicans, on the grounds that civilian courts were
operating at the time. Writing for the majority, Justice David Davis insisted the case had nothing to
do with the South, but nonetheless it “threw into question the legality of martial law and Freedmen’s
Bureau Courts,” thus casting an air of doubt over the Republican project. 28 And in 1867 in Cummings
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v. Missouri,29 the Supreme Court overturned the loyalty oath in Missouri’s constitution for lawyers,
ministers, and others.30 Though, somewhat ironically, Foner notes, this was the first time a state
constitution had been considered under federal judicial power. The case did indeed reflect an
expansive national power and federal oversight of state action, but it, along with Milligan, “suggested
that Republicans might soon face a hostile Supreme Court.” 31
An attack came first from the Supreme Court in 1872. It was, however, a tempered, stunted
attack. Similar to other historians, Kaczorowski points out that by 1872, the national climate was “no
longer favorable” to national civil rights enforcement and national citizenship.32 Due at least in part
to the Republican’s manipulation of the federal judiciary, the Supreme Court’s first opportunity to
give its opinion on Republican civil rights legislation did not come until 1872. Kaczorowski notes
that due to electoral shifts, the “political forces in Congress that produced the Reconstruction civil
rights enactments were fragmented.”33 As documented, Democrats had managed to find voice for
their ideas in state governments, social movements, and the people themselves. As a result they had
“regained much of their respectability and power in national as well as local politics.”34 It was in this
context that the Supreme Court heard its first challenge to Reconstruction civil rights legislation. The
case originated in 1868 in Lewis County, Kentucky. Two white men, John Blyew and George
Kennard, “brutally axed to death and mutilated the bodies” of several members of a black family.35
The subsequent investigation results in charges of murder in Lewis County jail. However, United
States Marshals removed them from state custody and placed them under federal arrest. Both
defendants were tried for murder in United States District Court in Louisville, Kentucky, and found
guilty and sentenced to death.

29

71 U.S. 277 (1867).

30

Foner (1988), 272.

31

Ibid.

32

Kaczorowski (2005), 108.

33

Ibid.

34

Ibid.

35

Ibid.

Chapter 4

!119

The Court heard arguments on the proper limits of federal jurisdiction under the Civil Rights
Act of 1866. The trial judge, Judge Bland Ballard, upheld federal jurisdiction by interpreting the
congressional intent behind the law as “prescribing a concurrent jurisdiction over civil rights that
permitted the states a role in establishing the conditions under which civil rights were to be exercised
and enjoyed.”36 The Supreme Court deliberated on this question for more than a year. On April 1,
1872, the Court announced its decision. Its decision indicated unwillingness to endorse the
Republican project, but a hesitancy towards attacking it outright. The Court, Kaczorowski notes,
“sidestepped questions concerning the national government’s authority over the administration of
criminal justice.”37 Ultimately, the decision was a compromise between endorsing and launching a
full-scale attack on the Republican project. The Court managed to sidestep the larger questions
regarding what it believed to be the “proper” role of the federal government in regulating state laws,
civil rights, and citizenship. In turn, it upheld the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, but
it eliminated the jurisdiction given to the federal courts over criminal prosecution of whites for
crimes against blacks.38 Foreshadowing its future actions, the Court in Blyew v. United States,39
Kaczorowski points out, “failed to affirm explicitly the broad legal theory of national civil rights
enforcement authority applied by the lower federal courts.”40 Consequently, it left unanswered
questions of the future of the Republican project and the prioritization of national citizenship over
state citizenship. Unfortunately, however, there seems to be “no record explaining why” the Court
left these questions unresolved.41
Throughout Reconstruction, therefore, the federal judiciary’s relationship to the Republican
project was directly tied to the actions of congressional Republicans. Through both circuit
consolation and jurisdiction alteration, Republicans tried to harness the judiciary to support their
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project. It succeeded for a time, especially in the lower federal judiciary. The Supreme Court was a
different story. Though Republican action made an outright assault on the Republican-driven shift in
governing authority less likely, it could not seal all the frictional gaps. It became clear throughout
Reconstruction that though the lower federal judiciary largely supported Reconstruction efforts and
national citizenship, the Supreme Court would soon launch an attack on the Republicans they could
not beat.

Tipping the Scales: The Slaughterhouse Cases of 1873
That attack came in 1873 on the heels of Blyew. In a key entrepreneurial move, the Supreme
Court dealt a fatal blow to the Republican vision of national citizenship. Importantly, however, there
was no single moment of “switching,” where the Court decided to no longer support Reconstruction
and national citizenship. As explained, the Court exhibited hostility all along, but Republican
manipulation of circuits and jurisdiction postponed a full-scale assault from the Court. Rather, in
1873, the institutional hurdles the Republicans put in place to limit any hostile influence from the
federal judiciary were all cleared in one formative case. This case, the Slaughterhouse Cases of
1873,42 amounted to a categorical rejection of the Republican project to promote federal oversight of
citizenship rights in the states.
Slaughterhouse was the first major Reconstruction-era Supreme Court decision. Though its
facts did not involve Klansmen or a violation of the rights of black Americans, it “held implications
for fewer (congressional and judicial) protections of black rights.”43 As legal scholar Richard Aynes
remarks, the Slaughterhouse Cases are “simultaneously unremarkable and extraordinary.” 44 It is an
unremarkable case (or, more specifically, set of cases) because of the seemingly mundane matter at
issue— whether butchers can be compelled to do business at a specific, central state facility. It is
extraordinary, however, in its legal ramifications for larger issues of state and national power, the
42
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Fourteenth Amendment, and citizenship. Aynes points out that in spite of the fact that three of
Slaughterhouse’s “significant” legal conclusions have been rejected and “‘everyone’ agrees the Court
incorrectly interpreted the Privileges or Immunities Clause, the conclusion that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment had no meaningful place in our constitutional
scheme continues to live on.”45
The dispute at issue in Slaughterhouse arose in Louisiana in 1869. When New Orleans was
first settled in 1718 on the banks of the Mississippi, its geographic location presented many
advantages for trade and commerce. Thomas Jefferson predicted that New Orleans “will forever be…
the might mart of the merchandise brought from more than a thousand rivers….With Boston,
Baltimore, New York, and Philadelphia on the left, Mexico on the right, Havana in front, and the
immense valley of the Mississippi in the rear, no such position for the accumulation and perpetuity of
wealth and power ever existed.”46 Indeed, by 1840 the city had become a massive trading center, the
hub of commerce between Latin American, Europe, and goods traveling up and down the Mississippi
River. However, the location also presented numerous disadvantages— notably, its climate and
topography. New Orleans sits squarely in a vast swamp and marshland. In the nineteenth century, the
average temperature was 54.4 degrees Fahrenheit in the winter, and 79.3 in the summer; average
annual rainfall was over fifty inches, and the highest point in the city was just fifteen feet above sea
level. The levees built to keep the river out of the city sometimes broke, inundating the city with
water. Labbé and Lurie explain that throughout the nineteenth century, there were complaints about
“pools of stagnant water standing in low-lying areas, in vacant lots, and under houses.”47 In this
environment, drainage was a serious concern. Underground drainage did not exist, so the city
depended largely on “irregularly graded ditches and canals to carry water away from inhabited
areas.” 48 Mosquito-infested swamps dotted the city and surrounding area. Exacerbated by the damp,
45
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humid conditions were the unfortunate practices of waste disposal. It was common practice to
“dispose of refuse by throwing it into one of the swamps or by dumping it onto a vacant lot.” 49
Indeed, during the nineteenth century, inhabitants of New Orleans used the ground between the river
and levee as a dumping ground for human waste, garbage, and dead animals. City-contracted waste
collectors were unsupervised, so several days might pass before garbage and offals from local
slaughterhouses were removed from the streets.50 The physical conditions of New Orleans, the waste
disposal practices of its inhabitants, and the “stubborn refusal” by city officials to address these
problems are important elements to the background of the Slaughterhouse Cases.
The dispute at issue reveals some of the “political tensions” surrounding the rapid economic
development of nineteenth-century America. 51 Along with the booming industry and manufacturing
during this period, the meat-packing industry was developing a “modern corporate structure.”52
Complementing this centralization of control was an invigorated health and sanitation effort. In New
Orleans, this was driven at least in part by its “very active” medical community.53 Between 1796 and
1869, New Orleans was engulfed by thirty-six separate waves of yellow fever.54 Doctors believed
(incorrectly) that the disease was caused by breathing gases, referred to as “miasma,” exuded by
decaying animal and vegetable matter. 55 Scientific errors aside, Labbé and Lurie argue that this
theory had the effect of “focusing attention on the relationship between good health and
environmental cleanliness.”56 Medical professionals called for more stringent sanitary practices in the
city to alleviate yellow fever.
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Plagued by deplorable sanitary practices and an ever-growing population, the city of New
Orleans “found itself plagued with all the nuisances that accompany the business of providing meat
to the markets of a growing metropolis through a system of private slaughterhouses.”57 Animals were
herded through the streets, and slaughtering sometimes took place in the open within sight of the
public. With an eye towards addressing the deplorable conditions of the city, the Louisiana state
legislature passed the Slaughterhouse Act in 1869. Formally titled “An Act to Protect the Health and
City of New Orleans, and to Locate the Stock Landings and Slaughter Houses,” the act incorporated
seventeenth individuals into the Crescent City Live Stock Landing and Slaughter House Company,
then granted this company an exclusive right to maintain a single central slaughterhouse facility
outside of the city to the south. This company would have the “sole and exclusive privilege” of
“conducting the business of landing, keeping, or slaughtering animals for in the contiguous parishes
of Orleans, Jefferson, and St. Bernard” for twenty-five years.58 Importantly, however, all butchers,
whether part of the corporation or not, would be allowed to use the facility.
The Act, however, posed a “direct threat to the interests of a large and coherent group of
tradesmen who knew how to complain.”59 After exhausting the state court system, the butchers who
were not part of the corporation challenged the state’s action in federal court. The cases were heard
by Justice Joseph Bradley and Judge William Woods on the Circuit in 1870. Bradley issued two
opinions, siding with the butchers who challenged the statute. The corporation appealed and brought
the case before the Supreme Court. It was argued first on January 11, 1872. Because Justice Nelson
was not present, the case was reargued on February 3, 4, and 5, 1873.60 The corporation was
represented by Republican Senator Matthew Carpenter, former Pennsylvania Supreme Court Chief
Justice Jeremiah S. Black, and Louisiana radical Republican politician Thomas Jefferson Durant.61
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The butchers were represented by former U.S. Supreme Court Justice (and Confederate Assistant
Secretary or War) John A. Campbell, and J.Q.A. Fellows, a lawyer from Louisiana.62
Campbell, a staunch supporter of state’s rights and former member of the Confederacy,
argued that a group of white butchers should be protected from state infringement by a
Reconstruction Amendment— showcasing how political ideas can be reassociated for antithetical
ends.63 Deep irony notwithstanding, Campbell presented arguments based on common law and the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. Labbé and Lurie draw attention to Campbell’s apparent dual
agenda. Indeed, his first goal was to represent his clients, the butchers, in court. But he was also on a
larger crusade. He wanted to “employ the Constitution’s new Reconstruction amendment as legal
weapons to bring about Reconstruction’s ultimate demise.”64 In fact, Slaughterhouse was only one of
several cases in which Campbell represented clients resisting Reconstruction measures. His efforts
contributed “significantly to the eventual failure of Reconstruction.”65 Accordingly, his arguments
must be understood with reference to his dual purposes.
In his submitted briefs and oral argument before the Supreme Court, Campbell traced the
history of monopolies in French and English common law, and argued the slaughterhouse produced a
monopoly that if not “void at common law, could be so under both the thirteenth and fourteenth
amendments.”66 Likening the slaughterhouse situation to slavery, he also suggested that the
monopoly created a “servitude” prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment.67 To demonstrate this, he
had to suggest that “involuntary servitude” covered much more than black chattel slavery.
Specifically, he suggested it could be applied to protect the rights of southern white butchers. Again
highlighting the irony of an ex-Confederate’s position on Reconstruction, Campbell suggested that
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the Louisiana state act is “even more plainly in the face of the fourteenth amendment” because it is a
“more comprehensive exposition of the principles of the Thirteenth [amendment].”68 He argued that
the Reconstruction Amendments “forever destroyed” the traditional states-rights doctrine by granting
more power to the federal government. To be a freeman in the United States under the new
Reconstruction Amendments, Campbell suggested, meant protection of one’s privileges and
immunities under the Constitution. The privileges and immunities he had in mind were an immunity
from compulsory work, imposed occupation, employment, or trade, the lawful pursuit of skills or
materials necessary for trade, and the full enjoyment of the fruits of one’s labor.69
In other words, Campbell had to liken the situation of the white butchers to black slaves. As
Labbé and Lurie point out, he realized that this comparison “might be somewhat extravagant.” 70
Nevertheless, he insisted that the butchers had been prohibited from “doing their usual or customary
work, except upon the property and for the compensation and profit of” those who ran the
slaughterhouse.71 The slaughterhouse had barred the butchers from pursuing their chosen occupation
and trade in the manner they liked and so, therefore, Campbell argued, the law forced upon the
butchers a form of involuntary servitude prohibited by the Reconstruction Amendments. A former
slaveowner himself, Campbell suggested that the basic motive behind the Amendments had been that
“man has a right to labor for himself, and not at the will, or under the constraint of another.”72 He
admitted that the Reconstruction Amendments altered the federal balance of power: “the sovereignty
of the State government is reduced… to a very limited extend.” 73 He continued: “life, liberty,
property, privilege, immunity, civil, political and public rights have been placed upon a foundation
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that the [state legislatures] cannot subvert or destroy.”74 Campbell saw the Fourteenth Amendment as
having altered the federal balance of power to ensure that liberty be safeguarded. The purpose of the
Amendment was to “establish through the whole jurisdiction of the United States one people.”75 At
least to an extent, Campbell was embracing the Republican theory of national citizenship.
Arguing on behalf of the company established by the Louisiana legislature to run the
slaughterhouse, Thomas Durant relied heavily on precedent to furnish an argument that highlighted
state power, namely the state police power. He cited Prigg v. Pennsylvania76 to assert that “the police
power of the State extends overall subjects within the territorial limits of the State, and has never
been conceded” to the federal government.77 Durant also called upon Chief Justice John Marhsall’s
opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden78 to highlight the validity of state police power, something that “has
never been denied,” as they are “considered as flowing from the acknowledgment power of a State to
protect its citizens.” 79 He placed the statute squarely within a state’s power to protect the health and
well being of its inhabitants. With regard to the Fourteenth Amendment, Durant and his co-counsel
suggested that by “all persons born or naturalized in the United States,” the Amendment means “only
the people of African descent, because all other people were already citizens of the United States.”80
Durant’s argument called upon an expansive definition of state power, and seemed to argue for a
reaffirmation of state citizenship over national citizenship.
The arguments on behalf of the parties presented the Court with an odd scenario that seemed
to have turned the Reconstruction Amendments on their heads. Admittedly, the Reconstruction
Amendments were ratified in response to the Civil War and targeted most directly at slaves and exslaves. It is worth reiterating, however, that their framers intended them to establish a national
74
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citizenship generally. As discussed in Chapter 2, Republicans strove to prioritize national citizenship
by giving the federal government the power to enforce civil and social rights violations. Republicans
saw states’ rights and the prioritization of state citizenship as the cause of the Civil War, so they
sought to override it. But here, the parties in Slaughterhouse had rejiggered the framework for ends
not quite antithetical, but partially so.81 Understanding the decision in this way may help shed light
on the narrowness of the decision— a 5 to 4 breakdown.
Ultimately, the Court rejected all of the petitioner’s (Campbell and the butchers) arguments.
Justice Samuel Miller, an abolitionist appointed by Abraham Lincoln in 1862, delivered the opinion
for the Court on April 14, 1873. Kaczorowksi notes the opinion was a “curious and contradictory
mixture” of “nationalist Republican assumption about Reconstruction and the need for national
protection of civil rights that led to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment” combined with a
“narrow conclusion that reflected the ideas of states’ rights Democratic Conservatives concerning the
scope of authority” the Fourteenth Amendment conferred upon the national government to protect
civil rights and national citizenship.82 After a summary of the statute, Miller addressed Campbell’s
argument. He took note that the act was argued to have created a monopoly, and conferred “odious
and exclusive privileges upon a small number of persons at the expense of the great body of the
community.” 83 He reminded readers that the act was denounced for depriving “a large and
meritorious class of citizens -- the whole of the butchers of the city -- of the right to exercise their
trade.”84 But Miller subsequently dismissed Campbell’s argument with one terse sentence: “But a
critical examination of the act hardly justifies these assertions.” 85
Importantly, Miller pointed out, the act indeed determined where livestock were to be
slaughtered, but it did not prevent anyone from practicing the trade of a butcher. The act only defined
the location for slaughtering and forbade slaughtering elsewhere. He found it “difficult to see a
81
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justification for the assertion that the butchers are deprived of the right to labor in their occupation.”86
Next, Miller turned to the power under which he believed the act to be a valid exercise— the police
power. This power, he wrote, “must be from its very nature, incapable of any very exact definition or
limitation,” and indeed the slaughterhouse issue in this case, and the issues of health and hygiene it
seeks to remedy are “among the most necessary and frequent exercises of this power.” 87 Labbé and
Lurie point out that Miller could have ended his opinion here. He had made the case that
Slaughterhouse Act was a valid, even routine, exercise of Louisiana’s police power. Remaining,
however, was the question of whether the Act violated provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To consider this question, Miller began with a quick reminder about the history of the
Amendments. Even the “most cursory glance” at the three Reconstruction Amendments, Miller
wrote, “discloses a unity of purpose, when taken in connection with the history of the times, which
cannot fail to have an important bearing on any question of doubt concerning their true meaning.”88
Miller explained that “fortunately” that history is “fresh within the memory of us all.”89 He
concluded that when considering the history behind these Amendments “no one can fail to be
impressed with the one pervading purpose found in them all.”90 That purpose was for Miller “the
freedom of the slave race, the security and the firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection
of the newly-made freeman and citizens.”91 Legal scholar Richard Aynes points out that in his
opinion, Justice Miller nonetheless “begrudgingly acknowledged” that African Americans were not
the only ones protected by this amendment.92 When discussing the citizenship clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Miller argued that it was designed to define citizenship and agreed that it
was targeted to overrule Dred Scott v. Sanford. The clause
86
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declares that persons may be citizens of the United States without regard to their citizenship
of a particular State, and it overturns the Dred Scott decision by making all persons born
within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens of the United States. That its
main purpose was to establish the citizenship of the negro can admit of no doubt. The phrase,
"subject to its jurisdiction" was intended to exclude from its operation children of ministers,
consuls, and citizens or subjects of foreign States born within the United States. 93
That the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make all persons subject to the jurisdiction of the
national government citizens of the United States is undisputed. But a second observation about the
citizenship clause is “more important in view of the arguments of counsel in the present case.”94
This observation involves the crucial distinction between state and national citizenship that
the Republicans desperately sought to employ. Miller argued that the distinction between these two
types of citizenship is “clearly recognized and established.”95 At issue, though, was which the
Fourteenth Amendment protected. Did it protect the set of “privileges and immunities” of all citizens
of the United States (including citizens of each state), meaning the rights that all citizens had under
the Bill of Rights, or did it protect just the “privileges and immunities” that were granted by the
original Constitution as citizens of the United States, as distinct from citizens of each state? Indeed,
as the investigation into the drafting and ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment make abundantly
clear, Republicans intended the Fourteenth Amendment to extend the Bill of Rights to each and every
citizen of every state and reaffirm national citizenship over state citizenship. But this very same issue
was now before the Supreme Court. What did the citizenship clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
mean? To answer this question, Miller relied on Corfield v. Coryell,96 a case from 1823. Corfield
defined the “privileges and immunities” that were granted to citizens of the United States as distinct
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from citizens of the states. These privileges were excruciatingly narrow.97 Indeed, Corfield was
explicitly addressed by the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment as something they hoped to
address with the Amendment. Nevertheless, Justice Miller decided that the Fourteenth Amendment
guaranteed only these rights, and did not protect the broader rights from the Bill of Rights from state
infringement. The second clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller argued, “protects from the
hostile legislation of the States the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, as
distinguished from the privileges and immunities of citizens of the States”98 To use the words of
Richard Aynes, Miller suggested here that only a limited number of rights were protected by section
1, “each of which was already protected by the federal government and enforced against the state by
the Supremacy Clause.”99 As such, because the rights claimed by the butchers in this case were rights
protected by the states, were they to be privileges and immunities under Section 1 of the Fourteenth
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Amendment, Miller reasoned, would “radically” change the “whole theory of the relations of the
State and Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people.” 100
Miller inferred that the Fourteenth Amendment was, therefore, made to enforce “any law
which shall abridge the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States.”101 In other words,
Miller arrived at the conclusion that the Amendment was intended only to protect privileges and
immunities possessed by a person in their capacity as a national citizen, and did not alter the statenational citizenship dynamic from before the Civil War. And because these privileges and immunities
are narrow, the Louisiana state law did not violate any rights belonging to the butchers. Whatever the,
albeit narrow, privileges and immunities of U.S. citizens may be, the rights claimed by the butchers
to have been violated by the Louisiana state legislature were not among them.102 Next, Miller briefly
addressed due process claim under the Fifth Amendment. His decision found no restraint that
Louisiana placed on the trade of the butchers to amount to a deprivation of property that would
trigger a due process violation. Finally and to an argument under the Equal Protection Clause. But
here, Aynes notes, unlike his treatment of the Reconstruction Amendments as a whole, Miller
“suggested an extreme racial limitation:”103
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way of discrimination
against the negroes as a class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come within
the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency that
a strong case would be necessary for its application to any other.104
As such, Miller found no valid claim before the Court.
Justice Miller’s decision in Slaughterhouse gutted the privileges or immunities clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Political scientist Howard Gillman suggests that Miller was hesitant to
exploit the Court’s newly expanded jurisdiction. He seemed not to want to “impose a federal trump
on activities that had previously [prior to the Civil War and Reconstruction] been the exclusive
100
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domain of local government.”105 Miller proposed a rather ironic question: “was [the Amendment]
intended to bring with the power of Congress the entire domain of civil rights heretofore belonging
exclusively to the States?…All this and more must follow, if the proposition of the plaintiffs
[Campbell and the butchers]…be sound.”106 Indeed, Miller posed this question as if the answer were
a vehement and undeniable “no.” Unfortunately, however, extending federal oversight of the civil
rights to ensure their protection against state infringement was, in fact, precisely one of the
motivating purposes behind the Amendment itself. As Foner points out, the conclusions drawn by
Justice Miller about the the distinction between the privileges and immunities of state versus national
citizens “should have been seriously doubted by anyone who read the Congressional debates of the
1860s.”107
The impact of the Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse has been well documented. Foner notes
that Justice Miller proceeded to “interpret [the Fourteenth Amendment] in so narrow a manner that
his decision evoked cries of protest from many who had drafted and voted on it.”108 The case “quite
controversially rejected the idea” that the Reconstruction Amendments had been intended to “change
significantly the federal system or to elevate national citizenship above that of the states…”109
Indeed, as Kaczorowski reminds us, the Republican framers understood the Reconstruction
Amendments as “constitutionally revolutionary” because they delegated to Congress the authority to
oversee the rights of citizenship— a “radical” change to the respective roles of the state and national
governments.110 Instead, the decision turned the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
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Amendment into a “dead letter.”111 Despite voluminous evidence to the contrary, the Court concluded
that “Congress intended to retain primary citizenship in the states.”112 By “emasculat[ing] the
fourteenth amendment’s citizenship and privileges and immunities clauses,” the Court “diminished
the amendment’s scope,” “destroyed the national government’s authority to secure directly citizens’
fundamental rights,” and generally rejected and repudiated the “Republican theory of citizenship and
privileges and immunities of United States citizenship.”113
Slaughterhouse marks a definitive moment in the development of American politics. Pamela
Brandwein shows how the Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse used arguments common among
Northern Democrats during Reconstruction and successfully managed to embed those arguments in
the dominant narrative for decades to come. Brandwein suggests that in presenting the distinction
between state and national citizenship as “long resolved— hence, beyond the scope of legitimate
contention— [Justice Miller] refused to acknowledge that dispute over the structure of federalism
went beyond the question of federal authority over formal slave law.” 114 Justice Miller refused to
acknowledge that question regarding the proper bounds of state and federal authority over personal
rights “also characterized slavery politics and were implicated in the Civil War.”115 Brandwein
devotes much of her book to demonstrating that the Democrats’ theories of state versus national
power and sovereignty were “racialized.” In fact, the primary dissent in Slaughterhouse, written by
Justice Field, reflected quite closely the Republican views of federalism, the Civil War, slavery, and
the Fourteenth’s Amendment’s endorsement of national citizenship. Field’s dissent even “emphasized
free-labor principles” that grounded the Republican ideology. 116 In other words, it is striking how
closely the majority opinion in Slaughterhouse reflected the Democratic preference for the
prioritization of state citizenship, while the dissent reflected what had been (barely) the dominant
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idea during Reconstruction, the prioritization of national citizenship. Indeed, Brandwein points out
that Justice Bradley, who also joined Field’s dissent, filed a separate dissent that “sounded very much
like” John Bingham, the primary drafter of the Fourteenth Amendment and its national citizenship
presumption.117 But when the Supreme Court endorsed the Democratic theory of state power and
slave history in its decision, it also “implicitly institutionalized their race theory.”118 This move struck
the decisive blow to the slowly-crumbling Republican vision.
Until Slaughterhouse, congressional Republicans had narrowly, though successfully, quashed
every attack on their dominance. The Court’s move here, though, proved too much. Brandwein shows
how Slaughterhouse had lasting implications for future questions of democracy, federalism, and
citizenship. Justice Miller’s act of rejecting Republican national citizenship and picking back up the
Democratic theory of citizenship “worked to limit future judicial approaches to the problems of
democracy in particular ways.”119 These ways included submerging “several dimensions of
Republican slavery critiques,” and “draining institutional memory” of traces that could have been
employment by future movements to “support federal protections of individual rights where states
had a history of abuses.”120 Not only did the Court reject the Republican definition of citizenship, but
its actions had implications for the future of the Republican project— it rendered its return
particularly difficult by closing off opportunities for political entrepreneurs to bring back national
citizenship. Indeed, in 1900, when the Supreme Court “looked backward to the ‘known conditions of
affairs’ that produced the Fourteenth Amendment… Miller’s history was definitive.”121 Over time,
Miller’s version of the war’s issues, the proper roles of state and federal power, and “his critique of
‘the problem’ with slavery took on an objective quality.”122 In fact, to this day Slaughterhouse’s
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges or immunities clause is still on the books. Despite
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it now being widely agreed to have exhibited a fundamental misreading of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Slaughterhouse has not been overruled. In the 2010 case of McDonald v. City of
Chicago123 Justice Samuel Alito declined to defend Slaughterhouse, but noted that many legal
scholars consider the case to have been wrongly decided. Thus, as Foner writes, the “cramped
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment survives.”124 Slaughterhouse was a critical “turning point in
Reconstruction.” 125 With the Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse, then, all hope for Reconstruction
was lost.

Re-Entrenching the Antebellum Vision: Cruikshank and The Civil Rights Cases
After Slaughterhouse, the Republican-led shift in governing authority was over, and the
primacy of national citizenship was being quickly eroded by Democratic ideas of federalism and a
preference for state citizenship. Actions the Republicans had taken to reconstruct the country at the
close of the Civil War and to embed the project of union and national citizenship were being
overturned, amended, and rejected. The Supreme Court continued to be the prime pathway for these
ideas of state citizenship over national citizenship to return to dominance. After Slaughterhouse,
Brandwein writes, the Supreme Court justices were working in a legal field that was characterized by
three things: (1) “Court precedent that presented the content of national citizenship as essentially
unchanged by the Civil War;” (2) “declining Republican strength;” and (3) minimal sanction for
being inclined the weigh state jurisdiction more heavily than the democratic participation of black
citizens.”126 Also notable was the “traditional fear of central [federal] power and its associated
conceptualization of central power as the ‘danger’ to democracy.”127 Of course, as political scientist
Megan Ming Francis points out, winning one Supreme Court case “does not amount to a new durable
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change in the national governing establishment.”128 It can, however, mark the end of one by creating
an additional discursive shift that paves the way for the a new governing authority. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Slaughterhouse acted as a judicial precedent for decisions that “later halted efforts
by the Grant administration to protect civil rights when it revived its policy of vigorous civil rights
enforcement to combat the renewal of Southern terrorism in 1874.”129 In a way, then, Slaughterhouse
not only ended one shift, but it began another— one a product of the context (the “legal field”) that
Slaughterhouse allowed. Because of Slaughterhouse, then, the brief era of the primacy of national
citizenship was over, and later attempts to bring it back, like the Grant administration’s actions in
1874, would not be tolerated. The elements the Court endorsed in its decisions after Slaughterhouse
in 1873 “were packaged in a ‘totality of remembrances, traditions and familiar ideas’ that borrowed
heavily from Northern Democratic slavery criticism.”130 Specifically, two more cases in the ensuing
decade did substantial damage to what remained of Republican attempts to entrench their vision.
These cases, United States v. Cruikshank (1875)131 and The Civil Rights Cases (1883),132 both reflect
the change in ideational dominance that Slaughterhouse instigated.

United States v. Cruikshank (1875)
Two years after Slaughterhouse, the Supreme Court heard another case that dealt specifically
with Reconstruction, the Republican project, and national citizenship. United States v. Cruikshank
arose out of the bloodiest incident of Reconstruction. The incident, the Colfax Massacre, involved a
“level of violence tantamount to a localized civil war.”133 It was a product of the confusion that
followed the bizarre Louisiana gubernatorial election of 1872. The election results were widely
disputed. Both Conservatives, led by incumbent governor Henry C. Warmouth, and Republicans, led
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by challenger William P. Kellogg, claimed victory in the election. For a brief time, Louisiana
experienced the “political anomaly of having two governors and two legislatures claiming and
exercising governmental authority.”134 Both governors appointed candidates to fill the positions of
judge and sheriff of Grant perish. Both pair simultaneously claimed to be the legitimate officeholders
and attempted to occupy the parish courthouse. The Republican-appointed candidates succeeded at
occupying the courthouse, and reinforced it with armed supporters. But on Easter morning, April 13,
1873, a “‘veritable army’ of ‘old time Ku Klux Klan’” led by the Conservative candidates stormed
the courthouse after a three-week siege. 135 Federal investigators sent from New Orleans reported that
Conservative white forces slaughtered several whites and almost three hundred black freemen,
including dozens that had already surrendered. 136
The Justice Department’s reaction to the massacre, Kaczorowski notes, “reflected the
administration’s ambivalence towards civil rights enforcement.”137 After realizing the manpower
required to round up and charge between 300 and 400 defendants, the attorney general balked. The
attorney general was evidently “less interested in vindicating federal law and the dead victims of
criminal violence by bringing offenders to justice than in merely discouraging future crimes.” 138
Eventually, just 97 defendants were brought up on federal charges. Each defendants was accused of
32 violations of sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870. 139 The first 16 counts charged that
the white defendants had conspired to deprive a pair of black victims, “being citizens of the United
States ‘of African descent, and persons of color,’” of various rights protected by the Constitution of
the United States, including many rights secured by the Bill of Rights.140 These rights included the
right of assembly, the right to keep and bear arms, the right to protection against deprivation of life,
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liberty, and property without due process of law, the right to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property, and the right to vote.141 The two-month long
trial resulted in only three convictions.
On appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the convictions of the men accused of slaughtering
freedmen in the Colfax County courthouse on the grounds that sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement
Act of 1870, which prohibited two or more people from conspiring to deprive someone of their
constitutional rights, could not be justified under Congress’s powers. The Court affirmed and upheld
Justice Bradley’s stance on the case, which he expounded upon in his circuit opinion. Bradley
believed that sections 6 and 7 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 could not stand if they were read to
reach private violations of rights in the Constitution. The Court argued that the Reconstruction
Amendments “only empowered the federal government to prohibit violations of black rights by
states.”142 The responsibility to punish individuals for rights violations rested where it always had—
with local and state authorities. Somewhat ironically, the decision did uphold the federal
government’s ability to protect the rights of national citizenship, but these had been defined so
narrowly in Slaughterhouse that this reaffirmation was virtually meaningless. By holding that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not apply to the states, the Court’s opinion amounted to a “repudiation of
original intent rather than an attempt to apply it.”143 The decision “rendered national prosecution of
crimes committed against blacks virtually impossible, and gave a green light on acts of terror where
local officials either could not or would not enforce the law.”144 The Supreme Court decided this all
in the name of federalism and the prioritization of state citizenship.
Cruikshank operated in the wake of Slaughterhouse, and as a similar repudiation of the
Republican project. Chief Justice Morrison Waite, writing the majority opinion in Cruikshank,
merely “repeated [Justice] Miller’s history” of the Reconstruction Amendments. 145 The decision was
141

Kaczorowski (2005), 143-144.

142

Foner (1988), 531.

143

Richard Aynes. “On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment.” Yale Law Journal 103, no. 1,
(1993): 99.
144

Ibid.

145

Brandwein (1999), 79.

Chapter 4

!139

“widely publicized as a decisive blow to national civil rights enforcement authority.”146 Indeed,
because of the decision, Democratic Conservatives who were hostile to the Republican vision
“became increasingly confident that the permanent elimination of Enforcement Acts prosecutions
was at hand.”147 The broader importance of Cruikshank for Reconstruction must be stressed. In it,
like in Slaughterhouse, the Court was presented with questions concerning the power to enforce civil
and political rights. The resolution of those questions, Kaczorowski writes, would “define anew the
constitutional structure of the American federal union by determining the primacy of national or state
authority over the fundamental rights of Americans.”148 By doing so, the Court would be
“sanctioning or rejecting congressional Reconstruction.”149 Cruikshank simply continued the
Supreme Court-driven “erosion of Reconstruction.”150

The Civil Rights Cases (1883)
Nearly a decade after Slaughterhouse, the Court had not let up. Bolstered by its previous
decisions and mounting popular support for state citizenship and the ascriptive hierarchy it produced,
the Court continued to reject Republican Reconstruction actions that had attempted to embed the
primacy of national citizenship. The period bookended by 1876 and 1898 Rogers Smith dubs “The
Gilded Age of Ascriptive Americanism.”151 This was a result of the failure of Reconstruction, caused
at least in part by Supreme Court action. But in 1883, the Supreme Court decided a case that sealed
the fate of Reconstruction. It overturned the final, last-ditch attempt by the Republicans to embed
national citizenship: the Civil Rights Act of 1875.
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This case, The Civil Rights Cases of 1883, was a consolidation of five similar cases that were
decided together as one issue.152 The cases concerned denials of services to blacks seeking entry to
an inn, a hotel, better seats in a theater, and use of transit service. Justice Bradley’s principal
argument was much like Miller’s in Slaughterhouse. It touched on the issue of state versus national
citizenship, and again rejected the federal government’s ability to enforce civil rights and protect a
broad definition of national citizenship. The cases triggered the Civil Rights Act of 1875 and
congressional power to pass the act under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The act provided
that “‘all persons…regardless of any previous condition of servitude’ were to be provided access to
all public accommodations, including inns, railroads, theaters, ‘and other places of public
amusement.”153 The Court denied that Congress had the power to pass the act.
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make it apply to every act of
discrimination which a person may see fit to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to
the people he will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or theatre, or deal
with in other matters of intercourse or business….When a man has emerged from slavery,
and, by the aid of beneficent legislation, has shaken off the inseparable concomitants of that
state, there must be some stage in the progress of his elevation when he takes the rank of a
mere citizen and ceases to be the special favorite of the laws, and when his rights as a citizen
or a man are to be protected in the ordinary modes by which other men's rights are
protected. 154
Indeed, businesses had denied services to blacks, but Bradley argued that if Congress could regulate
their conduct, it would amount to “tak[ing] the place of state legislatures” and “supersed[ing]
them.”155 And, Bradley wrote, it would be “absurd to affirm that.”156
Brandwein shows how The Civil Rights Cases were similarly influenced by Justice Miller’s
version of slavery history espoused in Slaughterhouse. Republicans had suggested that mobility, like
access to hotels and transit services, were civil rights that ought to be protected by the federal
government. But the Court disagreed. It identified mobility as a social right, and not one that the
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federal government could have any hand in regulating. The denial to blacks of access to theaters,
inns, and public transportation was not “incident” to slavery. Smith points out that though the
argument staunchly endorse states’ rights, Bradley’s opinion was laced with racism. Bradley
“brusquely” dismissed claims that economic discriminations were “badges or incidents” of slavery in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment.157 Indeed, Justice Bradley “expressly denied that race-based
denial of access to public accommodations was a brand of slavery.” 158 Brandwein points out that
Bradley’s views on the Fourteenth Amendment, Reconstruction, and slavery were “more Northern
Democratic than Republican.” 159 This set of cases, then, overturned one of the last vestiges of the
Republican project to ensure the federal government had to ability to enforce national, egalitarian
citizenship. This case not only entrenched the prioritization of state citizenship more deeply, but it
opened the door for a new element of citizenship. Smith notes that Justice Bradley’s opinion “might
be read as a triumph of pro-business economic ideology, as owners were allowed to discriminate if
they so chose, subject at most to state constraints.”160 The turn to a definition of citizenship
dominated by economic freedom would be at the heart of dominant citizenship doctrine for decades
to come. 161

Conclusion
The Republican vision for “free soil, free labor, free men,” union, and a national, egalitarian
citizenship was finally dismantled by the Supreme Court. Until 1873, Republicans successfully
fended off attacks— from the states, the President, and the people themselves— but the attack from
the Supreme Court proved too much. Despite Republican action to limit the contrarian capability of
the federal judiciary, by first rejiggering circuit courts, and partially stripping the Supreme Court of
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jurisdiction, frictional gaps remained. For Republicans, Reconstruction was a story of defense and
evasive action. From the very beginning, Republicans found themselves in a vulnerable position.
They attempted to harness the federal judiciary for political purposes, and bring it to their defense.
They hoped the judiciary would help bolster their vision. It did for a time. The lower federal judiciary
interpreted Reconstruction Amendments and legislation expansively, giving the federal government
power and leeway to enforce national citizenship and protect its infringement from both state and
private infringement. But in 1873, a case presented itself to the Court that ultimately lead to the end
of the Republican project, and Reconstruction itself.
It is less clear why and how the Court picked up the non-dominant ideas and put them on the
path to dominance. However, the makeup of the Court and the voting breakdown of their decisions
reflects the slowly eroding dominance of national citizenship. Slaughterhouse, for instance, was a 5-4
decision— the idea to put state citizenship back on a path to dominance just barely won. But by
1883, this notion of state citizenship was endorsed in The Civil Rights Cases162 by an 8-1 margin,
reflecting the further entrenchment of ideas of state-based ascriptive citizenship ideas. Importantly,
however, the Supreme Court did not “switch” from supporting the Republican project to suddenly
denouncing it in Slaughterhouse. No sudden jurisprudential shift emblematic of Justice Owen
Roberts’s in the post-New Deal decision of West Coast Hotel v. Parish163 in 1937 that gave rise to the
term “the switch in time that saved nine” occurred. Rather, true to form, the Republicans acted during
Reconstruction to limit the Court’s power in order to prevent it from doing something like
Slaughterhouse. Republicans were painfully aware of the federal judiciary’s capacity, but the
Supreme Court’s specifically, to challenge or even destroy their project, so they took offensive action
to prevent it from being exercised. Specifically, congressional Republicans limited the Court’s
jurisdiction and consolidated federal circuits in an effort to control the judiciary and limit its capacity
to exploit the frictional gap by bringing non-dominant citizenship ideas once again to the fore. These
are not the actions of a hegemonic congressional delegation— they are the actions of a regime
operating from a point of weakness.
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This chapter has highlighted at least three concepts that are reflected in the broader story of
development in American politics. The first is what Skowronek terms the “reconstruction of
meaning.” 164 Skowronek postulates that the dominant strands in American political thought, such as
Rogers Smith’s multiple traditions, are not mutually exclusive. Rather, they interact with each other
by exchanging ideas and purposes can be mutually constitutive. This interaction can be “a creative
act of first-order significance, one that, for better or worse, alters the meaning of both [traditions].”165
A political tradition, Skowronek, suggests, may be said to “bear on the development of the polity”
when the “promulgation of alternatives is at once informed by received ideas and productive of
purposes absent in prior formulations, and both effects should be manifest in the distinctive qualities
on the composites arrived at.” 166 The interaction between political traditions can result in “elements
of what were contrary ideals can be insinuate into the newly formulated synthesis.”167 The argument
by the butchers took full advantage of the opportunity to reassociate political ideas to ends
antithetical to their original purpose. The attorney for the butchers, Campbell, was an ex-confederate
official who was hostile to the Republican vision. Nevertheless, once the Reconstruction
Amendments were instituted, he attempted to harness their language to his own purposes.
The next concept is that of “critical junctures.” A critical juncture in political development is
an event that limits the options for future events. In a way, a critical juncture sets the scene for pathdependency. The decision in Slaughterhouse was just such a moment. Up until the decision, the
Republicans successfully had fended off all attacks from ideational dissenters. Slaughterhouse,
however, offered a moment for radical change. In her account of the development of the NAACP’s
litigation strategy during the first half of the twentieth century, Megan Ming Francis argues that the
Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education in 1954 168 cannot properly be understood
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without reference to Moore v. Dempsey in 1923.169 This is because Moore established a “politicallegal context” that represented an opportunity to “redirect both U.S. constitutional development and
the future of civil rights struggles.” 170 Prior to the 1920s and Moore, the federal government had “no
role in state or criminal trials.”171 But Moore made clear that “states could not always be trusted to
properly deal with matters of criminal procedure and that…the federal government could
intervene.”172 Moore was, then, a critical juncture. This chapter has argued that Slaughterhouse
operated in a similar manner. By establishing a new “political-legal context” more favorable to
antebellum ideas of citizenship, Slaughterhouse set American constitutional and political
development on a new path that enabled the Court’s subsequent decisions in United States v.
Cruiskshank and The Civil Rights Cases of 1883 to come more easily.
Finally, this chapter has highlighted the difficulty of political development in the United
States. It has provided more evidence that the fragmented nature of the American polity makes
“durable shifts” in governing authority difficult to accomplish and, therefore, highly unusual.173
Political scientist Stuart Chinn has argued that key moments of reform or institutional change are
followed by “a recurrent and clearly patterned process of ‘recalibration,’ where recently enacted
reforms are recalibrated in light of the continuing influence of preexisting institutions and rights.”174
Indeed, as demonstrated by the Court’s entrepreneurial actions in Slaughterhouse, the fragmented
nature of the state makes institutional change possible. Crucially, however, the same feature that
makes change possible also limits change. This is not to suggest that reform and development in
American politics does not happen. Rather, the conditions in the aftermath of such moments of
reform “demonstrate the stubborn resilience of older ideas, principles, and institutions that carried
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elements of the old order into the new.”175 The story this chapter has told is one that has closely
reflected this point.
As a result of Slaughterhouse, therefore, Supreme Court cases from 1873 until 1883 “closed
down inquiry among many generations of justice into what it mean to be included in the national
collective. The meaning of national citizenship and the basis of public life were not reopened as
legitimate judicial questions, except in minority opinions.”176 Indeed, the Court’s decisions in the
SlaughterHouse Cases and Cruikshank “reflected the changed political climate and the retreat from
Reconstruction idealism.”177 This point sheds light not only on the end of national citizenship and the
Republican project, but on the end of Reconstruction. This chapter has tried to show that
Reconstruction’s failure was not purely a result of exogenous factors— a new political climate
resulting in a partisan shift in Congress, the economic crash of 1873, or the Compromise of 1877.
These explanations for Reconstruction’s failure overlook the important interaction between
institutional design and political ideas. Ideational contestation over the meaning of citizenship in the
wake of the Civil War happened within the institutional framework. This chapter has suggested that
because of this interplay between ideas and institutions in the fragmented American state,
Reconstruction was doomed from the start.
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Conclusion
Fragmented Citizenship and Political Change

Citizenship as a concept was up for grabs during Reconstruction. The end of the Civil War
offered a unique opportunity to reshape the country. Never before, and not since, has a comparable
carte blanche been presented to policymakers in the United States. The Confederate states had lost
on the battlefield and the North was pushing to remold the country into one that was not as
susceptible to division. One thing was clear: chattel slavery would end. Beyond that, chances for
institutional reforms seemed ripe for picking. Congressional Republicans certainly believed this.
They held a majority in Congress and forced through three constitutional amendment and multiple
transformative pieces of legislation in an effort to not only “reconstruct” the broken country, but
ensure it would not break again. Their remedy called for a continuation of the federal power that had
begun before, but also as a result of, the Civil War.1 Republicans believed one of the primary causes
for the Civil War was that states held too much power over their citizens. When Republicans looked
at the inhabitants of the United States, they saw people who believed themselves to be state citizens
first, and national citizens second. Prioritization of state citizenship was one of the evils that caused
the Civil War to begin with. Flipping this lexical ordering of citizenship from state first, nation
second, to national first, state second offered two benefits for the Republicans. First, doing so would
require enhanced power by the federal government to protect the rights of citizens, which would
result in a more unified citizenry. This would lower the likelihood of another civil war. Second, this
enhanced federal oversight of civil and social rights would ensure slavery would end.
The apparent carte blanche, though, was not quite what it seemed. In fact, it was no carte
blanche at all. From its very inception, the Republican project to fix the problems they believed
caused the Civil War was met with fierce opposition. Embedding their vision for “free soil, free
labor, free men” was much trickier than Republicans anticipated. They wanted to give the federal
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government primary oversight over the rights of citizenship and relegate state citizenship to the
backseat. But, antebellum ideas of citizenship still existed and found ways to push back on the
Republican project. To pass the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, Republicans had to use
some dubious constitutional maneuvers — southern states were not counted at one point in the
ratification process, but were counted at others. And to pass the Fourteenth Amendment, Republicans
in Congress simply turned the Southern states into military districts to limit their influence. But next,
Republicans were challenged by President Johnson, who vehemently opposed the Republican vision
because he also held antebellum ideas of citizenship— the state citizenship should be prioritized over
national citizenship. To reify their project and quash the opposition, Johnson was promptly
impeached by Republicans.
All the while, though, antebellum ideas found other ways to challenge the Republicans. They
found voice outside the dominant institutional framework, in state governments and social
movements. States, where ascriptive, states’ rights definitions of citizenship still held sway, enacted
Black Codes and other laws to limit the citizenship rights of freedmen. Social movements too, a
method where “the people themselves” can easily voice their ideas, found ways to challenge the the
prioritization of national citizenship. The Ku Klux Klan went on a reign of terror in the South,
lynching, disemboweling, or otherwise using means of violent intimidation against freedmen and
Republicans who held different ideas of citizenship. Republicans responded to these threats by
passing a series of Enforcement Acts in 1870 and 1871. These acts further extended federal oversight
over citizenship and successfully quashed opposition for a time.
Despite Republican active manipulation of the federal judiciary to ensure it would be an ally
to their project, the fatal blow to the Republican project of Reconstruction came in 1873 from the
Supreme Court. The Slaughterhouse Cases in 1873 offered the Supreme Court an opportunity to
bring back antebellum ideas of citizenship. Republicans had restructured the federal circuits, and
stripped the Supreme Court of jurisdiction with an eye towards harnessing the judiciary for support.
It was not enough, however: frictional gaps abounded. In Slaughterhouse, the Court rejected the
reading of the Fourteenth Amendment intended by its framers — the reading that understood the
Fourteenth Amendment as upending the antebellum concept of citizenship. Justice Miller’s opinion
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for the majority echoed Southern Democratic critiques of the Republican vision for national
citizenship. The consequence was definitive — Slaughterhouse had dealt a blow to the Republican
vision they could not recover from. Slaughterhouse set the antebellum definition of citizenship on a
path to dominance once again. Accordingly, the Court entrenched the state-over-national citizenship
doctrine further in United States v. Cruikshank in 1875 and The Civil Rights Cases in 1883. As a
result of the Supreme Court’s rejection of the the Republican idea of citizenship, Reconstruction was
doomed.

Citizenship as Recognition and Political Change
This project has both drawn from and reinforced the idea that citizenship is necessarily
constituted by a political context. Without recognition by the state, citizenship, no matter its content,
cannot exist. Citizenship is, then, a category defined and delimited by the state. This is documented
by Margot Canaday, Shane Phelan, Stephen Engel, Nancy Cott, Peggy Pascoe, and others.2 If state
institutions are subject to change over time, then citizenship must be as well. In this project, I have
suggested that there may be a link between institutional change, and a developing concept of
citizenship in the United States. This project has attempted to begin bridging the gap between the
development political ideas and political institutions. This relationship has been significantly underexplored in the literature. As a result, many accounts of institutional change or ideational change
remain incomplete. Political ideas and political institutions interact with one another in mutually
constitutive and developmental ways. One can lead to the reshaping of another.
Understanding citizenship as constituted and defined by the state leads to several further
insights. First, as has been most explicit in this project, it leads to an endogenous explanation for the
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failure of Reconstruction. It also, however, provides several other insights that may lead to further
research. It may point to a more comprehensive account for the roots of Progressivism in the early
twentieth century. This project may present at least a partial understanding of why the Progressives
were so critical of the Constitution. Progressives took up many of the arguments about national
citizenship used by the Radical Republicans during Reconstruction, but the institutional structure
established by the Constitution had allowed their project to be thwarted. Woodrow Wilson, for
example argued that the “problem at the heard to modern American politics…lay in the Framers’
limited vision.” 3 By seeking to extricate America from the control of the British monarchy, the
framers of the Constitution instituted an institutional framework that appeared to harken back to a
political model “drawn from their happier experience of an earlier day.”4 As Britain advanced toward
a “modern state design that concentrated decision making and responsibility in a single representative
body,” America was stuck with a fragmented institutional system. The system the framers instituted,
“forced future accommodations to change in the nation into an increasingly inhospitable frame.” 5
Indeed, Wilson saw the Civil War as at least partially caused by the Constitution’s inability to
“provide for the irresistible growth and concentration of power” in the national legislature.6 As other
developing states centralized, America seemed stuck in limbo, trying to force an evolving economic
and socio-political situation onto an unaccommodating institutional framework.
This project also points towards a fuller understanding of citizenship as a concept in the
United States. Similar to Wilson’s critique, citizenship as a concept appears to be perpetually
unsettled and evolving as a result of the institutional structure. The lack of stable teleological or
whiggish development seems to be, at least in part, explainable by the fragmented state. Each attempt
to push towards some ideal of citizenship is tripped up by institutional hurdles, rather than simple
ideological backlash. Indeed, one of the fundamental premises of APD is that Lockean liberalism is,
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in fact, not the dominant philosophy in American political culture. This project has opened a new
window to understanding why. If, as I have argued, citizenship as a concept is perpetually unsettled
and subject to contestation within and between political institutions that, in turn, shapes its meaning
over time, then citizens themselves may get stuck in the frictional gaps. This result might point
towards an more robust explanation for why, in colloquial terms, “second-class citizen” status
abounds in the United States. Citizenship is delicate. Institutional makeup can help explain why
citizenship can be granted, taken away, altered, expanded, narrowed, reframed, or otherwise changed
for different groups of persons at different times. Normatively, the relative ease with which
citizenship can change as a result of the institutional arrangement is double sided. On the one hand, it
allows for liberalizing projects that attempt to expand citizenship to groups otherwise marginalized,
such as happened during Reconstruction, the Progressive Era, the Civil Rights Movement, perhaps
even during the era during which the Supreme Court was lead by Earl Warren, and most certainly in
Obergefell v. Hodges in 2015. On the other, however, as has been seen, by the same mechanisms, it
limits these projects by allowing illiberal challenges to gain a stronger foothold.
For example, it seems American democracy is not “alive and well,” especially when the
criminal justice system is taken into account. Political scientists Amy Lerman and Vesla Weaver
explain how the rise of the carceral state in the United States has had profound effects on the
democratic citizenship of large classes of people, but especially blacks.7 In a 1994 interview, advisor
to President Nixon John Ehrlichman (one of the Watergate co-conspirators) explained how the “war
on drugs” was highly racialized:
“You want to know what this was really all about?” he asked with the bluntness of a man
who, after public disgrace and a stretch in federal prison, had little left to protect. “The Nixon
campaign in 1968, and the Nixon White House after that, had two enemies: the antiwar left
and black people. You understand what I’m saying? We knew we couldn’t make it illegal to
be either against the war or black, but by getting the public to associate the hippies with
marijuana and blacks with heroin, and then criminalizing both heavily, we could disrupt those
communities. We could arrest their leaders, raid their homes, break up their meetings, and
vilify them night after night on the evening news. Did we know we were lying about the
drugs? Of course we did.”8
7 Amy
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That the “war on drugs” was a political tool used to “racialize” the “crime problem” or “criminalize”
the “race problem” was not doubted, but rhetoric this stark provides a causal link between the two
that had long been suspected.9 It is no surprise, then, that the carceral state that resulted from these
“crime” policies disproportionately affected blacks — that was their purpose. Lerman and Weaver
argue that punishment (through carceral state policies) is an important aspect of the modern
American state “because it transforms the social and economic relationships of its citizens.”10 In
addition, they show that “criminal justice is important because it transforms citizens’ relationships to
the polity.”11 Custodial citizens, who are largely members of racial or ethnic minority groups, exist
somewhere in limbo between “full citizens” (whatever this might mean) and non-citizens through
their blurred relationship with the state. Indeed, their are able to vote and are entitled to formal
equality before the law, but
because of their race, their income, and the characteristics of their neighborhoods in which
they live, these individuals are systematically more likely to be exposed to public institutions
that deny them voice, treat them as suspect, do not respond to their needs, and are
unaccountable to their complaints.12
As a result, their standing as citizens is stunted and limited. The point here is hardly definite or clear.
However, the analysis in this project may provide grounds for further investigation between
institutional design and the rise of carceral state policies that have limited citizenship standing for
large classes of persons. Indeed, the fragmented state and perpetually unsettled definition of
citizenship I have argued for might make policies like the racialized “war on drugs” less immediately
objectionable because their true intent and impact can be hidden under layers of institutional overlap,
deferred responsibility, and confusing rhetoric. In other words, ensuring that policies that violate
some Lockean ideal definition of equal citizenship (by drawing from several traditions of citizenship,
including ascriptive hierarchical notions) may be hard to guard against in the United States because
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of the fragmented institutional design.13 In turn, however, they may also be harder to implement
across the board. But this might be precisely the point — the resulting frictions that occur between
and within state institutions allow policies that affect citizenship to go unnoticed and unchallenged.
Further research in the field of APD is needed to test this hypothesis, however.
Finally, the analysis contained in this project reaffirms a broader story about political
development and political change in the United States. I have suggested that the multiple explanatory
notions provided by the field of American Political Development employed most explicitly in this
project, layering, path dependency, critical junctures, political entrepreneurship, and durable shifts,
all accurately help depict the interaction between political ideas and institutions during
Reconstruction. First, this supports the study of APD as a discipline. Second, however, it also raises
several important insights into the discipline. Namely, there seems to be tension in some of
fundamental ideas undergirding APD scholarship. One of the most insightful claims of APD is that
politics is dynamic: the key element to explain in politics is not equilibrium, but change. Also, APD
suggests that that this change is often (or even mostly) produced by dynamics internal to political
systems rather than exogenous shocks— frictions created by the layering of new institutions or
policies upon old ones; the creation of unintended consequences that political entrepreneurs may
exploit to thereby foster new opportunities for further change. In other words, politics is always
developing. Nevertheless, at the same time, APD posits that there are such definable moments that
can be cast as "developments," or "durable shifts in governing authority." It seems, then, that there
appears to be an internal tension between the definition of development as focused on durability and
the definition of politics as focused on change. In other words, we must ask if the key insight of APD
is that politics is never clearly in equilibrium then how can it be said to be durable?
The analysis contained in this project points towards a possible resolution to this apparent
dilemma. Reconstruction resulted in a (not so) durable shift — we got the Reconstruction
Amendments — but that only succeeds in resetting the ideals. Reconstruction ultimately failed to
reset policies or law, for constitutional text is fungible at best, or ignored at worst. The durable shift
13
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may be a resetting of the ideals, but not a resetting of lived experience. In fact, in terms of lived
experience, Reconstruction ended up with the abandonment of the ideals, something that I have
argued the constitutional structure of governance paradoxically enables. Perhaps the great irony of
the design of American constitutional governance is that it enables the abandonment of the ideals in
the constitutional text. This project has suggested just how much formal institutional changes cannot
be taken as emblematic of durable shifts in governing authority. As Stuart Chinn has argued, political
change cannot simply be “foisted upon the larger matrix of governance and fit seamlessly with
preexisting constraints. Instead, a recalibration usually follows the enactment of major reforms
because of three primary conditions.”14 First, “principles of reform are often articulated in broad,
open-ended, and universalistic terms.” 15 Second, “when major reforms are enacted, preexisting
institutions and individual rights are usually disrupted and rearranged.”16 And third, “reformers
consistently lack either the foresight or the political consensus and willpower to resolve all problems
of recalibration upfront.”17 Politics may produce a durable shift in some element of the fragmented
state, but due to the nature of the fragmented state, that durability does not, or indeed cannot, exist
throughout. The development of politics as a whole does not stop, but it may reach points of
durability in different institutions for brief moments. These points may be referred to as specific
moments of development.
This definition of development, however, does not quite fit with that of Orren and
Skowronek.18 Development seems to be more nuanced. If we use the definition provided by Orren
and Skowronek of development and the achievement of a “durable shift in governing authority,” then
development is not common in the United States.19 This definition does not fit the evidence, as the
American state has of course changed significantly since its founding. And so, the definition of
14

Stuart Chinn. “Institutional Recalibration and Judicial Delimitation.” Law & Social Inquiry 37, no. 3 (2012): 539.

15

Ibid.

16

Ibid.

17

Ibid: 539.

18

Orren & Skowronek (2004).

19

Ibid, 123.

Conclusion

!154

development should be narrowed to account for the momentary periods where development in
particular institutions at a particular time appears “sticky.” “Stickiness” is not to suggest that
development has paused, but rather to account for how it might slow to a crawl in one institution for
a short period, while change proceeds at a normal pace in other zones of the state. These moments are
still worth analyzing, and require a more nuanced lens — one that account for the interplay between
political ideas and institutions.
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